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2. 
Abstract 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
There is an as yet unacknowledged and incomparable contribution to the 
philosophical debates about know-how to be found in the writings of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. It is sourced in his investigations into knowledge and certainty in On 
Certainty, though it is not limited to these late passages. Understanding the 
ramifications of this putative contribution (even if one does not agree with it) 
highlights the extent to which (i) there is now a new range of issues pertaining to 
know-how which no future philosophical consideration of the topic can ignore, except 
on pain of failing to engage comprehensively with the subject; (ii) the topic of know-
how has been inappropriately marginalised by naturalized epistemology, and may 
well be as central to epistemology as the propositional knowledge which currently 
dominates epistemology’s attention; and (iii) any engagement with these potential 
Wittgensteinian contributions will need to be conducted in tandem with a reflection 
on the meta-philosophy of epistemology, since their potential impact extends to 
epistemology’s main methodology, i.e., naturalized reflective equilibrium.  These 
three conclusions, together with a diagnosis of where and why all the current 
intellectualist accounts of know-how are either internally inconsistent, or 
irreconcilably flawed on their own terms, provide the motivation and the opportunity 
for a New Epistemology of Know-How.  
 
These conclusions established, I offer one possible Wittgensteinian-orientated version 
of the New Epistemology of Know-How, providing the first example of a non-
naturalized philosophical approach to the topic since Gilbert Ryle.   
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The Epistemology of Know-how 
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6. 
1 
 
Introduction 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Human beings are knowledgeable.  Our human knowledge is typically taken to divide 
into at least three pre-theoretical categories: propositional knowledge (the knowledge 
that such-and-such is the case), acquaintance knowledge (our knowledge of a person 
or a place) and know-how (the knowledge we have in knowing how to do something).  
Contemporary philosophical consideration of know-how tends to pursue one of two 
major activities. One is to argue that know-how cannot be reduced to, or regarded as, 
either propositional knowledge or acquaintance knowledge, but is its own kind of 
knowledge.  The other is to argue that know-how is reducible to, or more accurately 
regarded as, either propositional or acquaintance knowledge, notwithstanding its 
apparent distinctiveness.  The purpose of this dissertation on the epistemology of 
know-how is to do something quite different.   
 Its purpose is to articulate a perspicuous presentation of (some) of the 
reticulations of the concept of know-how.  In so doing, I engage in what I take to be 
one of a number of possible examples of what might be called ‘Wittgensteinian 
Epistemology’.  I do this in a philosophical environment where there is, as yet, no 
such thing as Wittgensteinian Epistemology.  There are exegetical discussions 
between Wittgensteinian scholars concerning how best to characterise what 
Wittgenstein understands by our notions of knowledge, doubt, relativism, etc.  There 
is also some, though not much, discussion by contemporary epistemologists as to 
what, if anything, Wittgenstein’s work might contribute the task of providing 
philosophical theories about knowledge.  Neither of these, I think, are best described 
as Wittgensteinian Epistemology.   
 In pursuit of such a fresh quarry, my strategy is threefold.  Firstly, I consider 
the main contributions to the debate about know-how as currently conducted.  I reveal 
the extent to which each falls prey to internal inconsistencies and confusions. 
Individually these critical encounters expose the vulnerabilities inherent in the various 
specific accounts that constitute the ongoing discussions. Collectively these 
encounters add up to a clearing of the philosophical decks in readiness for an 
alternative approach.  
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 Secondly, I identify an as yet unnoticed but potential (and potentially 
revolutionary) contribution to the debate.  This is Wittgenstein’s insight that there is a 
kind of know-how that is neither separate from, nor reducible to, the rest of our 
knowledge, but which is implicated in it.  This not only cuts across the 
intellectualist/anti-intellectualist confrontation which has thus far shaped the 
philosophy of know-how, but its ramifications reach into the very methodology of 
epistemology itself.  For it brings into question the extent to which the methodology 
of reflective equilibrium (one way of characterising contemporary epistemology’s 
methodology) is capable of functioning in the solely propositional, intellectualist way 
it appears to think it can. This reveals the extent to which a Wittgensteinian 
contribution to the philosophy of know-how has meta-philosophical implications, 
even if one doesn’t agree with the full thrust of Wittgenstein’s insights. This entails 
that some of the unexamined tenets by which naturalized philosophy functions can no 
longer be taken for granted.  
 Thirdly, I clarify the extent to which the apparently neutral vocabulary in 
which contemporary epistemology is conducted harbours a series of inescapably 
intellectualist commitments.  In so doing, I reveal the reasons why any non-
naturalized, non-intellectualist philosophical approach to know-how, would benefit 
from eschewing the terms ‘epistemic’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘competence’.  In executing 
these three manoeuvres, the decks are now cleared, the meta-philosophical 
considerations raised, and the jargon found wanting.  The dissertation is at last ready 
to engage in its raison d’être: the assembling of reminders about know-how in the 
pursuit of a (partial) surveyable representation of (some of) the relevant conceptual 
connections and distinctions.  
 Specifically, this tri-partite approach takes the following form. In Chapter 2, I 
consider Gilbert Ryle’s challenge to intellectualism and his articulation of a kind of 
sui generis, non-reducible know-how.  Showing that now, as then, Ryle is forced to 
defend not just his conclusions but his method against a variety of misguided 
characterisations.  In Chapter 3, I examine Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson’s 
debate-reigniting intellectualist claim that knowing how to do something is just a case 
of knowing a fact under a particular mode of presentation.  This is followed, in 
Chapter 4, by critical engagement with John Bengson & Marc Moffett’s so-called 
‘Non-Propositional Intellectualism’ which turns out to be not only entirely 
propositional, but thoroughly Platonistic.  The problematic nature of all these (and 
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other associated) accounts having been established, I turn, in Chapter 5, to 
Wittgenstein’s putative contribution to the debate.   
 Not only have no participants in the discussion thus far either acknowledged 
or engaged with Wittgenstein, none has even considered the possibility about know-
how which he identifies. This is Wittgenstein’s insight that our empirical 
propositional knowledge is enabled by a particular kind of certainty which is itself a 
kind of know-how.  Prompted by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s non-propositional 
understanding of what she calls ‘hinge certainty’ in Wittgenstein’s final writings On 
Certainty, I show that the very possibility of this know-how offers a fresh way to cut 
through the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist impasse that has now been reached.  
Although my engagement with Moyal-Sharrock is not uncritical, what it brings to 
light is the realisation that any philosophical appreciation of know-how in the future 
would no longer be deemed comprehensive were it to fail to engage with the issues 
raised by Wittgenstein and the non-propositional readings of his work.   
 Inevitably this highlights differences between the kind of meta-philosophical 
principles which frame naturalized philosophy and the more non-naturalized 
Wittgensteinian understanding of what philosophy is and seeks to achieve.  In Chapter 
6, I argue that this clash of meta-philosophical orientations is given an invigorating 
new shake-up through the investigations into know-how.  For, it transpires that the 
kinds of Moorean truisms that Wittgenstein identifies in On Certainty as non-
propositional expressions of our know-how, are similar in kind to a number of the so-
called ‘intuitions’ which are taken to be the propositional raw material of 
epistemology’s own main methodology, i.e., reflective equilibrium.  So the bite of the 
philosophical challenge from Wittgenstein concerning know-how extends to the very 
methodology of epistemology itself.  
 Having shown the internal problems which undermine all the intellectualist 
accounts of know-how, and revealed the importance of the meta-philosophical 
implications of Wittgenstein’s involvement in this topic, I conclude that the need for a 
new approach to the topic is now warranted.  With this as a springboard, I offer, in 
Chapter 7, the first non-naturalized philosophical approach to the topic of know-how 
since Gilbert Ryle.  In so doing, I am no longer merely trumpeting the need for, or the 
value of perspicuous presentations, but offering the beginnings of one; in this 
instance, for know-how. At this point, I take myself to be engaged in one possible 
version of what Wittgensteinian Epistemology might be.   
9. 
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Before I begin, a few house-keeping points.  On the matter of hyphenation 
conventions, I have followed the more or less standard practice of hyphenating the 
nominalisation ‘know-how’.  Where this features in the titles of chapters or sections, 
or is used as part of a name, I also capitalize the ‘h’ in ‘how’.  When ‘know how’ is 
used as a verb then no hyphen is used.  Exceptions to this rule are a consequence of 
conforming to the punctuation choices of a position for which I am providing an 
exposition.  Similarly I standardly use intellectualism (and its cognates) with a lower 
case ‘i’; exceptions being those cases where I follow the practices of others when 
explaining their positions.  I avoid all use of Greek letters, formalisations or 
mathematical symbols myself, except again where articulating the views of others.  In 
such situations, I follow the letter and formalisation choices of the third parties. Given 
that the New Epistemology of Know-How I pursue is a non-theoretical, non-
naturalized philosophical approach, I deem the use of formalisations and 
symbolization to be inappropriate.  On the matter of gendered pronouns, I do not use 
‘she’ instead of ‘he’, except in cases where I’m referring to another philosopher’s 
example within which ‘she’ was original used.  When referring to the third person 
singular, I prefer to use, ‘he or she’.   
 A number of the philosophers I refer to are connected by an ampersand (e.g., 
Stanley & Williamson and Bengson & Moffett).  Where an ampersand is used, this 
denotes joint authorship of a particular paper; where ‘and’ is used to connect two or 
more philosophers, this connotation is not intended. I apologise in advance for the 
reduction of philosopher teams to their initials (S&W, B&M).  This is solely to 
facilitate the readability of the text.  
 
* 
 
I very much welcome this the opportunity to acknowledge the importance of the 
British Wittgenstein Society and Shell for this work.  This dissertation would not have 
been possible without the opportunities facilitated by the BWS/Shell Bursary. I am 
also extremely appreciative of the incomparable annual conferences of the BWS and 
its bi-annual lecture series which together contributed enormously to my 
understanding of Wittgenstein. I would also like to thank Peter Hacker and Joachim 
10. 
Schulte for their three Wittgenstein Summer Schools (in Kirchberg am Wechsel in 
2009, 2010, and 2011) organised by Volker Munz on behalf of the Austrian Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Society.  These were not only of unique philosophical value but a 
privilege to attend. 
 My thanks go to the philosophical community at Birkbeck College, London 
University, where I began my philosophical studies; particularly fellow students 
Tracey Palmer, Linda Sayle, and the now much-missed Annabel Obholzer. Further 
gratitude is owed to the philosophical faculty of the University of Hertfordshire, 
especially my supervisors, Dr. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Professor Daniel D. 
Hutto, together with fellow research student Matthew Sinnicks, and the undergraduate 
philosophy students whom I had the rewarding opportunity to tutor. Finally, I greatly 
appreciate the intellectual environment created by Luke Cash and all the members of 
his London Wittgenstein Reading Group, particularly the contributions of Nadav 
Matalon.  
 
 
* 
11. 
2 
 
Anti-Intellectualism 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Doing jigsaws, inventing and enjoying jokes, boxing, behaving appropriately at 
funerals, cooking omelets, conducting battles, persuading juries, pruning trees, 
speaking Swedish, multiplying numbers, untangling wool, writing plays, clowning, 
reasoning, designing dresses, reading maps, playing chess, performing surgical 
operations, ice-skating, shooting targets, composing Latin verses, humming a tune, 
playing tennis, fishing, giving advice, map-reading, swimming, teaching, tying knots, 
driving cars, playing hide-and-seek, and philosophising, are, according to Gilbert 
Ryle, just a few of the myriad of examples1 from the vast repertoire of our intelligent 
activities.  For it is not merely in those more intellectual activities, such as theorizing 
or deducing conclusions from propositional premises, that our intelligence is involved 
or shown.  To think that these presumed paradigms of intellectual activity have a 
monopoly on our intelligence is, on Ryle’s view, to make a conceptual mistake.  It is 
to confuse our intelligence, our rationality, indeed, our very mindedness itself, with 
that limited spectrum of intellectual practices whose operational currency is 
propositional.  This misguided conflation of intelligent and intellectual activities, 
invites the further conflation of our knowledge how to do something with our 
knowledge that something is the case.  
 Confusion over these matters is, Ryle argues, indicative of a commitment to 
the so-called ‘Intellectualist Legend’; an insidious philosophical myth which is 
haunted by, and perpetuates, what he christens the ‘dogma of the Ghost in the 
Machine.’  Ryle’s examination of the relation between knowing-how and knowing-
that is but one of a number of tasks in the service of his primary aim to undermine this 
legend and exorcise its ghost; an ambition he takes to be best served by mapping the 
‘logical geography’ (1945, 201) of our mental concepts, in general.  As such, not only 
do Ryle’s specifically epistemological insights interconnect with his wider 
investigation into what it is to be minded, they are intimately bound up with his 
particular philosophical method and its meta-philosophical commitments. Any 
alternative account of the epistemology of know-how, be it sympathetic or hostile to 
                                                
1 All of these particular examples are Ryle’s own; appearing repeatedly throughout his writings.  
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Ryle’s orientation, is not only obliged to engage with Ryle’s original articulation of 
the relation between knowing-how and knowing-that, but must also, I suggest, be alert 
to the extent to which meta-philosophical allegiances are unavoidable.  This relation 
between Ryle’s philosophy and his meta-philosophy will provide a double legacy 
whose twin threads are woven throughout the coming investigations.   
 In this chapter, I examine Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and 
knowing-that, drawing primarily on his original 1945 presentation on the topic to the 
Aristotelian Society, first published in (1946) together with the further exploration of 
this work in Chapter 2 of (and throughout) his (1949) book, The Concept of Mind, in 
order to establish the continuing philosophical credentials of his own anti-
intellectualist orientation. To achieve this, I also exploit Ryle’s (1963) and the several 
decades’ worth of articles now gathered together in (2009a) and (2009b) including his 
particularly important, ‘Why are the Calculuses of Logic and Arithmetic Applicable 
to Reality’ (1946b).  In so doing, I lay the groundwork for a fuller acknowledgement 
of the importance of Ryle’s appreciation that our human know-how is indeed distinct 
from our propositional knowledge and that this is a matter of the grammar of our 
concepts, not one of empirical discovery.   
 In Section 1, I provide an exposition of Ryle’s distinction between knowing-
how and knowing-that, focusing particularly on the regress argument and reductio ad 
absurdum it generates for an Intellectualist view.  I then articulate Jason Stanley & 
Timothy Williamson’s dismissal of Ryle’s regress argument, identifying where and 
why it fails to undermine Ryle’s distinction.  In Section 2, I evaluate the central role 
taken by the notion of rules, criteria and standards, in what I prefer to characterise as 
Ryle’s normative performance account of knowing-how, rather than his ability 
account.  I show why the two major counter-examples proposed by Stanley & 
Williamson, ultimately lack any power to drive a wedge between our knowledge-how 
and its constitutive rule-involving performances.  In Section 3, I criticise Ryle’s 
supposedly dispositional explanation of performance, arguing that he operates with 
too broad, indeed too unfamiliar a notion of dispositions.  I identify the motivation for 
this move and show that one can avoid its pitfalls by returning to the rationale for its 
pursuit, i.e., the investigation into our human ‘second nature’, that product of our 
inculcation and education into the rule-involving activities and practices that are 
constitutive of our humanity.  In Section 4, I explore Ryle’s reasons for offering not 
merely a categorial distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that, but the view 
13. 
that knowing-how is prior to knowing-that. I argue that this Priority Thesis is not only 
mistaken but unnecessary, given Ryle’s own project.  In Section 5, I briefly consider 
several alternative, supposedly Rylean-friendly, anti-intellectualist views.  Recent 
developments in cognitive science are, in some cases, embracing anti-intellectualist 
(rather than the more typical intellectualist) views, and overtly acknowledging Ryle 
distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that.  Yet though they share Ryle’s 
conclusions they do so for very different reasons; reasons that may well run entirely 
counter to Ryle’s meta-philosophical orientation. In the Concluding Remarks of the 
final section I draw the lessons of this initial investigation together and identify the 
journey ahead: its outstanding argumentative and thematic challenges and the 
philosophical tasks to come. 
 
1 Preliminary Tensions 
 
From a non- or pre-philosophical point of view, I take it to be uncontentious to say 
that there is a difference between what it is to know how to do something and what it 
is to know that something is the case.  To know how to play the piano and to know 
that you do so by striking the black and white keys with your fingers, are, we might 
say, two different kinds of knowledge.  To know how to play Chopin’s Prelude No.4 
in E Minor, Opus 28, is somehow different, in kind, to knowing that the sheet music 
is in the piano stool. Notwithstanding this seemingly straightforward distinction 
between our know-how (or the kinds of things we can and can’t do), and our know-
that (or propositional knowledge of truths), both are taken to be familiar examples or 
evidence of the fact that people are knowledgeable, educated and intelligent.   
 Yet pre-philosophical thought about the richness of our knowledge and the 
breadth of our intelligent activities, sometimes pulls in a different, more narrowly 
circumscribed, direction.  Gilbert Ryle reminds us of the father who, “after spending 
the morning in teaching [his son] Tommy to swim, to dribble the football, or to 
diagnose and repair what is wrong with the kitchen clock, in the afternoon cheerfully 
writes to the newspaper letters which take it for granted that all lessons are strings of 
memorizable propositions.” (1967, 467)  This example is supposed to point to the not 
uncommon assumption that although we do engage in a host of different kinds of 
practical activities, which are indeed learnt, taught and practiced, they are neither the 
purpose of a ‘proper’ education, nor the stuff of ‘genuine’ knowledge.  ‘Real’ 
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intelligence is exercised solely when engaged in theoretical or intellectual activities; 
something perhaps optimally done when seated in a classroom. Pen, or perhaps, head, 
in hand. 
 This pre-philosophical tension concerning what it is that might be regarded as 
‘proper’ knowledge, is echoed in two broad and contrasting philosophical approaches 
to the nature of knowing-how and knowing-that.  Broadly speaking, so-called 
‘intellectualist’ views hold that all knowledge is, and is only, propositional 
knowledge.  On such intellectualist-orientated views there is no such thing as non-
propositional knowledge, or non-propositional know-how.  Putative candidates for 
any such putative non-propositional knowledge, or know-how, are dismissed in one of 
two ways.  Either all such non-propositional know-how is claimed to be propositional 
knowledge after all; appearances notwithstanding.  Thus it keeps its status as a kind of 
knowledge.  Alternatively, it is claimed that non-propositional know-how is not a kind 
of propositional knowledge, and given that it is only propositional knowledge which 
is knowledge, this non-propositional know-how is, strictly speaking, unfit to be 
awarded the status of ‘knowledge’.  On this second option, non-propositional know-
how is thus downgraded to some kind of sub-epistemological or epistemologically 
irrelevant category; usually that of ‘mere’ ability.  
 By contrast, Ryle’s own anti-intellectualist holds that non-propositional 
knowledge or know-how and propositional knowledge or know-that are mutually 
irreducible types of knowledge, each meriting the status of knowledge, each 
contributing to the epistemological confederacy.  Furthermore, it is only in virtue of 
both our know-how and our know-that we human beings exemplify, manifest and 
articulate our human intelligence. As Ryle reminds us, “‘Intelligent’ cannot be 
defined in terms of ‘intellectual’ or ‘knowing how’ in terms of ‘knowing that’”.  
(1949, 32)  Intellectualists are, according to Ryle, misguided in their assumption that, 
“intelligence equates with the contemplation of propositions and is exhausted in this 
contemplation”. (1946a, 225)  In so limiting knowledge to “this dry and chilly 
propositional arena” the result is an impoverished, “one-sidedly Academic human 
nature”. (1962, 430).   Intelligent activity is not the privilege of overtly intellectual 
activities and accomplishments but is to be found across a whole range of flourishing 
areas of human life, be they, “moral or artistic, conversational or commercial or 
sporting, and so on indefinitely.” (1962, 432).  
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 This philosophical contrast between the intellectualist and the anti-
intellectualist should not, therefore, be understood as the opposition of some 
particularly philosophico-theoretical view against what might be regarded as a more 
pre-philosophical, common-sense position (as Glick (2011) presumes).  Rather, the 
philosophical consideration of the nature, extent, status, value, source and detail of 
our know-how, in tandem with its relation to our knowledge and intelligence, in 
general, consists in resolving tensions at play in both the philosophical and pre-
philosophical arenas.   
 Furthermore, whilst these two camps mark out the general territory of the 
central debate, not only does each play host to various more nuanced views, they do 
not represent an exhaustive division of the field.  In addition, there are two approaches 
which cut across the standard dichotomy just outlined.  The first is a recent proposal 
which severs the marriage between intellectualism and its long-serving propositional 
partner.  This proffers a non-propositional yet nonetheless intellectualist account of 
know-how2. The second potential alternative view is that Rylean anti-intellectualism 
and intellectualism are both mistaken insofar as they set out the relation between 
knowing-how and knowing-that as a polarity: either knowing-how reduces (entirely) 
to knowing-that or is (entirely) distinct from it.  The former I consider in Chapter 4, 
the latter in Chapters 5 and 7 as part of the consideration of one alternative conception 
of know-how that Wittgenstein illuminates.  For the moment, however, I focus on the 
original intellectualist and anti-intellectualist divide, around which the contemporary 
debate revolves.  
 I now evaluate in detail why Ryle thinks that intellectualist views about know-
how are not only misguided, but generate a reductio ad absurdum.  
 
1.1   One Challenge, Two Regresses 
 
Ryle characterises intellectualism as the view that intelligent activity is that which is 
not only, “accompanied by […] internal acts of considering propositions” (1946a, 
222), but “is exhausted in this contemplation” (1946a, 225 emphases added).  This 
would appear to fit well with two familiar presumptions: (i) that knowing is the 
paradigmatic example of intelligent activity, and (ii) that knowledge is knowledge of 
                                                
2 Bengson & Moffett  (2007) and (2011a) and Bengson, Moffett and Wright (2009). 
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true propositions.  Almost the entire edifice of contemporary epistemology is 
constructed around this view, together with its vast array of investigations into the 
nature, sources, structure and value of what it is for a subject, S, to know a particular 
proposition, p.  The suggestion that intelligent activity, or knowing, is exhausted by 
the appropriate engagement with propositions requires that any supposed non-
propositional knowledge, or know-how (be these either the same or different), must 
be either propositional knowledge of some sort, or fail to be knowledge of any sort.  
The intellectualist conception seeks, “to reassimilate knowing how to knowing that by 
arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules, or the 
application of criteria”. (1949, 29)  This is done not by using something other than 
propositions, but rather by the identification and incorporation of a particular type of 
regulative proposition. Thus the assumed distinction between knowing-how and 
knowing-that is illusory, given that both are actually propositional knowledge.  This 
conflation of the intelligent with the propositional brings in its wake the subsumption 
of knowing-how by knowing-that3.  
 Having identified this intellectualist approach, Ryle argues that it generates a 
reductio ad absurdum because it entails that propositional knowledge is itself 
impossible.  For if the exercise of one’s capacity for propositional knowledge is 
something which itself can be done intelligently or stupidly, then this must also 
require the preliminary consideration of the relevant regulative propositions.  But in 
order for this to be done intelligently, it too requires the consideration of yet further 
appropriately regulative propositions. In the attempt to begin the supposed process 
one is launched upon an infinite regress; ruling out the gaining of any propositional 
knowledge, at all. Yet we do have such knowledge, hence the relation between 
knowing-how and knowing-that cannot be as the misguided intellectualist supposes.  
“If the intelligence exhibited in any act, practical or theoretical, is to be credited with 
the occurrence of some ulterior act of intelligently considering regulative 
propositions, no intelligent act, practical or theoretical could ever begin.” (1946a, 
223)  
 This ‘Starting Regress’, is associated with a second equally reductio-
generating ‘Janus Regress’, (as I distinguish and call them.)  The Janus Regress 
                                                
3 Cf., the parallel intellectualist conflation of ratiocination and rationality, which denies Ryle’s point 
that, “Ratiocination is not the general condition of rational behaviour but only one species of it.” 
(1946a, 229) 
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focusses specifically on a  presumed epistemological gap which seems to stand in 
need of crossing.  “If a deed, to be intelligent, has to be guided by the consideration of 
a regulative proposition, the gap between that consideration and the practical 
application of the regulation has to be bridged by some go-between process which 
cannot by the presupposed definition itself be an exercise of intelligence and cannot 
by definition, be the resultant deed.” (1946a, 223) But this “schizophrenic broker” 
(1946a, 223) is inevitably paralysed; trapped between contemplation and activity, 
between theory and practice, between consideration and execution.  The only way to 
cross this no man’s land is with something that will bestride two things whose very 
incompatibility is supposedly definitional.  Thus, both the impotence of the Starting 
Regress and the paralysis of the Janus Regress reveal the conceptual confusion which 
Ryle diagnoses as “misconstruing the ‘logical type or category’ of intelligence 
concepts, making a ‘type-mistake.’”  (1946a, 224) 
 Is there a way to resist the disabling effect of Ryle’s challenge?  I consider 
now the leading attempt to diffuse the threat of regress.  
 
1.2   An Intellectualist Response 
 
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001) provide the most substantial attempt to 
counter Ryle’s criticism of intellectualism. Stanley & Williamson (henceforth S&W) 
claim that the supposed (Starting) Regress4 fails to show that knowledge-how cannot 
be a species of knowledge-that. Their counter-argument aims its bite, not at the first 
level of Ryle’s descriptive articulation of the Regress Argument, which S&W take to 
be sound but, rather, at a deeper level.  They attempt to show that the prose expression 
of the Regress Argument is superficially deceptive, masking a problematic and 
ultimately undermining tension.  Specifically, they claim that the only way Ryle’s two 
necessary premises can both be true is for each to pick out a different, mutually 
exclusive, type of action.  Thus, with no univocal notion of action operating in both 
premises, the reductio does not go through.  This works, supposedly, as follows. 
 According to S&W, the descriptive articulation of Ryle’s argument can be 
roughly paraphrased, thus: 
                                                
4 S&W do not acknowledge the distinction I am making between the Starting and the Janus Regresses.  
Rather they take Ryle’s announcement that he relies on “variations of one argument” (1946a, 223) to 
justify ignoring any of the variations in favour of focusing on what I dub ‘the Starting Regress’ and 
they call ‘the [sole] Regress Argument’. (2001, 412)   
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  [I]f knowledge how were a species of knowledge-that, then to  
 engage in any action, one would have to contemplate a proposition.   
 But, the contemplation of a proposition is itself an action, which  
 presumably would itself have to be accompanied by a distinct  
 contemplation of a proposition.  If the thesis that knowledge-how  
 is a species of knowledge-that required each manifestation of the  
 knowledge-how to be accompany by a distinct action of contemplating  
 a proposition, which was itself a manifestation of knowledge-how,  
 then no knowledge-how could ever be manifested.    (S&W 2001, 413) 
 
S&W claim that this argument uses the following two premises:  
 
 (P1)  If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F 
  
 (P2)  If one employs knowledge that p one contemplates the proposition that p 
 
This generates an infinite regress, making it impossible to ever F.  The assumption for 
reductio being: 
 
 (RA): knowledge how to F is knowledge that φ(F)5. 
 
S&W argue that for (P1) to be true it requires the notion of intentional action6.  The 
truth of P2, however, requires that the relevant action be unintentional. As such, (P1) 
and (P2) cannot refer to the same type of action. Therefore the Regress Argument 
fails to show that (RA) is false.  
 With regard to (P1), S&W point out, in the first instance, that its truth is 
vulnerable to counter-examples.  Consider, they suggest, such actions as digestion. A 
                                                
5 S&W also point out that though Ryle is committed to a Priority Thesis (that knowing-how is logically 
prior to knowing-that) this is not a requirement for his Regress Challenge.  For one might equally well 
wish to argue that P1 and P2 are simultaneous, rather than sequential considerations of an infinite 
number of distinct propositions.     
6 In discussing S&W’s challenge I follow their use of the terms ‘action’ and ‘intentional action’ rather 
than Ryle’s preferred ‘activity’, though this shift in nomenclature which they impose upon Ryle is not 
simply the substitution of different terms for the same concepts. As will be discerned in Chapter 7, 
action, intentional action and activity are not identical concepts. 
19. 
person might well successfully digest his or her food, but this is not to say that he or 
she knows how to digest her food.7  This illustrates the need to limit the applicability 
of (P1) to certain kinds of action.  S&W take it to be uncontroversial that the scope of 
those actions one knows how to do is, thus, restricted and indeed should be restricted 
to those actions which are intentional.  
 A second counter-example is proposed in order to reveal the sensitivity of (P2) 
to scope issues. S&W use a suggestion from Carl Ginet in which he claims that one 
might well employ knowledge that p, without, after all, needing to contemplate the 
proposition that p.  Ginet’s particular example is that of his opening of a door, by 
turning its door knob.  According to Ginet, this action is something which he does 
“quite automatically”.  (1975, 7)  It reveals, supposedly, that whilst, as he puts it, “I 
exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the 
knob and pushing it”, this is done, “without formulating (in my mind or out loud) that 
proposition or any other relevant proposition.” (1975, 7) 
 This suggestion looks, potentially, like one that might well be reconciled with 
a more anti-intellectualist orientation.  Yet rather than take Ginet’s example as open 
perhaps to a more Rylean interpretation, S&W take it to be evidence that the exercise 
of one’s propositional knowledge need not require its overt contemplation.  Indeed, 
they embrace an intellectualist reading of Ginet, holding that the example confirms 
that, “employments of knowledge-that are often unaccompanied by distinct acts of 
contemplating propositions.” (2001, 415)  Thus, (P2) is false.  According to S&W, 
this is only the case, however, on a reading that takes the action of contemplating a 
proposition, to be an intentional action.  For were contemplating a proposition an 
unintentional action, then (P2) would be true. The truth, then, of (P2) might be 
maintained by restricting its scope to the unintentional act of contemplating a 
proposition.  Given, then, that the truth of (P1) requires the relevant act be intentional 
and the truth of (P2) requires the associated act be unintentional, there is, according to 
S&W’s argument, no univocal reading in virtue of which both (P1) and (P2) can be 
simultaneously true.  Therefore, contrary to the initially tempting descriptive 
presentation of his Regress Argument, S&W claim that their deeper analysis of Ryle’s 
argument reveals that it fails. The reductio does not go through.  
                                                
7 This is not a claim Ryle does, or would wish to make. On the contrary, he already anticipates the 
mistake.  “It would be interesting to consider how far epistemologists and psychologists have, 
unwittingly, yearned to describe thought after the model of digestion.” Ryle (1953, 312)  
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 Such is S&W’s sole challenge to Ryle’s Regress Argument. For this counter 
proposal to be successful, however, several things have to be the case. These include, 
but are not limited to, the following three requirements: (i) S&W must be accurately 
re-presenting Ryle’s Regress Argument with their (P1), (P2), and (RA) analysis; (ii) 
The notion of an unintentional act of contemplating a proposition has to make sense, 
and (iii) The Ginet Objection to the truth of (P2) has to withstand scrutiny.   Now, 
whilst I do think there are serious concerns about (i), I will nonetheless accept S&W’s 
articulation of Ryle’s account, as presented, in order to engage with (ii) on their own 
proposed terms.8  
 In (ii) then, S&W suggest that one way to rescue the truth of the claim that if 
one employs knowledge that p then one contemplates the proposition that p, would be 
to allow for non-intentional contemplation of the relevant proposition.  Such non-
intentional contemplation is captured, perhaps, by Ginet’s notion of ‘automatic’ 
action. Here, a person opening a door is not, as such, intentionally contemplating the 
proposition that he or she can leave a room by turning its doorknob.  But what, 
exactly is this unintentional contemplation to which they are alluding?  Having tabled 
the notion as viable, S&W limit its further elucidation to two potential options.  The 
first is that, “perhaps there is a sense of contemplating a proposition’ in which it refers 
to an action that is no more intentional than is the action of digesting food.” (2001, 
416)  Their second suggestion is that of a new “deflationary sense of action”, but once 
mooted is then un-pursued.  With these sketchy indications, S&W leave the matter 
alone; perhaps not unsurprisingly. 
 I would like to suggest that S&W are here engaged in a rhetorical, rather than 
argumentative, strategy of presenting a faux rescue attempt on Ryle’s behalf in order 
to suggest that the only way his Regress Argument might work requires torturing our 
notions of contemplation and action into unrecognisable shape.   But any such 
                                                
8 Cf., Hetherington (2006) who does choose to question S&W’s initial presentation of Ryle’s argument, 
claiming that they have, “misunderstood both the focus and the form [and] the force of Ryle’s 
reasoning.” (2006, 72) Hetherington then proceeds to present his own Knowledge-as-Ability 
Hypothesis (distinct from either Lewis & Nemirow’s Ability Hypothesis (see Lewis 1990) or Mellor’s 
Knowing How Theory (1993).   The Knowledge-as-Ability Hypothesis is not, however, as might be 
anticipated, a Rylean-friendly approach, but rather one which characterises all knowledge as, “the 
ability – the know-how – to register accurately that p,” a view which “from the outset” ensures that  
“knowledge’s traditional truth condition is retained.” (2006, 77) Having stepped in to defend Ryle from 
the S&W’s misrepresentations, Hetherington ironically helps himself to a thoroughly propositional 
conception of knowledge.  This provides more evidence (from an altogether unlikely source) for what I 
argue (in Chapter 5) can be described as ‘the propositional presumption’ that the focus of epistemology 
is thoroughly propositional, or truth-related.  
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conceptual manhandling is entirely the work of S&W, and not anything needed, let 
alone pursued, by Ryle.  This is simply a diversionary tactic designed to distract 
attention from an appreciation of the precariousness of their Ginet Objection.  The 
reason for this is that the Ginet Objection is doing not just doing some of their 
argumentative work, but all of it.   
 Consider then, (iii), the Ginet Objection. For this to contribute what S&W’s 
argument requires, S&W need to accept that Ginet’s two notions, (exercising 
propositional knowledge and manifesting propositional knowledge) are the same. 
Furthermore, such exercising (or the supposedly synonymous manifesting) of 
propositional knowledge needs also to be the same as what S&W call employing 
propositional knowledge; an identity that one might have thought to be constitutive of 
the very question at issue.  A second conflation occurs with S&W’s requirement that 
formulating propositional knowledge and contemplating propositional knowledge be 
the same.  That S&W require so much synonymity between key terms in order to map 
the Ginet Objection on to their own analysis of Ryle’s Regress Argument, already 
suggests their position may well be frail.  Let it be noted, though, that the minimum 
cost of any attempt to make sense of the unintentional act of contemplating a 
proposition requires both the interchangeability of the supposedly synonymous trio: 
exercising, manifesting and employing propositional knowledge, together with that of 
the supposedly synonymous duo: formulating and contemplating propositional 
knowledge.  Once again, I allow these questionable conflations to go unchallenged, in 
order to allow S&W as much of the preferred apparatus of their argument as possible. 
 The Ginet Objection from the automaticity of our action is, then, supposed to 
show that when successfully opening a door, the relevant propositional knowledge, 
i.e., that one can open a particular door by turning its handle, need not be  
contemplated/ formulated though it is still exercised/employed.  But can just such an 
automatic action be taken as indicative of, or justification for the possibility of side-
stepping the contemplation/formulation of the supposed relevant propositional 
knowledge?  If the answer is no, then S&W have made a mistake in appealing to the 
Ginet Objection in the first place.  If the answer is yes, one need not 
contemplate/formulate the relevant propositional knowledge, then why does this not 
also indicate it is similarly possible, or at least plausible, to side-step the exercise/ 
employment of such propositional knowledge?  Why doesn’t the (unarticulated) 
reason that serves to justify the irrelevance of contemplation/formulation of the 
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relevant proposition, not also justify the irrelevance of the exercise/employment of the 
relevant proposition? 
 There is only one answer to this question which can provide S&W with the 
argumentative clout they require.  This is that the exercise/employment of 
propositional knowledge is a necessary requirement for action. But this is the very 
question at issue.  So the Ginet Objection only works by presupposing the conclusion 
that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that: i.e., the (RA) claim at the heart of 
the debate. Contrary to the presentation of their challenge, S&W do not, therefore, 
have a viable counter-argument to the Regress Argument.  All they have is a 
straightforward denial of Ryle’s argument, purporting to be an argument against it.  
 In so far as one can open doors by turning door handles, then according to the 
Ginet Objection and indeed, according to Ryle, one need not be contemplating the 
relevant propositions. But for Ryle there is no reason to presume that one need be 
need be employing any particular propositional knowledge, either.  One simply knows 
how to open a door.  S&W follow Ginet in denying this, presuming that one must 
always be employing or exercising the appropriate propositional knowledge.  To 
repeat: this is not an argument against Ryle, it is just the re-statement of the opposing 
intellectualist position.  Thus even allowing S&W full use of their own (dubious) 
premises and strategies, the above demonstrates the inadequacy of their attempt to 
respond to Ryle’s Regress Argument against Intellectualism.  
 Furthermore, S&W’s challenge represents the only known attempt to tackle 
the Ryle’s Regress Argument.  Those who claim that Ryle’s Regress Argument does 
not work, such as Jeremy Fantl (2008), tend to piggy-back on the presumed success of 
S&W’s argument.  They accept it, and its key Ginet Objection, without qualification 
or further investigation, in their presumption that the Regress worry has been 
dismissed. It falls to Ryle himself to suggest a putative strategy for slipping out of the 
grip of the Regress Argument. He proposes that one might resort to a notion of 
implicit rather than explicit propositional knowledge; something he describes as a ‘not 
unfashionable shuffle’ (1946, 227); a route he takes to leads only to deeper 
intellectualist quicksand.9 
                                                
9 Cf.. Schiffer (2001) “[A]lthough understanding is indeed a practical ability, it may none the less be 
characterized as an instance of “knowing that” – providing we recognize that the knowledge is 
implicit” (2001, 312, footnote 5.)  I return to this shuffle in Chapter 6, as part a consideration of the 
propositionality that constitutes the intellectualist paradigm under and with which Naturalized 
Philosophy operates. 
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 As there are no other intellectualist attempts to de-rail Ryle’s Regress 
Argument, I now turn to his own positive account of the relation between the two 
distinct kinds of knowledge: knowing-how and knowing-that 
 
2 Performances and their Rules, Criteria and Standards 
 
For Ryle, knowing-how cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. The very 
possibility of propositional knowledge requires some kind of non-propositional 
knowledge; on pain of generating an infinite regress. “Effective possession of a piece 
of knowledge-that involves knowing how to use that knowledge.” (1946a, 235 
emphasis added)  Furthermore, it is not merely those proposition-involving, or more 
theoretical, intellectual activities which require some such know-how.   Indeed it is a 
“ruinous but popular mistake to suppose that intelligence operates only in the 
production and manipulation of propositions, i.e. that only in ratiocinating are we 
rational.” (1946a, 228)   Ryle’s account of and interest in know-how is not simply a 
pre-occupation with some narrow or (potentially marginal) epistemological issue 
pertaining to a discrete kind of non-propositional knowledge.  It is intrinsically related 
to, and demanded by, any proper understanding of what it is to be human, to be 
intelligent and to be rational.  Any account of our knowledge and rationality that does 
not engage in the consideration of know-how is not just mistaken, but woefully 
inadequate. 
 Ryle’s own positive account of know-how turns not, as near-ubiquitously 
described, on the notion of ability per se but on a twin-pronged conception which 
rejects the  intellectualists’ preferred proposition in favour of that of performance; a 
notion of performance that is, constitutively, normative.  Specifically, Ryle argues for 
the view that (i) a person’s know-how is a kind of knowledge that is “actualised or 
exercised in what he does”, and (ii) all such “performances” are “in some way 
governed by principles, rules, cannons, standards or criteria.” (1946a, 228)    
 This normative aspect of our performances is one that immediately invites 
comparison with the intellectualist suggestion that know-how may simply be 
propositional knowledge of the appropriate regulative propositions.  There is, 
however, a crucial difference between such regulative propositions and the kind of 
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performance rules which Ryle identifies.  For whilst he does not rule out the fact that 
certain regulations, maxims and indeed rules can be put into propositional form, they 
remain inert unless they are coupled with the ability to use such rules intelligently, to 
know how to select amongst the rules, and to appreciated the applicability of an 
appropriate rule, etc.  One “might accept any set of hypothetical propositions and still 
not know how to cook or drive a car.” (1946a, 230) No amount of propositional 
knowledge of the rules of an activity will serve in place of the knowledge of how to 
use those rules. “[P]ropositional acknowledge of rules, reasons or principles is not the 
parent of the intelligent application of them; it is a step-child of that application” 
(1946a, 228)  
 In rejecting the intellectualist proposal that our knowledge of rules is but a 
sub-division of our propositional knowledge, Ryle aims to offer instead not only an 
understanding of what these rules are, but how it is that they constitute our know-how.  
The detail of this position turns on distinguishing two broad types of rules and the two 
associated types of education whereby they are learnt.  ‘Performance rules’, as he 
calls them are, according to Ryle, “criteria according to which performances are 
characterised as legitimate or illegitimate, correct or incorrect, suitable or unsuitable, 
etc.” (1946b, 238)   They can be divided into two main categories: (i) Procrustean 
rules and (ii) “rules or canons of style, strategy, prudence, skill and taste.” (1946b, 
240).  The first are rules which are learnt by conditioning, the second by a particular 
conception of practice; the first are involved in generating our blind habits, the second 
in the formation, acquisition and on-going development of our skills, abilities and 
generally intelligent powers.  Though we are disciplined in both kinds of rule-
involving activity,10 it is the Procrustean rules whose observance is, “inculcated by 
sheer drill” becoming “automatic or habitual” in normal circumstances.  By contrast, 
the non-Procrustean rules are “taught by criticism rather than rote and we have never 
finished learning them.” (1946b, 240)  Hence Ryle discriminates between those 
performances and activities achievable in virtue of habituation involving merely 
Procrustean rules, such as spelling, sloping arms, chanting the multiplication table, 
fastening buttons etc., and those requiring education and training in the second kind of 
                                                
10 I use the expression ‘rule-involving’, which though not Ryle’s, is, I trust both a fair and neutral way 
of highlighting the centrality for Ryle of the normative performance aspects of know-how without 
imposing on his view any of implications behind the more familiar locutions of ‘rule-following’, or 
‘rule-governed’.  It is not the task of this dissertation to argue for a particular understanding of our rule-
following practices, or what it is to engage in normative activity, though clearly this is a task whose 
importance is exposed by much of the argument that unfolds here and in Chapters 5 and 7. 
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rules; such as writing flowing prose, reading maps, constructing mathematical proofs 
and designing dresses.  Whilst the former skills and performances are sometimes 
described as “mere competences”, only the latter skills involve “craftsmanship” and 
thus have a, “place for originality, ingenuity, taste or flair.” (1993, 60)  This 
distinction notwithstanding, it is the case that “a performance is an exercise of a skill”, 
(1949, 33) whichever kind of rule or rules is involves. Hence Ryle’s insistence that 
“[k]nowing a rule is knowing how.” (1946a, 227)   
 Thus, for Ryle, knowledge in general includes not only propositional 
knowledge but this irreducibly non-propositional knowledge, or normative know-
how.  “The advance of knowledge does not consist only in the accumulation of 
discovered truths, but also and chiefly in the cumulative mastery of methods.” (1946a, 
234). That said, having identified the notions of normative performance and the 
mastery of methods, as key to his account of know-how, Ryle leaves the crucial 
aspect of what it is for a performance to be rule-involving, tantalizingly incomplete.  
Intellectualist-orientated critics, almost invariably avoid engaging with the question of 
what it means to engage in a rule-involving performance or practice,11 preferring to 
reconstruct Ryle’s account of know-how in terms of ability12.  There are three main 
exceptions to this; one intellectualist, two anti-intellectualist.  The first, historically 
speaking, is the intellectualist D. G. Brown, who though arguing for the view that “all 
knowing how is knowing that” briefly raises the topic of rule13.  He then goes on to 
pose but not answer one of the key questions any such discussion prompts, namely, 
“if knowing a rule is said to be exhibited in performance, one has the analogous 
problem of why it is called knowing rather than being able to act in accordance with 
the rule.” (1970, 219).  These notoriously difficult issues surrounding rule-following, 
                                                
11 Roland (1958) is a rare and early example of questions being raised (if not answers given) about the 
issue and importance of normative practice. 
12 This is in contrast to Snowdon (2004), the first major article to reconsider Ryle in the wake of S&W 
(2001) which barely acknowledges the notion of rule-involvement, but takes Ryle to be proposing, 
instead, a “Capacity Thesis” that “knowing how to G does in fact consist in being able to G, in having 
the capacity to G.” (2004, 2) This fails to discriminate between capacities that are one, as opposed to 
two-way powers, as well as missing out the rule-involving issues.  See also Brogaard (2011), who takes 
Ryle’s view to be an ability account, which, like S&W she then seeks to challenge by counter-example, 
whilst ignoring any characteristics pertinent to normative performance.  (In this respect she reveals her 
Chomskyan linguistic heritage, as will become clear in the wake of Chapter 6).   
13 Brown (1970, 219-221) makes an further distinction between what he calls the “English use” of 
know-how, whereby if you don’t know how to do something you aren’t able, e.g., to run a projector, or 
build a house, as opposed to the “standard use”, whereby though you don’t know how to do properly 
something you are still able to do it, after a fashion, e.g., move about in a canoe, address a magistrate. 
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acting in accordance with a rule, and the possibility of rule-skepticism14, do muddy 
the waters for Ryleans and critics alike. 
 The original anti-intellectualist engagement with this central issue of rule-
involvement is David Carr, who is unique in his appreciation of the importance of 
understanding “knowing how as a partly a matter of grasping the rules of an activity.” 
(1981, 55)  Unfortunately, Carr does not seek to investigate further this matter, 
himself, instead he offers his own a tripartite account of knowing-how analogous to 
the justified, true belief account of propositional knowledge, which turns on being 
able to entertain an action and being acquainted with a set of success-involving 
practical procedures.15  Of course, one could suggest that any account that analyses 
know-how into ‘success-involving practical procedures’ without further illumination  
on the crucial matter of rule-involving matter has not moved on much further than 
Ryle.  Not to mention it risks conflating success and correctness conditions, which 
would, of course, be a counter-productive step.  
 The second (more anti-intellectualist than intellectualist) engagement with this 
difficult element of Ryle’s view, is offered by Ian Rumfitt (2011).  But though 
Rumfitt entirely agrees that the rule-involving activity of “deduction itself is not 
piloted by the knowledge of true propositions”, this being the very “moral of Lewis 
Carroll’s fable” (2011, 358)16, he does question whether or not “a deductive capacity 
is a form of Rylean know how to.”  (2011, 359)  He regards the lack of clarity on this 
                                                
14 Cf., Gellner (1951) for the worry that whilst Ryle is correct to bring in rules, he still needs to address 
what it is for a rule of inference (say), to be a correct rule.  Of course, Ryle might respond to this 
challenge by pointing out that this is to misunderstand his notion of a rule.  For a rule is not itself 
correct (or otherwise) rather it is the standard against which rule-involving behaviour can be compared 
and thus adjudged correct or incorrect.  
15 This proposal has, more recently, been picked up by Hawley (2003) who similarly suggests that there 
is a, “structural analogy between propositional knowledge and know-how” (2003, 20) where 
“knowledge-how can be understood in terms of successful actions plus warrant.” (2003, 19) Though 
she takes her version to be a framework for further investigation which leaves open whether or not 
know-how is a “subtype” (2003, 20) of propositional knowledge.  
16 See Ryle (1946, 226-227) for the original discussion of Lewis Carroll (1895). In personal 
conversation (October 15th, 2009, Geneva) Stanley declared that he was “discomforted” and “annoyed” 
by Carroll’s puzzle and remained unclear as to what it sought to show.  His attempts to engage with 
Carroll’s discussion though drawing on Rumfitt’s nice distinction (in Rumfitt’s 2011) between 
deducing and inferring show that he still struggles to understand the Carroll point. “If the moral of the 
Lewis Carroll case is that there is a gap between standing epistemic states of the agent and the 
manifestation or application of those states on a particular occasion, appealing to more standing 
epistemic states of the agent, whether propositional or not, is no solution at all.’ (Stanley 2011a, 31)  
This reveals the source of the problem, for Stanley interprets the question at issue as being about the 
status of some supposed ‘standing epistemic states’, whereas for Ryle (like Carroll), the question is not 
about the status of these states, but the supposed fact of them in the first place.  Given Stanley (as will 
be discussed in the next chapter) operates with a propositional (and indeed a Fodorian computational) 
theory of mind, then, inevitably, the idea that Ryle doesn’t cannot be accommodated.  
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subject to stem from unresolved issues concerning the source, and codification of, the 
relevant deductive principles.  Which is, I think, yet another way of highlighting 
worries about just what it might be engage in a normative activity somehow governed 
by, or in accord with, rules.    
 Standard anti-Rylean criticism starts with the assumption that Ryle is 
providing an ability account of know-how, possibly along the lines of  (or as identical 
with) what epistemology textbooks sometimes characterise as ability knowledge.17 
Having given Ryle this ‘ability account’ construal, critical attention is then typically 
trained on issues pertaining to what it is to be (usually physically) able to do 
something. Although there is, for Ryle, a normative aspect to his know-how, it is 
almost entirely ignored under cover of this emphasis by others on ability, rather than 
performance.  To the extent that ‘performativity’ is sometimes a characteristic 
invoked, normativity again remains un-considered. I trust that the above, however, 
motivates the importance of undertaking this task, not merely as part of a proper 
understanding and characterisation of Ryle’s position, but for any proposal that seeks 
to build on, or incorporate a Rylean perspective into their own account of the 
epistemology of know-how.18  
 With this caveat in mind, I concede to the more conventional terminology and 
characterisation of Ryle’s so-called ‘ability’ account, and consider the specific 
intellectualist criticism that is proposed. 
   
2.1  Knowledge-how as Ability:  Intellectualist Responses 
 
Intellectualist criticisms of Ryle’s supposed ability account of know-how seek to 
show that know-how and ability come apart.  The general strategy employed is the 
challenge-by-counter-example favoured by Stanley & Williamson.  S&W’s original 
ultra-brief critique states that Ryle claims “knowledge-how is an ability” (2001, 411).  
In the space of one paragraph, they then challenge this view by tabling two supposed 
                                                
17 The distinction between propositional and ability knowledge (and often also acquaintance 
knowledge) is typically presented as the starting point for epistemology in the introductions to 
contemporary textbooks, only to be immediately put aside and never mentioned again, as propositional 
knowledge becomes the focus of the all further consideration. The importance of this contemporary 
practice for the current debate is articulated in Chapter 5.  
18 The thoroughly naturalized philosophical environment of today’s epistemological landscape, 
however, makes the possibility of a reconsideration of the normative aspects of Ryle’s work look 
increasingly unlikely. 
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counter-examples (the ski-instructor and the armless pianist) to show that “[i]t is 
entirely false, however, that ascriptions19 of knowledge-how ascribe abilities.” (2001, 
416) In both cases, S&W insist that the ability supposedly entailed by Rylean know-
how is not present. For, whilst a ski-instructor might know how to perform a complex 
stunt, she may, nonetheless, be herself unable to perform it.  An armless pianist, the 
victim of a terrible accident, may at one time have been a virtuoso, and thus though 
she can reasonably be said to know how to play, she is no longer able.  
 Neither case is, however, as straightforward as S&W’s swift dismissal might 
suggest. Consider the ski-instructor.  The proposal is that whilst she does know-how 
to do some particularly complex stunt, she is nonetheless unable to actually do it, and 
as such Ryle’s (or indeed, any putative) ability account of know-how fails.  
Presumably, though, for S&W to think it makes any sense at all to ascribe know how 
to the ski instructor, in the first place, there must be some feature or criteria that 
makes the know-how ascription, itself, plausible.  The only viable option here would 
seem to be that this know-how is what she possesses in virtue of being an instructor, 
rather than a skier.   I take it that it is an uncontentious (and necessary) feature of this 
scenario, that the ski instructor teaches, trains or coaches other skiers such that they 
can and do progress from be unable to do the stunt under consideration, to being able 
to do it.  And that this is as a result of her direct involvement.  This looks to be 
required by S&W’s view that the ski instructor knows-how even though she’s unable 
to do the stunt.  Yet, if this is the case, then are S&W not mis-identifying the ski-
instructor’s particular type of know-how, perhaps in virtue of their failure to 
appreciate a conventional ellipsis in our natural speech?    
 For, it is not that the ski-instructor knows how to perform the stunt, but rather 
than she knows how to teach someone else how to perform the stunt, or knows how to 
train someone else to do the stunt, or knows how to coach someone, or knows how to 
advise, guide or otherwise, correct someone who is learning how to do the stunt.   
Insofar as the ski-instructor can help a stunt-novice learn how to achieve a complex 
stunt, the ski-instructor can be said to know-how to teach such moves and to be able 
to teach, train, coach, advise, guide or correct someone such that they, themselves, 
might come to have the ability to do it.  So the instructor knows how and is able, to 
                                                
19 Note S&W’s challenge, here quoted, also indicates the extent to which they move indiscriminately 
between both targeting or providing an account of nature of know-how per se and an account of the 
nature of know-how ascriptions.   
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teach a skier how to perform the complex stunt.  If, in her entire teaching, training, or 
coaching career, not one of her students had ever achieved the particular stunt under 
consideration, then we would not be tempted to say that she knows how to teach the 
stunt, and thus the supposed counter-example could not get off the ground. 
 This reading, which goes unacknowledged and unexplored by S&W, is 
perhaps ignored because of the conventional ellipsis in our natural speech.  It is 
unexceptional to refer to those teachers, trainers and coaches of our abilities, activities 
and skills, as people with the relevant knowledge of those abilities and skills; whether 
or not they are able to exemplify those abilities and skills themselves.  Indeed, the 
mark of a great teacher is often taken to be the extent to which he or she is outstripped 
by his or her own pupils or protégés. 
 Unfortunately for S&W, the opportunity to respond to this counter-challenge, 
is limited by the constraints of their own general methodology.  For, (as will be seen 
in the next chapter), S&W cannot favour, let alone acknowledge the elliptical version, 
because of the demands of their own positive account of know-how.  This turns on 
their principled rejection of ordinary speech as any kind of legitimate guide to the 
issue at hand.  Instead accurate, detailed and comprehensive analysis of the supposed 
deep linguistic structure and content of the relevant know-how sentences is the central 
tool of their own grammatically sourced propositional account of know-how.  So the 
only viable response S&W might make here is closed off to them, on pain of 
inconsistency. 
 This leaves S&W’s challenge to Ryle’s ability-based account resting entirely 
on their second counter-example: the armless pianist.  The claim here is that, having 
suffered a tragic accident, in which she loses her arms, the now armless pianist still 
knows how to play, whilst being unable.  Thus Ryle’s supposed claim that to know 
how to F is to be able to F, is false.  The apparent force of S&W’s armless pianist 
example confuses: (i) being able to do something, as a personal skill, capacity or 
ability, and (ii) being able to exercise one’s ability to do something because one has 
the right equipment, facilities or associates.  
 One might well know how to knit, but without needles and wool one cannot 
exercise one’s ability.  One might know how to dance the tango but, similarly without 
the appropriate resources, in this case music, together with a dancing partner, one 
cannot exercise this ability.  In such contexts one might say the knitter and the dancer 
have lost the ability to knit and tango, though their know-how remains undiminished.  
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But, in another sense, neither has lost their particular ability, rather they are 
(temporarily) deprived of the equipment, facilities or requisite colleagues.20  
 What of the armless pianist? S&W insist that though her ability to play the 
piano is lost, as a result of losing her arms; her know-how, however, remains intact. 
Though she no longer possesses the necessary equipment (albeit bodily) required to 
strike the keys, her know-how is undimmed.21  Her predicament, like that of the ski 
instructor, supposedly shows that know-how fails to entail ability, as Ryle’s account is 
deemed to require.  According to S&W, the pianist, “still knows how to play the piano 
[…b]ut has lost her ability to do so”. (2001, 416)  Unlike the knitter, temporarily 
deprived of wool & needles, or the currently partner-less tango dancer, the pianist 
cannot regain her ability by changing location, meeting a fellow dancer, or doing 
some shopping.  Were the pianist to be on stage at Carnegie Hall, seated in front of 
the world’s finest Steinway she would still, unfortunately, be unable to play. Perhaps 
S&W are right. If one’s equipment or resources are personal physical attributes, then 
their loss is a genuine loss of ability, whilst the associated know-how is retained.  
 For S&W’s counter-example to undermine Ryle’s supposed ability knowledge 
several issues, however, need to be resolved.  First of all, Ryle needs to be providing, 
or attempting to provide, necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how; which he 
is not.  Alternatively, he would need to be proposing that know-how and ability are 
synonymous; which he is not.  Furthermore, an argument would need to be supplied 
to justify why one extreme counter-example, on the fringes of the normal usage of the 
word ‘ability’ should de-rail our countless unproblematic applications of the word.  
No such argument is offered. These three considerations point to a meta-philosophical 
tactic which I will call ‘the Domino Strategy’.  The Domino Strategy proposes that 
possibilities from the extremities of unproblematic use, are capable of undermining or 
even destroying our regular and familiar understanding.  Rather than seek for an even 
more outlying (and outlandish) domino in an attempt to supply some kind of an 
antidote (perhaps the pianist could have radical prosthetic surgery, etc…) I reject this 
                                                
20 Cf., Maier (MSS and 2010) for a recent articulation of a familiar distinction between what he calls 
having a general ability (to say, play tennis) and the specific ability (to serve right now, because one is 
on court, racket and ball in hand.) 
21 In personal conversation with Williamson (June 23rd, 2010, Geneva) he suggested that the pianist’s 
know-how might fade, as a result of deterioration in what he took be the necessary associated brain 
states. This indicates that the metaphysics behind Stanley & Williamson’s views which were 
unarticulated in their (2001), but have recently come to light in Stanley (2011a) are indeed shared by 
Williamson.  
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modus operandi, on the grounds that it is self-defeating.  If we cannot work with the 
idea that the concepts of know-how and ability run – if not always – then for a 
substantial amount of time – along parallel tracks, then neither term would have any 
of its usual meaning for us, and the concepts involved would no longer be 
recognisable. Were this to be the case, neither the intellectualist nor the anti-
intellectualist would have any idea of the subject-matter they were attempting to 
discuss. 
 More importantly, however, the armless pianist example crucially brings home 
the importance of distinguishing between some supposed general ability account 
which Ryle is taken to be championing, and the normative performance account he 
actually is.  For part of this normative performance account is that it holds that 
knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing how to do a range of things. 
This involves not just having one, but a set of interconnected skills; not all of which 
need be lost, in cases of bodily harm. For in knowing-how to do something one not 
only is likely to utilise one’s own physical abilities, as part of one’s skillful 
performance, one has a collection of skills and abilities which relate to and involve 
other performers and practitioners. So a knitter, or a tango dancer, not only knows 
how to knit or tango themselves, but they can evaluate the individual rule-involving 
performances of other performers; detect their faults, predict their moves, appreciate 
the quality of their creative responses to the particular situations or circumstances 
encountered, and much more.  So for Ryle, when a person knows how to play the 
piano, one is not simply saying that their fingers can hit the keys in some appropriate 
way, nor is one saying that they have a further range of skills such as, inter alia, being 
able to play a number of different pieces, hearing when they have hit a wrong note, 
sight-reading, discriminating major and minor chords, etc. It also acknowledges that 
as someone with know-how, a person possesses a range of skills and abilities that 
enable one to detect mistakes in other pianists’ performances, distinguish the 
interpretative choices made by other players, advise on or correct other players’ 
technique, tell if another’s performance has improved, etc. Thus, whilst S&W’s 
armless pianist may have lost her own physical ability to play the piano, as a result of 
a tragic accident, she need not have lost the ability to perform these other skills which 
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are also part-constitutive of her piano-playing know-how.22  So even if S&W’s 
Domino Strategy is admissable, it only works if their initial characterisation of Ryle’s 
view is (i) an ability account, rather than a normative performance account and (ii) a 
very thin ability account, at that. As this misrepresents and under appreciates both the 
principle and the detail of Ryle’s account, I conclude that S&W’s challenge-by-
counter-example, like their criticism of the Regress Argument, fails.  
 That said, there are two features of Ryle’s account which do appear to be more 
vulnerable, neither of which are given any scrutiny by S&W.  In the next section I 
consider the first of these, namely, the role of dispositions as they relate to normative 
performance. 
  
3  Complex Skills & Dispositions  
 
Key to Ryle’s account of knowing-how is the notion of normative performance. 
Given this involves skills, abilities, competences, capacities, knacks, tendencies, and 
bents then it does makes some sense to speak of Ryle’s account as an ability account 
of know-how.  This conception is, though, parasitic on his more fundamental claim 
that know-how is constituted by normative performances.   
 In his wider-ranging elucidation of the logical geography of mental concepts 
Ryle categorises the notion of these rule-involving skills as being kinds of 
dispositions.  He approaches the concept of dispositions from two perspectives; that 
of the skill itself and that of the individual performer. “[T]he skill exercised in a 
performance […] is a disposition, or complex of dispositions.” (1949, 33) “The way 
in which rules, standards, techniques, criteria, etc. govern his particular performances 
is one with the way in which his dispositional excellences are actualised in those 
performances.” (1946a, 233)  Thus, for Ryle, the contribution dispositions make is 
crucially and directly related to the rule-involving character of our know-how.  As 
                                                
22 Cf., Hornsby’s (2007) reminder that “it is the variety in the ways for someone to act which can 
display her knowledge of how to participate in some one activity”, (second emphasis added), and thus 
it is implausible that complex activities like pruning roses should just be the kind of “series of token 
events” presumed in standard action theory. (2007, 179)  Though she does not explore the normative 
dimension of performance directly, Hornsby takes her point to explain why, perhaps, Ryle focusses on 
activities rather those more paradigmatic actions (like turning on light switches).  “The same sort of 
considerations that lead to seeing the inadequacies of an account of actions as belief-desire-caused 
bodily movements (the “standard story”) would seem to serve to show that there is knowledge how 
which is not propositional.” (2007, 180)  Somewhat confusingly, however, in Hornsby (2011), 
however, she talks about “standing in the relation of knowing-how to an activity or type of action”, 
which looks in danger of instigating an epistemic gap that sits awkwardly with the rest of her account.   
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such, it is not immediately obvious whether Ryle’s notion of a disposition is one and 
the same as those perhaps more familiar metaphysical or scientific conceptions of a 
dispositions qua some kind of state or property of physical substances. Nor indeed 
does Ryle introduce his notion of disposition as a preliminary to some possible 
ensuing naturalistic reduction from the normative to the non-normative.  Rather, Ryle 
uses the notion of dispositions specifically to further explore normativity; to 
investigate the often law-like, features of (some of) our mental concepts. 
 Just as, “to say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would 
dissolve, if submersed anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water” (1949, 119) 
so to know that someone speaks French provides one with a licence to conclude a 
variety of further things about that person.  These include, but are not limited to, if 
“he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds 
pertinently in French”, or were he not to do so, then one might reasonably infer that 
he is might be drunk or in a panic. To say that knowing how to speak French is a 
disposition and that it therefore has a law-like aspect, is not to say that there is some 
singular and particular state in existence that will bring about some singular and 
particular further state of affairs, but rather that one is licensed to make certain 
inferences.  This is because, for Ryle, “Dispositional statements are neither reports of 
observed or observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable 
states of affairs. They narrate no incidents.  But their jobs are intimately connected 
with narratives of incidents.” (1949, 120)   Instead, statements about dispositions are 
statements about law-like, hypothetical statements, what Ryle calls, “inference tickets 
which license us to predict, retrodict, explain and modify” as opposed to describe, 
“actions, reactions and states.” (1949, 119).  Thus to find out that “John Doe knows 
French”, one “needs no further ticket to enable him to argue from his having read a 
telegram in French to his having made sense of it.” (1949, 120)  
 I suggest, however, that in so articulating the notion of skill as a dispositional 
concept, Ryle’s is doing two things, each of which pull in different directions.  On the 
one hand, particularly in the specific context of knowing-how, he is doing too little: 
for the move to dispositions looks to be simply a more confusing re-expression of the 
characteristic rule-involving aspect of his view of skillful performance.  Not one that 
gets closer, however, to resolving the various open questions that are prompted by the 
problematic issues of rule-following, and what it is to act in accordance with a rule.  
On the other hand, Ryle is doing too much, by bringing in a term that now looks to be 
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so liberal and diverse in its potential applications that it risks failing to provide any 
real traction, at all.23  As Ryle acknowledges, “many of the cardinal concepts in terms 
of which we describe specifically human behaviour are dispositional concepts”, 
though such terms are also used “just as much for describing animals, insects, crystals 
and atoms.” (1949, 112)     
 Being both too narrow and too broad in its scope, as well as too mired in a raft 
of competing metaphysical theories and presumptions, this dispositional aspect to 
knowing-how is a hindrance rather than a help to our understanding.24  Indeed those 
intellectualists who choose to aim their critical blows at the dispositional part of 
Ryle’s account, do seem to have identified its most vulnerable feature.  I suggest, 
however, that this difficulty with Ryle’s account is not as damaging as might be 
thought. For the introduction of dispositions is not an attempt on Ryle’s part to hitch 
his conceptual geography to a particular metaphysics.  On the contrary, it is his 
chosen route into the issues and difficulties involved in the notion of rule-involving, 
normative performance.  Though this road proves to be counter-productive, pursuit of 
its quarry remains of genuine value, given the connections it helps to establish and 
consolidate. Specifically, those links between human nature, indeed our second 
nature, and the rule-involving education, training, practices and activities which 
contribute to its inculcation.  That a dispositional account is not the way to articulate 
this, makes it no less the case that, “rules etc. are the living nerves of that second 
nature.” (1946a, 233) 
 By tackling the rule-following considerations and their relevance to our know-
how, without involving dispositions, one might sidestep the troublesome waters of 
Ryle’s account, rather than surrender to them. For the avoidance of doubt, this is not a 
task that can be attempted or accomplished here, but the need for and value of it, is 
becoming unquestionable.25   
  
                                                
23 See Ammerman (1956) for the impossibility of providing a coherent account of dispositions in 
general, and thus a fortiori of providing a dispositional account of knowing-how, together with Carr on 
the, “intractable problems about dispositional analyses” (1981, 55) in general. 
24 Cf., Hartland-Swann (1956) and (1957) where the difficulties with the nature of dispositional 
concepts cause Hartland-Swann to rescind his initial account that all knowing is a dispositional know-
how under pressure from Ammerman (1956).  Though the dependency relation comes into question in 
the work of Maier (MSS) for whom, “a false presupposition that dispositions are more fundamental 
than abilities.” Yet further evidence that a move to dispositions looks unlikely to be of any explanatory 
benefit. 
25 Even for those naturalized philosophers who might think that rules can be reduced to non-normative 
properties, some commentary, as opposed to silence on the topic, would seem to be warranted.  
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4 Ryle’s Priority Thesis 
 
Ryle not only makes a categorial distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that 
but claims that knowing-how is prior to knowing-that.  In insisting, however, that, 
“knowing-that presupposes knowing-how” (1946a, 234) he may be in danger of 
making the kinds of confusions he charges the intellectualist with.  I complete my 
critical evaluation of Ryle’s account of know-how by considering what I will call his 
‘Priority Thesis’. 
 Ryle’s claim is that propositional knowledge is not merely different in kind 
from know-how, but subsequent to any such knowing-how.   
 
 To know a truth, I must have discovered or established it.   
 But discovering and establishing are intelligent operations,  
 requiring rules of method, checks, tests, criteria, etc.  A scientist  
 or an historian is primarily a man who knows how to decide  
 certain sorts of question.  Only secondarily is he a man who has  
 discovered a lot of facts. (1946a, 234)   
 
But as already seen with Ryle’s Regress Argument, propositional knowledge alone 
cannot get going without knowing how to engage with and use propositional 
knowledge.  In rejecting intellectualist approaches which not only prioritise 
propositional knowledge, but make knowledge exclusively propositional, Ryle swings 
the pendulum in the opposite direction, and prioritises knowledge-how. A scientist26, 
he insists, “is primarily a knower-how and only secondarily a knower-that.  He 
couldn’t discover any particular truth unless he knew how to discover.” (1946a, 235)  
 Yet, in the very next sentence, Ryle challenges this own Priority Thesis.  “He 
[the scientist] couldn’t know how to discover, without making this or that particular 
discovery”. (1946a, 235)  This indicates a central tension in Ryle’s work, for though 
he repeatedly insists on the necessity for the priority of knowing-how, he 
simultaneously appears to propose a more interdependent view of the relation 
between knowing-how and knowing-that.  Furthermore, the idea of what David 
                                                
26 The irreducible (but noticeably intertwined rather than prior) nature of a scientist’s imaginative 
‘know-how’ is a topic pursued by Michael Polanyi.  “I regard knowing as an active comprehension of 
the things known, an action that requires a skill.”  (1958, vii) Furthermore, “[T]hrough the exercise of 
his skill [the scientist] shapes his scientific knowledge.” (1958, 49)   
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Wiggins characterises as the, “manifold relations of interdependence” (2009, 263) is 
not, he suggests, a view that is undermined in any way, by the suggestion that 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that are distinct.  Just as it is difficult, “perhaps, 
impossible ‘cleanly to apportion’” the role played by self-love and benevolence in the 
motivation of action, nonetheless there one can still be actions motivated by “genuine 
benevolence.” (2009, 267)  So too, according to Wiggins, with what he describes as 
Ryle’s “back-and-forth” view of the two types of knowledge27.  That said, it is 
indicative of the mixed signals in Ryle’s writings on this point that Wiggins chooses 
to support his interdependent reading with a substantial quote from Ryle in which the 
priority thesis is, yet again, re-stated. (2009, 266) Ryle’s own claims of priority 
notwithstanding, I do agree that regarding knowing-how and know-that as 
conceptually twinned better fits the meta-philosophical framework of Ryle’s self-
professed task.28  
 The danger for Ryle is that in resisting the forces of intellectualism, he 
unwittingly steps away from the principles which guide his method of mapping the 
logical geography of our mental concepts.  For a conceptual relation between 
knowledge-how and knowledge-that is not the same as an empirical relation.  Where 
it might make sense to talk of a priority thesis in an empirical context, there is an 
atemporality to conceptual relations, which Ryle is here failing to acknowledge. Yet 
the rest of work is a constant reminder that his points are to be understood 
conceptually and not empirically. As Ryle reminds us, the “mind is not even a 
metaphorical place. On the contrary, the chessboard, the platform, the scholar’s desk, 
the judge’s bench, the lorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the football field are among 
its places.  These are where people work and play stupidly or intelligently.”  (1949, 
50)  
 I will not attempt to arbitrate further on the priority thesis, but merely 
acknowledge the relevance of the question it raises, for any epistemology of know-
how, and the extent to which its very use acts as a litmus test for the appreciation of a 
distinction between empirical and conceptual approaches.    In Chapter 4’s 
investigation into the notion of concept mastery this issue will again be considered, as 
                                                
27 Cf., Christopher Winch (2009) for the concern that far from having an interdependent conception of 
the know-how and know-that relation, Ryle “tends to disparage the role of propositional knowledge in 
expert practices” and “seriously underplays the role of the propositional.” (2009, 88)  
28 The interdependency of knowing-how and knowing-that is perhaps the insight that Wittgenstein 
appreciates and articulates in On Certainty (which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5).   
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part of the task to provide an argumentative step towards my own understanding of 
know-how in which any attempt to prioritise one of the conceptual pair (of our know-
how and our know-that) risks making both unrecognisable (as will be articulated in 
Chapter 7). 
 
5 Alternative Anti-Intellectualists 
 
According to Ryle’s own autobiographical note, The Concept of Mind, “is a 
philosophical book written with a meta-philosophical purpose.” (1970, 12) Part of this 
purpose is, I suggest, to engage, directly and in detail, with the kind of conceptual 
clarification that Ryle regards as the primary task of philosophy.  Part of Ryle’s task is 
to develop, practice and demonstrate the skills involved in philosophizing, not only 
for himself but for the wider philosophical community.  A decade prior to this major 
work in logical cartography, Ryle is already sensitive to the distinction between the 
task and methods of philosophy and science. “[T]he philosopher throws new light, but 
he does not give new information.” (1937, 173)  
 This view was (and still is) at odds, however, with the growing naturalistic 
priorities, preferences and presumptions that emerged in the post-War period and 
were consolidated in the second half of the twentieth century. This orientation is one 
in which philosophers seek to diminish or eliminate the distinction between 
philosophy and science.29 Such a climate is anathematic to Ryle’s suggestion that, “To 
suppose that a philosopher’s propositions can be falsified or corroborated by a new 
empirical discovery is to annihilate the difference between philosophy and the special 
sciences.” (1937, 169-170)  Indeed, to so suppose would be to fall prey to conceptual 
error.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that such affiliations between philosophy and 
science tend not to occur in the work of those philosophers of a more anti-
intellectualist flavour.  Having said that, there are a few philosophers emerging who 
are seeking to harness experimental evidence to the service of anti-intellectualism in 
general, and Ryle’s specific views on knowing-how, in particular.   
 Garry Young proposes that the findings of neuroscience provide evidence for 
Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that.  It is a distinction, he 
claims, which is scientifically ‘proven’ by comparing the “key neurological pathways 
                                                
29 I pursue these meta-philosophical distinctions further in Chapter 6. 
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said to subserve visuomotor action – the ventral and dorsal projections from the area 
VI of the visual cortex” (2009, 355) in patients suffering from visual agnosia30.  In 
one such visually-impaired patient, DF, who cannot indicate with her hand the angle 
of a narrow slot, can nonetheless successfully post a letter through the same slot.  By 
comparing DF’s damaged ventral streams and the undamaged dorsal streams, Young 
concludes that she retains a know-how that is more than mere ability, and yet is 
irreducible to propositional knowledge.  But this already requires Young to be 
working with the very conceptual distinction he wishes seeks to prove.  “It is my view 
that DF and similar patient are able to engage with their environments, in a manner 
that is distinguishable form a mere physical ability to G, precisely because their 
movements are knowledge-based.” (2009, 342)  Young’s repeated use (in both 2009, 
and 2011) of the idea that know-how is knowledge-based (my emphasis), in tandem 
with his insistence on localising knowing-how in particular parts of the brain, point to 
the very confusions which Ryle, took as part of the problem of the Intellectualist 
Legend, not the solution or dissolution, he was aiming to provide.31 
 That said, Young is not alone in seeking to provide evidence for anti-
intellectualism. Similar localizing and causal approaches can be found in Kumar 
(2011).  “In order to intelligently guide behaviour the cerebellum represents in some 
way how the body is to be positioned.  Plausibly, however, the cerebellum does not 
encode information propositionally.  So knowing how to keep balance on a bike does 
not consist in having a propositionally encoded representation”.  (2011, 147)  This 
claim is designed to serve the connectionist approach to mental representations 
favoured by Kumar.32  Thus, “[t]o know how is to possess descriptive representations 
of the world, perhaps, but it also requires a connection with the structures of the mind 
responsible for guiding behaviour.” (2011, 153 emphases added) 
 Both Young and Kumar succumb to what Bennett & Hacker call, in full 
Rylean spirit, ‘the mereological fallacy’ (2003, Ch.3), namely the mistake of ascribing 
to the part, a characteristic or property which can only be ascribed to the whole.  For, 
it is not the ventral stream that knows how to do something, nor the cerebellum, but 
                                                
30 In Young (2011) he compares the know-how supposedly had by a visual agnosia patient, to the 
know-how supposedly lacking in a patient suffering from optic ataxia.    
31 Confusion between conceptual and empirical matters are also to be found in Adams (2009) who 
claims, “Despite Ryle’s unsuccessful refutation of intellectualism, it seems his positive argument for 
the distinction has, in the end, been vindicated by empirical research.” (2009, 112) 
32 Though see Fodor & Plyshyn (1988) for a challenge to the supposed non-representationality of 
connectionist approaches to mental representations.   
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the person (and only a person) that knows how to do anything.  A point to which I 
will be returning in subsequent chapters when considering the commitments in the 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science to see what views wider afield, maybe 
constraining the epistemology of know-how.33  The point being here, however, that 
one cannot understand Ryle’s legacy without appreciating the relevance and the 
inextricability of the meta-philosophical commitments that are at work. 
 It suffices for the moment to acknowledge that there are philosophers who, 
though sharing the principled distinction between know-how and know-that and 
thereby claiming to be either heirs to, or supporters of, Ryle, nonetheless appear to be 
using methods that manifest the conceptual confusions that he wishes to dispel.  They 
risk doing the very thing Ryle is proud to have managed always to avoid, what he 
characterises as, “committing any metaphysics.” (Wood & Pitcher 1970, 10)  
 
 
6  Concluding Remarks 
 
Ryle’s conceptual distinction between knowing-how and know-that is supported by a 
argument that reveals the absurdity of the intellectualist presumption that knowing-
how might be reducible to knowing-that.  The most important substantial attempt to 
show that the Regress Argument for this reductio does not go through, itself fails; 
leaving the Regress Argument unassailed and apparently invulnerable.  Intellectualist 
criticism of Ryle’s view tries to drive a wedge between know-how and ability, on the 
assumption that Ryle’s position takes ability to be the necessary and sufficient 
condition for knowledge-how.  But this is mistaken, because Ryle is not engaged in 
supplying necessary or sufficient conditions as part of some supposed ‘analysis’ of 
know-how, rather he is pursuing the non-metaphysical task of establishing the logical 
geography of our mental concepts.  Furthermore, the account Ryle does present about 
the nature of know-how takes rule-involving normative performance, not ability, as its 
primary notion.   
                                                
33 Cf., Hutto’s suggestion that there is a difficulty for those profess anti-intellectualist leanings, “to 
make sense of practical knowledge without falling back on the representationalist paradigm for 
support.” (2005, 390) An example of which is to be found in Brogaard (2011) who argues that by 
articulating ambiguities surrounding, “the two ways in which a knowledge state can be grounded”, the 
apparent conflict between Ryle and S&W can be shown to be “partially resolved”.  But this requires 
the kind of (metaphysical) mental states and mental representation which Ryle eschews.  So yet again, 
the supposed solution just reinstates the problem.  
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 Ryle’s own attempts to provide greater illumination about the rule-involving 
nature of knowing-how turn down something of a cul-de-sac, however, with his move 
to involve dispositions; a strategy that rightly comes in for criticism.  Nonetheless, I 
take it to be indicative of the centrality of the involvement of rules; motivating the 
need for further consideration of this matter.  Similarly, Ryle’s claim that know-how 
is prior to know-that is noted, together with the internal tensions that would speak for 
a more interdependent relation between knowing-how and knowing-that.  I resist the 
urge to adjudicate on which view is correct exegesis of Ryle, but take it as motivating 
the importance of acknowledging and further clarifying the priority vs. 
interdependence tension for any non-reductive account of know-how.  (A point to 
which I return in Chapter 5 with the entry of Wittgenstein into the discussion.) 
 I now turn to the leading contemporary intellectualist proposal about knowing-
how: that of Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson.  For, whilst S&W have not 
provided any successful arguments against Ryle, perhaps their own positive account is 
similarly impregnable. 
 
 
* 
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3 
 
Propositional Intellectualism 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson deny that knowing how to do something, and 
knowing that something is the case, are two distinct kinds of knowledge.  According 
to their leading propositional intellectualist34 account, know-how is a species of 
propositional knowledge.  Whether it be our knowledge how to ride a bicycle, play 
the piano, dance the tango, make a roast dinner, tell jokes, do long division, compose 
symphonies, play hockey, read, write, or speak one’s mother tongue, all know-how is 
propositional knowledge or knowledge-that.  Stanley & Williamson argue that their 
conclusion is justified by the deliverances of linguistics, specifically the linguistic 
theories of embedded questions.  Furthermore, not only does their account run counter 
to the supposedly misguided claims of anti-intellectualist Gilbert Ryle, for whom 
knowing-how is deemed to be a matter of having a (non-propositional) ability, it 
claims to diagnose why Ryle’s view is intuitively appealing.  
 In the previous chapter, I argued that Stanley & Williamson’s specific 
arguments against Ryle’s understanding of know-how failed to bite.  I now show the 
extent to which Stanley & Williamson’s positive account is not only unjustified, but is 
built on undermining inconsistencies and confusions.  I focus primarily on their 
(2001) locus classicus, which is the paradigmatic articulation of post-Rylean 
propositional intellectualism.  I also utilise material from the continued exploration of 
knowing-how by Jason Stanley alone, including his (2005), (2011a), (2011b) (2011c), 
as well as a variety of additional satellite suggestions from Yuri Cath and other 
intellectualists. Stanley & Williamson are henceforth referred to as S&W. 
 In Section 1, I provide an exposition of S&W’s three-stage positive account of 
the nature of know-how, in order to make available the detail on which my challenges 
rest. I follow their explanatory order from the initial consideration of the syntax of so-
called ‘know how’ sentences; through the relevant semantics; to the practical mode of 
presentation of true propositional knowledge ascriptions. In each associated sub-
section, I raise a variety of my own concerns, accepting as much as possible of 
                                                
34 “Propositional Intellectualism” is perhaps the most unambiguous term.  Both “Intellectualism” and 
“Propositionalism” (see Braun, 2011) are also used as synonyms, if less often.  Caution is required 
given the recent arrival of Non-Propositional Intellectualism (see Bengson & Moffett, (2007), (2011b) 
and (2011c).   
42. 
S&W’s theoretical apparatus, in order to critically engage with S&W’s proposal on 
their own terms.  In Section 2, I consider the main challenges which Stanley considers 
S&W’s account must address, and show that the suggested responses leave several 
key anti-intellectualist concerns unaddressed.  Pursuing these pressures, I explore a 
problematic conflation together with three further issues on which S&W have, thus 
far, been near-silent. In the concluding remarks of Section 3, I reflect on issues 
exposed by this critical discussion to help identify the three different levels at which 
propositional intellectualism, as presented, unravels. In so doing, I also implicitly 
commit to a view (implicitly shared by S&W) that providing any preferred 
epistemology of know-how requires a simultaneous commitment to a particular meta-
philosophical position. This motivates the closer look at meta-philosophical matters in 
Chapter 6.  To begin, then: 
 
1  Stanley & Williamson’s Positive Account 
 
S&W’s complete proposal for their view that know-how is a species of propositional 
knowledge has three stages.  First the syntax of know-how ascriptions is identified; 
secondly, the semantic interpretation of the relevant sentences is detailed, and finally 
the mode of presentation of the relevant propositional attitude is explained.  Using as 
their paradigm example: 
 
 (1)  Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
 
S&W argue that this sentence has the syntactic structure: 
 
 (1*) Hannah knows [how PRO to ride a bicycle t].35 
 
where the square brackets indicate the clausal complement taken by ‘knows’.  This 
complement contains an embedded question which denotes its answer.  Following the 
semantics of embedded questions, and in line with this syntactic structure, S&W state 
that the correct semantic interpretation of (1*) is: 
 
                                                
35 Explanation of the ‘PRO’ and ‘t’ is forthcoming immediately below.  
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 (1**)  Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle. 
 
Finally, taking propositional knowledge to be a relation between a person and a 
proposition, S&W complete their account by proposing that the relevant propositional 
attitude be understood as follows: 
 
 (1***) Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle, under a  
  practical mode of presentation. 
 
I now examine these three stages in closer detail, starting with the syntax. 
 
1.1 The Syntax of Know-how 
 
S&W table two alternative approaches to the syntactic structure of sentences 
containing the words ‘know how’, as in: 
 
 (1) Hannah knows how to ride a bike. 
 
One approach regards ‘knows’ as a verb which takes a complement clause introduced 
by the question word ‘how’.  This can be indicated with complement clause brackets, 
thus: 
 
 (1a)  Hannah knows [how to ride a bike]. 
 
The other takes ‘knows how’ to be a singular syntactical unit which takes an 
infinitive, thus: 
 
 (1b)  Hannah knows how [to ride a bike]. 
 
S&W’s claim is that the complement clause in (1a) is an embedded interrogative, just 
as all other embedded clauses introduced by a question- or wh-word, such as: 
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 (2) Hannah knows [whom to call for help in a fire]36. 
 (3) Hannah knows [why to vote for Gore]. 
 
Additionally, in virtue of their denoting propositions, these embedded complement 
clauses are no different to sentences containing non-interrogative complement 
clauses, such as:  
 
 (4) Hannah knows [that penguins waddle]. 
 
On this view, the structure of the syntax of (1) identified in (1a), is shared by (2), (3), 
and (4).  By contrast, the structure of the syntax of (1) articulated in (1b) is not that of 
(2), (3), and (4).  For in (1b) ‘knows’ does not take a clausal complement ‘how to ride 
a bike’, but rather phrase ‘knows how’, “forms a [singular] constituent, which takes as 
a complement the expression ‘to ride a bicycle’.” (2001, 417)  The complement here 
is not a proposition-denoting clause but is a verb phrase; specifically an action-
specifying infinitive.   
 These syntactic distinctions are held to support two epistemological 
distinctions.  In the first instance, the shared syntax of (1a), and (4) is taken to confirm 
that whilst these sentences contain the words ‘knows how’ and ‘knows that’, 
respectively, they do not, however, indicate or refer to two different types of 
knowledge; one (somehow) non-propositional, the other propositional.  Rather there is 
but one kind of knowledge, propositional knowledge, had by both.  In the second 
instance, the distinct syntax found in (1b) and (4) is taken to confirm, or at least 
indicate, that the kind of knowledge indicated in each sentence is not the same.  The 
‘know how’ of (1b) being non-propositional, unlike the paradigmatic propositional 
knowledge of the ‘know that’ in (4). 
 S&W’s proposal is that the shared syntax found in the first approach, their 
own view, is correct, unlike the rival syntactic structure proposed by the second 
approach, which they take from Bechtel & Abrahamsen (1991).37  As such, the 
                                                
36 All sentence examples mentioning Hannah or John are directly taken from S&W (2001) or Stanley 
(various).  Sentences with other personal names are my own. 
37 Bechtel & Abrahamsen are not, however, engaged in the project of arguing from syntax to 
epistemology, or indeed to anything else.  They start from the presumption that there are two different 
types of mutually irreducible knowledge. Knowing-how to ride a bicycle is, “what is required is to 
have certain ability to control one’s perceptual-motor system, a system that can plan, execute, and 
monitor motor activity”. (1991, 152) This is different, they presume without argument, from the ability 
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epistemological view that there is but one kind of knowledge, propositional 
knowledge, and which attends their approach is correct.  The rival epistemological 
position that holds there are two distinct kinds of knowledge, a non-propositional 
know-how and a propositional know-that, is deemed mistaken.   
 Furthering the technical detail of their technical account, S&W consider the 
potential concern that there may be distinctions between embedded questions with 
how- as opposed to other wh-question word interrogatives, given that ‘how’ often 
takes an infinitive, i.e., an untensed verb.  They insist that it matters not to the relevant 
syntax of the clausal complement whether a wh-question complement clause contains 
untensed clauses as in (1a), (2) or (3) or comparable tensed clauses, such as: 
 
 (5) Hannah knows [whom Bill called for help yesterday]. 
 (6) Hannah knows [why Gore is the best candidate]. 
 
On this view, the tensed clause contained in the embedded question, here: 
 
 (7) Hannah knows [how Bill rides a bicycle]. 
 
is no different, syntactically, to the untensed clause contained in the embedded 
question, here:   
 
 (1a) Hannah knows [how to ride a bicycle]. 
 
Whilst the surface grammar of infinitive-involving sentences, such as (1a), does not 
include a pronoun that can be the subject of the verb “rides”, as is the case with ‘Bill’ 
in (7), there is, nonetheless, a pronoun, albeit a silent one, according to S&W’s 
preferred syntactic theory.  Thus the superficial lack of propositionality in the 
                                                                                                                                       
to remember propositions or make deductions from remembered propositions, which characterises 
propositional knowledge.  The view they do take to be more “radical” (1991, 152) and to be in need of 
an argument, is not that these two kinds of knowledge are different, but that knowing how is more 
basic.  Whilst the extended discussion about the categorial difference between knowing-how and 
knowing-that is radically curtained in Bechtel & Abrahamson’s 2nd edition (2002); they nonetheless 
continue to operate with a “major distinction” between a Rylean-inspired procedural knowledge that 
“involves skills rather than facts or episodic memories” (2002, 106), a distinction they insist is upheld 
by many cognitive scientists.  
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supposed complement clause is not an accurate guide to the matter.  Instead, the 
syntax of (1a) to be fully articulated, according to S&W, as follows: 
 
 (1*) Hannah knows [how PRO to ride a bicycle t]. 
 
where PRO is “a phonologically null pronoun that occurs, according to standard 
syntactic theory, in the subject position of untensed clauses”, and t to the “traces of 
movement” of the question words, which “occur at the site from which the phrases 
have moved.” (2001, 419)   (This might be characterised as a theoretical 
accommodation of pronoun-less clauses; bringing them into theoretically amenable 
line with embedded question clauses which contain a pronoun.) 
 Insofar then as (7) is uncontentiously a propositional knowledge ascription, 
then so too is the syntax-revealing articulation (1*).  Hence, the word ‘knows’ in: 
 
 (4) Hannah knows that penguins waddle. 
 (7) Hannah knows how Bill rides a bicycle. 
 (1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
 
always takes a clausal complement that is proposition-involving, either overtly, as in 
(4), or less obviously, in the embedded questions that are to be understood as present 
in both (7) and (1).  “The supposed difference has no basis in structure” (2001, 419) 
 No argument is offered to justify these syntactic descriptions.  Rather S&W 
present the various claims as the deliverances of the (best of the) science of 
linguistics. There is however, an argument as to why the syntax offered by S&W’s 
view is to be preferred to the syntax of a Bechtel & Abrahamsen-style approach. This 
is that the syntax of the former is inline with that of the “standardly accepted syntax” 
(2001, 420) whereas, the syntactic theory behind that of the Distinctness Hypothesis 
is, by contrast, “inconsistent with what is said about such structure in recent syntactic 
theory.” (2001, 417)  S&W claim that the standard syntax of embedded questions, 
which they use, is that proposed by Lauri Karttunen (1977), and their own articulation 
of the syntax of (1), in terms of (1*) is consistent with his theory.  Furthermore, they 
justify Karttunen’s account as the standard theoretical view, by offering Groenendijk 
and Stofkhof’s 1991 evaluative claim that Kartunnen’s approach “is probably the 
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most influential analysis in the semantics literature to date” (2011, 1111).38  These 
testimonials taken together, suffice to warrant S&W’s dismissal of the rival theory of 
syntax, and with it, any putative syntactical evidence for a possible distinct 
epistemological notion of ‘know how’.39 
 This conclusion requires, however, that S&W explain why the supposed sub-
sentential structural syntax of sentences should, in principle, be epistemologically 
revealing in this way. It also requires it to be the case that Kartunnen’s theoretical 
approach is indeed the standard view of embedded questions.  Furthermore it requires 
that ‘how’ always operate like the other of the embedded wh-question words, rather 
than merely some of the time. I now argue that none of these requirements can be met 
by S&W’s account.  
 On the first requirement, there is no attempt to provide any argument for the 
methodological merit of S&W’s general strategy that one might from argue from 
syntax to epistemology, in any fruitfully philosophical way.  Nor is there any 
indication that any such justification is either forthcoming, or indeed even needed.  
Instead, the nearest S&W get to any methodological justification is their claim that 
“most obvious benefit” of their account is that it is “entailed by current theories about 
the syntax and semantics of the relevant constructions.” (2001: 440).  One might be 
concerned, however, that this suggests a worrisome circularity, rather than a chief 
benefit.  Any rejection of their account’s epistemological conclusions, they insist, 
“would involve revising many well-entrenched beliefs about them in linguistics”.  
(2001: 440)   
 This points to the possibility that informing S&W’s approach is set of 
unannounced commitments to a deeply naturalized epistemology, that expects, invites 
and supports an intimate connection between the deliverances of scientific enquiry 
and the considerations of philosophical investigation. I will be returning to the 
relevance of these meta-philosophical issues. 40   At this stage it suffices to point out 
                                                
38 S&W (2001) quote this evaluation from the 1st edition of Groenendijk & Stokhof’s Handbook of 
Logical and Language (1997, 1105).  The wording is unchanged in the 2nd edition (2011, 1111)  
39 See Brogaard (2009) for an intellectualist view which takes the wh-complement clause to be a 
predicate rather than a proposition, but nonetheless takes the relevant knowledge-how (like all 
knowledge-wh) to be propositional.  In her case, “a special kind of de re knowledge” (2009, 439)   
40 I would agree with Bengson & Moffett’s diagnosis that S&W strategy conforms to a “uniformity 
thesis” derived from Chomsky, and which can be generalized as suggesting, “if two surface forms A 
and B pattern in similar ways with respect to their syntactic and semantic behavior, then ceteris paribus 
both are generated from some underlying form C.” (2011c, 179)  As will be explored in Chapter 6, this 
is also indicative of a naturalized philosophical understanding of the supposed philosophical task to 
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the operative notion of truth-conditional propositional content which is now, 
“entrenched in our intuitions and serves as a bench mark” across the science of 
linguistics (G&S 2011: 1082): perhaps the Archimedean point around which all else 
must move. The epistemology must fit the propositional syntax.  It is not clear which 
is the explanatory direction of fit here.  
 On the second issue, that of the pre-eminent status of Karttunen’s account, 
Groenendijk & Stokhof were, and still are, referring to the status of Karttunen’s 
theory of embedded questions as one amongst like theories: like theories that are 
merely one of just several actual approaches to interrogatives. Ten years on from the 
original presentation of Groenendijk & Stokhof’s overview of the field, the concerns, 
priorities and theories of the syntax of questions have, inevitably, not remained static. 
Nonetheless, their own description of the area looks to be in marked contrast to that 
claimed by S&W: 
  
 The semantics of interrogatives […] is an underdeveloped part of  
 natural language semantics. Part of the reason for that, it seems, is that  
 there is no standard framework that is generally acknowledged as  
 providing a common starting point for semantic analysis of 
 various phenomena in the field.  No set of concepts exists that can  
 be used to formulate and compare rival analyses.    
      (2011, 1060 emphasis added)   
 
Not only is it inappropriate for S&W to justify their Karttunen-orientated view as the 
standard theory, the very idea that there is any such single standard theory looks 
unsupportable.41  According to Groenendijk & Stokhof’s latest overview, the 
spectrum of current theories of embedded questions can be split loosely into “two 
main streams”.  One is more pragmatically orientated, taking speech acts as its 
starting point (an approach never even alluded to by S&W).  The other stream, which 
includes logical and computations theories, also includes a range of so-called 
semantic views.  Additionally, there is “a third position”, that held by David Lewis. 
                                                                                                                                       
provide  theoretical hypotheses which explanatory postulate at ‘hidden’ levels.  Not only are Bengson 
and Moffett right about S&W’s use of this technique, it also more than applies to their own approach, 
as will be seen in the next chapter.  
41 This applies even at the level of introductory works on linguistics.  With regard to, “most approaches 
to syntax [in general] there is no generally accepted framework […] Any textbook that ignore this fact 
is misrepresenting the field.” (Borsely, Robert D. 1999, ix) 
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(2011, 1077). It is within the semantic sub-section of the (non-pragmatic) second 
stream that Karttunen’s account is deemed to be a leading view, not across all the 
theories concerning interrogatives, as S&W would have their readers believe.  But I 
will return to this, at the end of the next section on the semantics of ‘know how’, 
given that it is actually Karttunen’s semantics, much more than the syntax, that S&W 
actually exploit.  
 An appreciation of the importance of semantics rather than syntax is, perhaps, 
implicit in Stanley’s own, more recent presentation of S&W’s view, where he admits, 
“there is no one unique standard analysis of the semantics of embedded questions” 
(2011c, 221).  S&W’s approach is now described as “combining a natural semantics 
for questions with one standard treatment of PRO and one standard analysis of the 
meaning of infinitives.”  (2011c, 221)42.  This looks, potentially, like Stanley is 
downgrading the ‘standard theory justification’ previous used to justify their preferred 
syntactic views as opposed to the alternative Bechtel & Abrahamsen version.  That 
said, no alternative justification has been offered since, as to why one version is better 
than the other. 
 Nor indeed is there any justification attempted to support the claim that it is all 
occurrences of ‘knows how’, rather than just some, that are to be understood 
syntactically as embedded questions.  One might accept the view that ‘know how’ 
sentences do, indeed, sometimes contain embedded questions, without being 
committed to the view, required by S&W’s epistemological account, that all 
sentences do so.  After all, the embedded question reading looks to be a plausible way 
of considering sentences43 such as: 
 
 (8)  Ruth knows how to get to Leeds on public transport. 
 (9)  Brian knows how many rose bushes have flowered this year.
 (10)  Sherre knows how best to prepare the soil in the vegetable beds.  
 
I now consider the next stage of S&W’s view, the proposed semantics of embedded 
questions, which is consequent on S&W’s proposed syntactic discrimination.  
                                                
42 For an alternative view, see Culicover & Jackendoff (2006) for whom, “PRO does not exist as a 
syntactic object” and that the required thesis of control “is best characterized in semantic [not syntactic] 
terms” (2006, 133).  So-called ‘Answer Theorists’ like Braun (2011) are themselves, “agnostic about 
whether ‘PRO’ exists and introduces ambiguity,” (2011 fn.8), though Braun nonetheless shares much 
of S&W’s intellectualist view about the propositional nature of know-how. 
43 The generalization-resisting diversity apparent here will be pursued further in Chapter 7. 
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1.2 The Semantics of Know-how 
 
As S&W acknowledge, the work of Lauri Kartunnen (1977) on the semantics of 
embedded questions follows in a tradition inaugurated by Montague (1974), and 
includes the work of Hamblin (1958 and 1973), and more recently Groenendijk and 
Stokhof (1982).44  Unlike more pragmatically-orientated theoretical approaches to 
interrogatives, this theoretical orientation does not start with any consideration of the 
speech acts of questioning, but the syntax of sentences. It takes the clausal 
complement of the embedded question to denote a set of propositions, i.e., the set of 
answers to the relevant embedded question.  In the case of Hamblin this is the set of 
all possible answers to the embedded question.  Kartunnen’s modifies this by 
narrowing the scope down to the set of true answers.45  S&W’s articulate this 
approach through considering the example:  
 
 (11) Hannah knows whom Bill likes. 
 
The embedded question, here, “whom Bill likes”, is a clausal complement. According 
to S&W, “On Kartunnen’s analysis, the embedded question ‘whom Bill likes’ denotes 
the set of true propositions expressed by sentences of the form ‘Bill likes x’.” (2001, 
420). S&W embrace this approach, but narrow the scope even further, from the set of 
all true propositions that answer the embedded question, ‘Bill likes x’ to those true 
propositions that are relevant in a particular context.  By making, “the denotation of 
the embedded question relative to that context of use” (2001, 421 original emphasis), 
the set of propositions that constitute the true answers need only “contain very few 
members.” (2001, 421)  Indeed, as it turns out, for S&W, the set need contain only 
one answer.  Hence, S&W shift from identifying the denotation of the embedded 
question from being the set of propositions, to the propositions (or proposition, 
singular) themselves.  I will follow their cue, (before discussing why this scope 
alteration takes their account into problematic territory). 
                                                
44 “The conclusion of our consideration will be that there are good reasons to assume wh-complements 
to [sic] denote the same kind of semantic object as that-complements: propositions.” (Groenendijk & 
Stokhof 1982, 176) 
45 “[M]odifying a suggestion by C.L. Hamblin, I propose that indirect questions denote sets of 
propositions.” Karttunen (1977, 39) 
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 The challenge then is to specify the relevant semantic interpretation to the 
answer(s) denoted by the embedded questions in ‘knows how’ sentences.  Just what is 
denoted?  In the case of (11), with its embedded question ‘whom Bill likes’, the 
sentence “is true, if and only if, for each proposition p in that set, Hannah knows that 
p.” (2001, 420)   If the context of use of the sentence is, say, their shared maths class, 
and Bill likes only Susan, then the denotation of the embedded question is the 
proposition ‘Bill likes Susan’.   If Hannah knows that Bill likes Susan, then (11) is 
true: Hannah does indeed know whom Bill likes.  An alternative way of articulating 
this would be: 
 
 (12)   Hannah knows that x is a person in their maths class, and Bill likes x. 
 
Similarly with other embedded wh-questions:   
 
 (13)  John knows who has a light. 
 
The propositional content can be indicated, thus: 
 
 (13) John knows, of some person x, that x has a light. 
 
The task of providing a semantic interpretation, along these lines, for sentences such 
as: 
 
 (1) Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
 
utilises the PRO pronoun revealed as part of the syntactic structure.  Here again, S&W 
use supposedly standard semantics to legislate that ‘PRO’ “can be interpreted either as 
expressions anaphoric on the subject of the main clause, or albeit less naturally, as 
‘one’.  Put simply this means that may we read: 
 
 (1*)  Hannah knows [how PRO to ride a bicycle] 
 
as either: 
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 (1*b)  Hannah knows how PRO(she) to ride a bike. 
 (1*c)   Hannah knows how PRO(one) to ride a bike. 
 
With regard to the (currently awkward) infinitive, there are two potential readings, 
which can be illuminated by comparing: 
 
 (14) Hannah is the person to call in case of danger. 
 (15) John asked where to board the plane. 
 
S&W presume that (14) invites a deontic reading, that one ought to call Hannah in 
case of danger, whereas in (15) the embedded question does not invite information 
about where John ought to board, but rather where he could board the plane.   Given 
these four alternatives readings of both the PRO pronoun and the infinitive, S&W 
propose four possible interpretations for:  
 
 (1) Hannah knows how to ride a bike. 
 
These being: 
  
 (1d) Hannah knows how she ought to ride a bike. 
 (1e)  Hannah knows how one ought to ride a bike. 
 (1f)   Hannah knows how she could ride a bike. 
 (1g)   Hannah knows how one could ride a bike. 
 
Of these four options, S&W hold that it is uncontentious that (1d) and (1e) ascribe 
propositional knowledge.  By contrast, (1f) and (1g) are possible interpretations which 
might reasonably be taken to provide potential support for the view that there are two 
types rather than one type of knowledge.  They take (1f) to be the “paradigm reading” 
with its “nonnormative modal force” (2001, 425) and put (1g) aside.46   These 
                                                
46 What is meant here by ‘non-normative’ modal force is obscure. Given however the highly 
naturalized and reductive commitment of Stanley’s account one wonders if the judicious use of a 
negating prefix is a swift side-stepping manoeuvre to avoid the need for a discussion about the 
normativity of know-how.   And indeed, one could raise a host of questions about the various modal 
issues at play here. But in seeking to grant S&W as much apparatus of their account as they wish, 
before showing how it is compromised, I will let accept this characterisation as offered. 
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preliminaries set-out, S&W propose that Hannah’s bike-riding knowledge be 
construed along exactly the same lines as her knowledge of whom Bill likes, i.e., 
along standard semantic interpretation lines for embedded questions.  In this particular 
case, that means interpreting (1f) and thus (1), as: 
 
 (1h) Hannah knows that w is a way she could ride a bicycle.  
 
This sentence is then deemed synonymous with:  
 
 (1j) Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle. 
 
Accordingly, the propositionality of the complement clause ‘how to ride a bicycle’ is 
revealed and detailed.  By using the syntax and semantics of embedded questions, 
S&W take their positive account of know-how to show how and why the apparently 
non-propositional know-how of Hannah’s knowledge of (1) is the propositional 
knowledge ascribed by (1j).  Furthermore, this is deemed to hold for all sentences of 
the form: 
 
 (16)  S knows how to V. 
 
All such sentences are syntactically structured in this way, and permit of the same 
semantic interpretation: 
 
 (17) S knows that w is a way to V. 
 
As S&W, conclude, “Thus, to say that someone knows how to F is always to ascribe 
them knowledge-that.” (2001, 426)  
 It is indeed, then with the semantics, more than the syntax of embedded 
questions, that S&W utilise the work of Kartunnen.  It is by no means agreed that 
Kartunnen’s theory is the leading theory, or to what extent it might serve to justify the 
results S&W present.  Nor is it clear that the scope restrictions S&W impose are not 
in tension with the conclusions S&W go on to draw. 
 As already indicated, Kartunnen’s work on embedded questions is just one of 
a variety of different approaches to the semantics of interrogatives.  Even within the 
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sub-section of semantic theories (in the second, non-pragmatic stream, mentioned 
above), there is no consensus that the relevant semantic objects are propositions, 
rather there is a, “confusing multitude of semantic objects”.  (G&S 2011, 1122)  
Groenendijk & Stokhof’s own evaluation of this raft of competing semantic theories 
with their mutually exclusive semantic objects, is that, “for each of these theories 
some empirical and methodological motivation can be given.” (G&S 2011, 1122).  
Indeed, they conclude their own survey of the current status of the semantic theories 
for interrogatives by suggesting that “perhaps the search for one single type of object 
which is to function as the semantic interpretation is misguided by [sic] an 
unwarranted urge for uniformity.” (G&S 2011, 1122)  Instead of, “the rigid ‘one-
category – one type’ attitude that has dominated semantics for quite some time”, 
Groenendijk and Stokhof invite theoreticians to continue with their ever-widening 
liberalism and its growing “polymorphic stance”. (G&S 2011, 1122) 
 This indicates that S&W not only need to justify the possibility of moving 
from semantics to epistemology, in principle (as already noted), but further need to 
justify using Kartunnen-style semantics in particular.  For S&W to state that, “we 
shall, with only minimal commentary use Lauri Karttunen’s classic 1997 account in 
presenting our account of embedded questions” and claim it to be the, “standard 
accepted semantics” (2001, 420), looks a little presumptuous. Furthermore, whilst it is 
the case that Karttunen does include ‘how’ in his list of wh-question words (along 
with ‘where’, ‘why’, ‘who’, etc.) not a single one of the 91 examples he uses in setting 
out his theory of embedded questions, involves the word ‘how’.47  Nor does Karttunen 
acknowledge let alone explore, at all, the tension ear-marked in the four potential 
interpretations offered by (1d), (1e), (1f), and (1g).  Indeed, all Karttunen’s examples 
of embedded questions are of the unambiguous form of embedded questions, such as 
(2), (3), (5), and (6).  There is no discussion in his work of untensed clauses of the 
kind that concern S&W here.  Rather all examples of embedded interrogatives used 
by Karttunen’s are tensed.  Typical examples of embedded questions, on which he 
focusses, include: 
 
 (18)  John wonders whether it is raining. (1977, 8)  
                                                
47 It is perhaps also important to note that in the Higginbotham & May approach to embedded questions 
which S&W claim is compatible, there is not one single ‘how’ example in the 39 pages of their 1981 
key text.  Instead their focus is on sentences such as, ‘Which people brought which books?’  
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 (19)  John knows what grade every student deserves (1977, 32) 
 
This is in the context of Karttunen’s own task to provide a, “model-theoretic 
interpretation for indirect questions.” (1977, 3)  He does so by providing a range of 
“new syntactic categories”, “new syntactic rules.”, (1977, 3)  each of the rules being 
further “accompanied by a translation rule which assigns to each resulting English 
construction an appropriate expression of intensional logic as a representation of its 
meaning.” (1977, 41)  Thus, S&W’s reliance on Karttunen semantics is the reliance 
on a theory that is itself attempting to ensure the reduction of natural language to 
logic, courtesy of stipulative translation rules.  So not only is Kartunnen’s rationale 
not seeking to draw epistemological conclusions, it requires that he operate with a 
propositional currency, ab initio.  
 Whilst S&W take the same theoretical orientation to unproblematically license 
harnessing this technique to the provision of epistemological conclusions, Karttunen 
himself remains alert to the strangeness of some of some of the theoretical features it 
involves and entails. He readily concedes that “If direct questions are semantically 
equivalent to declarative sentences of a certain kind, then direct questions, too will 
have a truth value”, a consequence that he admits seems “pointless, even 
nonsensical.”48 (1977, 4)    
 Not only are these points camouflaged in S&W’s account, they go 
unanswered.  But even leaving aside these bigger concerns, there are nonetheless 
issues internal to the proposed account that demand closer attention; the first of these 
pertaining to the scope restrictions which S&W impose.  As indicated, the key 
theoreticians of embedded questions apply scope limitations to their proposed 
semantics.  Hamblin takes the semantic interpretation of an embedded question to be 
all its possible answers, Kartunnen all its true answers, and S&W narrow the scope to 
all true answers, relative to a context of use.  Additionally, Karttunen acknowledges 
that not all embedded questions operate in the same way, though he does suggest that, 
“in the light of the great majority of cases of overlapping distribution, […] wh-
questions and whether-questions should be assigned to the same  syntactic category.” 
(1977, 3)   There is no such admission, by S&W, that there are any cases that fall 
outside the proposed account presented by S&W.  They insist that all ‘know how’-
                                                
48 The ubiquity of the propositional seems to be inescapable, regardless of the consequences.  One 
might argue that as a cornerstone of the intellectualist paradigm this is unsurprising. 
56. 
involving sentences, without exception, are structured as described.  S&W’s final 
conclusion is presented without caveats, without scope limitations and with no 
suggestion that there are awkward cases, exceptions to the rule, or additional 
interpretations.  S&W present their conclusion not as an inference to the best 
explanation, the result of some inductive scientific investigation, but with the 
authority of a deductive conclusion.49  A methodology which is itself suspect. 
 A further example of what one might describe as the amenable scope elasticity 
of S&W’s account, is to be seen in cases where the embedded question has no true 
answer.  This, though is an example S&W do acknowledge (see 2001: fn 19), when 
considering the situation in which there is no-one that Bill likes.  In this situation, the 
embedded question in (11): 
 
 (11) Hannah knows whom Bill likes. 
 
will, according to S&W be, “trivially true relative to such a context” (2001, 421). The 
triviality of the truth is a matter, presumably, of S&W treating (11) as a conditional 
whose antecedent is false (i.e., If there is someone who Bill likes, then Hannah knows 
who that person/those people are). But if (11) is trivially true in the case (and relative 
to the context of use) where there is no-one that Bill likes, then what about: 
 
 (21) Hannah knows how to catch the Loch Ness Monster. 
 
Given that there is no w such that w is a way to catch the Loch Ness Monster (because 
it doesn’t exist), then, by the same token (21) would also be trivially true. This 
suggests that the semantic interpretation of embedded questions sentences is correct, 
only in cases where there is at least one answer.  S&W’s response is limited to the 
proposal that sentences such as (11) do indeed presuppose the truth of at least one 
answer. “If this presupposition is not satisfied, no proposition is expressed.” (2001, fn. 
19) This gestures to further scope restrictions operative in the S&W account; scope 
restrictions not embraced in their acknowledgement that they operate with a mention-
some, rather than mention-all approach.   Note also that they justify this mention-
some reading on grounds of it being more ‘natural’.  “Mention-some readings are 
                                                
49 In Chapter 6, I explore the extent to which such ‘theoretical’ hypotheses would seem (unlike their 
natural scientific counterparts) to be immune to experimental confirmation or refutation.  
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somewhat more natural for embedded questions constructions containing infinitives” 
(Stanley 2011c, 224), however if taking something to be ‘more natural’ is the criterion 
for a stronger justification, then why is the entirely natural reading of a know-how 
sentence (that of ascribing the ability, capacity or skill to do something) not more 
warranted? 
 Consider too, so called ‘open questions’, where it is unclear whether or not 
there is an answer.  As Groenendijk & Stokhof confirm, such questions are, “not 
requests for a particular piece of information”, rather, “[a]nswering an open question 
is a creative process, one might say, where we make up the answers as we go along, 
and do not simply choose from a pre-established set.” (G&S 2011, 1115).  It remains 
unclear what S&W would say in response to such questions. In later writing, Stanley 
does admit that, “some idealizations are in order.” (2011c, 221)  Notwithstanding this, 
there continues to be unadvertised scope restrictions in play, regardless of their 
insistence that without exception, “All knowing-how is knowing-that” (2001, 444 
emphasis added).50   
 Perhaps the tensions surrounding this scope elasticity51 might be resolved in 
the light of the final piece in the jig-saw of S&W’s three-stage account.  I now 
conclude this exposition of their intellectualist theory of know-how, by turning to the 
notion of the practical mode of presentation of the propositional knowledge. 
 
1.3 The Mode of Presentation of Know-how 
 
In line with to the supposed standard theoretic accounts of the syntactic structure and 
the semantics of embedded questions, S&W hold that the sentence: 
 
 (1)  Hannah knows how to ride a bike. 
 
                                                
50 Though given that S&W’s view is more about the metaphysics of mind than epistemology, 
exceptions are not feasible. 
51 Perhaps S&W are embracing, if not announcing, Chomsky’s (1980) suggestion that, “linguistics 
would perhaps profit by taken to heart a familiar lesson of the natural sciences.  Apparent 
counterexamples and unexplained phenomena should be carefully noted, but it is often rational to put 
them aside pending further study when principles of a certain degree of explanatory power are at 
stake.”  This is from Chomsky’s On Binding (1980b, 2), which is a paper  identified in the footnotes of 
S&W’s (2001).  It also begs the question why S&W can use their Domino Strategy on Ryle, but slip its 
clutches when its challenge might be applied to their own views.  
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does not ascribe some form of non-propositional know-how to Hannah, but is an 
ascription of propositional knowledge.  This is exposed, on S&W’s account, by the 
fully analysed and interpreted sentence:  
 
 (1j) Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle. 
 
Not only is w a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle, but there are different ways (modes) 
in which this particular way, w, can be entertained.  “The same way can be entertained 
under distinct modes of presentation” (2001, 428)  S&W suggest that to know how to 
ride a bicycle, i.e., to know that w is a way to ride a bicycle, can be entertained in 
either (at least) a demonstrative mode of a presentation, or a practical mode of 
presentation.  
 This notion of entertaining propositions under different modes of presentation 
is deemed applicable to any of the “three standard theories of the semantics of 
propositional-attitudes ascriptions” (2001, 426), whichever one prefers. 52 The 
distinction between entertaining the proposition that w is way to V, under a 
demonstrative mode of presentation, as opposed to a practical mode of presentation, 
is given by the analogy between entertaining a proposition under a demonstrative 
mode of presentation, as opposed to a first-personal mode of presentation.53  Consider 
the sentence: 
 
 (22)  John has burning pants. 
 
Now consider the scenario in which John believes himself to be looking through a 
window at another person, (though in fact he is looking at himself in a mirror).  In the 
                                                
52 According to S&W’s own taxonomy, these are (a) “the Fregean theory” whereby “propositions 
contain modes of presentation of properties and objects”, (b) “the contemporary Russellian theory” in 
which “propositions are ordered sequences of properties and objects” or (c) “a third standard theory” in 
which “‘believes’ and ‘knows’ express three-place relations between persons, Russellian propositions 
and ways of thinking of Russellian propositions”.  (2001, 427)  N.B. Given that Russell, of course, 
takes propositional knowledge to be ultimately based on acquaintance (with actual properties and 
objects), this may explain why S&W assume, along with Hamblin et al, that there is always at least one 
true answer to an embedded question.  
53 Note also that Stanley identifies two further modes of presentation: “a discursive mode of 
presentation of a way of doing something” and “a descriptive mode of presentation of a way, rather 
than a practical one” (2011c, 230) which seem to be the same thing, though it’s not clear if they are 
also identical to a (the?) third-personal mode of presentation of a way of doing something. 
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first instance, he notice flames on what he takes to be someone else’s trousers. In this 
situation: 
 
 (23)   John believes that that man has burning pants. 
 
He is, thus, entertaining (22) under a demonstrative mode of presentation.  When John 
realises he has mistaken a mirror for a window, and that he is actually looking at 
himself, then: 
 
 (24)   John believes that he himself has burning pants. 
 
The “very same proposition” (2001, 428) (22) is now entertained, in (24), under a 
first-personal mode of presentation.     
 By analogy, S&W propose that propositions whose contents include, “ways of 
engaging in actions” (2001, 427 original emphasis) have the option to be known 
under both a similar demonstrative mode of presentation, and a comparable practical 
mode of presentation.  (Though S&W remain silent on whether a practical mode is 
one and the same as a type of first-personal mode of presentation.54)  Consider 
Hannah’s friend Susan, pointing and saying, as they watch John cycle past:  
 
 (25)  That way is a way for you to ride a bicycle. 
 
Susan is here identifying a way (that way, John’s way55) in which Hannah could ride 
a  bicycle, under a demonstrative mode of presentation.  But just as truth of the 
propositions entertained under demonstrative modes of presentation don’t entail those 
entertained under first-personal modes of presentation (as shown above in the failure 
of (23) to guarantee the truth of (24)), so S&W propose that the analogous 
propositions entertained under demonstrative modes of presentation do not entail 
those entertained under practical modes of demonstration.  Hence, Hannah might 
stand in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is a way for her to ride a 
bicycle, under a demonstrative mode of presentation (when Susan comments on John 
                                                
54 Stanley (2011a) suggests that a first-personal mode of presentation is both personal and practical.  
55 Just what way is this?  Against a prevailing wind?  Wearing one’s pyjamas?  Whilst drunk?  
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cycling past), this need not entail that she entertains it under a practical mode of 
presentation.  
 S&W concede that providing any further, non-trivial characterization of this 
practical mode of presentation is, as with the first-person mode of presentation “a 
substantial philosophical task”, though they do claim there is an existence proof 
available for both.  (2001, 429)   These tasks are announced, then put aside.  Further 
detail about such ways, what it is to ‘entertain’ a way, or any consideration about the 
extent to which a practical mode of presentation of ways might be ability-involving, is 
confined to a selection of tantalizingly brief comments, none of which are pursued 
further. These include, “thinking of ways under a practical mode of presentation 
undoubtedly entails the possession of certain complex dispositions”, where 
dispositions are “dispositional states”. (2001, 429)   Indeed these modes of 
presentation are taken to illuminate the view that: “It is simply a feature of certain 
kinds of propositional knowledge that possession of it is related in complex ways to 
dispositional states.” (2001, 430)  Furthermore, “any successful account of natural 
language must postulate entities such as ways”. (2001, 427)  That said, S&W refuse to 
be drawn into revealing anything more about the “metaphysics of ways”, except to 
say that they are “properties of token events”. (2001, 427)56  It is to be noted, 
however, in entertaining ways of Ving under a practical mode of presentation, one is  
(on Stanley’s more recent exposition of this account) thinking. “To think of (say) a 
way of swimming under a practical mode of presentation is to have a multi-track 
disposition towards that way of swimming”. (Stanley: 2011b, 42 emphasis added)
 With the articulation of the practical mode of presentation, S&W conclude 
their positive account of knowing how.  Their paradigm sentence:   
 
                                                
56 In his (2011a) Stanley now calls these dispositional states which supposedly cause and guide our 
person-level intelligent activity, and which it is the task of the epistemology of know-how to theorise 
about, “standing epistemic states” (2011a, 26, 31, 182, 184, 185).  In finally revealing his metaphysical 
hand with the characterisation of these states not only does he expose his commitment to a 
Representational Theory of Mind (which fits in with his much of his Chomsky/Fodorian orientation to 
the philosophy of mind) he reveals his fundamental misunderstanding of Ryle’s project. For he 
suggests Ryle is arguing for a non-propositional view of these (supposed mind/brain) ‘standing 
epistemic states’. “[I]t is undeniable that knowledge of how to do something is a standing epistemic 
state of an agent; both those who deny and those who accept its propositional natural agree with this 
truism.” (2011a, 185)  Yet far from being a truism, this not only misses the point that Ryle is not 
arguing about the nature of these ‘standing epistemic states’, but about their very (metaphysical) 
existence. Therefore, Stanley’s account is not just intellectualist in its conclusion, but in the very 
paradigm by which it operates, and (mistakenly) imposes as part of the very framework for all other 
viable proposals, including that of Ryle.  In Chapter 6, I look more closely at the marriage between the 
intellectualist paradigm and the methodology of naturalized philosophy.  
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 (1)  Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle. 
 
is revealed to be not an ascription of some kind of particular non-propositional know-
how, but propositional knowledge, thought of, or entertained, in a particular way: 
 
 (1***)  Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle under a  
  practical mode of presentation.  
 
S&W take their conclusion to legitimize a generalization to all knowledge ascriptions.  
So any sentence of the form: 
 
 (16)   S knows how to V. 
 
ascribes the following propositional knowledge: 
 
 (25)  S knows that w is a way to V under a practical mode of presentation. 
 
“All knowing-how is knowing-that”. (2001, 444)  To think otherwise is to “embrace a 
false dichotomy.” (2001, 444)  
 Given that S&W concede that their notion of a practical mode of presentation 
is not essential57 to their positive account of know-how, what, then, is the purpose of 
including it in their “complete account”? (2001, 43)  Could it be that the practical 
mode of presentation offers a way of introducing an intentional, action-like element 
into what is otherwise an overtly highly intellectual account, in order to attempt to 
make it less immediately counter-intuitive? Although S&W insist that, “It is simply 
false, however, that ascriptions of knowledge-how ascribe abilities,” (2001, 416) 
                                                
57 See S&W (2001, fn.38), “[P]ractical modes of presentation are not essential to our analysis, in the 
sense that a philosopher who rejects modes of presentation simpliciter may easily accept the rest of our 
analysis of knowing-how.”  In one sense this is right if one is operating with a cognitive scientific 
inherited picture of the mind, on which intelligence just is a matter of a information-processing over 
propositional/representational content, which has no addition need for modes of representation. But this 
bigger picture (of the mind) is one of the paradigms that anti- and non-intellectualist approaches (like 
Ryle, and indeed, like Wittgenstein (as will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6) question.  Plus one may wish 
to consider those high-ranking apostates of the cognitive science world (like Rodney Brooks (1991a) , 
(1991b), (2001) and (2012) and John Haugeland (1978) (2004) who have come to reject the 
Cognitivism that this ‘easy analysis’ of know-how or intelligence enshrines.   And of course, there are 
those like Descombes (2001), Bennett & Hacker (2003), Kenny (1989) (2009) for whom this view of 
our mindedness has always been flawed. 
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nonetheless they appreciate that such ability-orientated views are much more 
intuitively appealing than their own position. Indeed, when considering Gilbert Ryle’s 
ability account of know-how, they acknowledge, “The thesis that intentional actions 
are employments58 of knowledge-how is precisely what accounts for the initial 
plausibility of Ryle’s original argument against the claim that knowledge-how is a 
species of knowledge-that.” (2001, 443)  S&W’s own appeal to this suggested 
practical mode of presentation might be regarded as an unabashed attempt to reduce 
the implausibility of their intellectualist position, by including a practical aspect that 
alludes more directly to the ability-involving accounts of know-how.  Of course, this 
prompts concern that S&W might well be shooing the ability requirement out of the 
front door only to facilitate its return through the back: a point S&W deny, insisting, 
“We are not engaged in the reductive project of reducing talk of knowledge-how to 
talk of knowledge-that.  Our view is rather than knowledge-how is a species of 
knowledge-that. To establish that one concept is a subspecies of another, it is not 
necessary to provide a reductive analysis of that concept”. (2001, 433-434)  In 
Chapter 6, I consider the extent to which claims to be providing non-reductive 
analyses are what they seem, but S&W’s defensive manoeuvre is somewhat awkward.  
 Perhaps though the claim that the practical mode of presentation is not 
essential is simply a way of introducing a device which provides S&W with a richer 
reservoir of resources from which to draw when articulating, elucidating and 
justifying their intellectualist account, but without having to tie themselves to it. If 
this is the case, then any viable notion of a practical mode of presentation will need to 
be, at least, free from obvious ambiguity, and be capable of providing more 
illumination than it needs. There are a variety of potential difficulties which suggest 
these criteria are not met.   There is the unexplained notion of entertaining a 
proposition under a practical mode of presentation, offered in order to side-step 
recourse to having to know a mode of presentation.  Plus entertaining’s awkward 
partner, thinking about a proposition under a practical mode of presentation.  When 
Hannah rides her bike, is she really thinking?  Even when she was learning, was she 
                                                
58 I would also point out the extent to which the intellectualist paradigm is operative in the choice of 
phrase ‘employment’ of know-how, as opposed to the anti- or non-intellectualist or connotations 
involved in ‘exemplification’ of know-how.  The former sets up the expectation of a metaphysical 
causal state, the latter has none of these metaphysical consequences.  So whilst Stanley says of S&W’s 
account that, “They intend their analysis to be entirely neutral on how propositional knowledge is 
realized in the brain,” (2011b, 45) Stanley (and S&W) are not neutral in having a view that 
propositional knowledge is somehow realized in the brain.   
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thinking?  Concentrating, focusing, trying to balance, perhaps; but thinking?    
Secondly, certain features of the practical mode of presentation, indeed its very 
existence, are supposedly justified by analogy to the first-personal mode or 
presentation, yet in other respects S&W’s account exploits the disanalogies between 
these modes.  The result is that the arguments from analogy seem to be brought to 
bear in ways that are conveniently ad hoc.  Thirdly, with regard to the supposed 
opacity of know-how, S&W’s intuitions may actually run counter to the very point 
that the practical mode of presentation is introduced to capture, as will be seen.  
Fourthly, having the option of a practical mode of presentation for know-how, runs 
the risk of collapsing the distinction between what it is to know how to do something, 
and what it is not to know how to do something.  I will take a closer look at each of 
these worries. 
 Firstly, then, what is entertaining a proposition? Though S&W give no details, 
it clearly cannot be the same as knowing a proposition, as it is deemed capable of to 
illuminating and explaining what it is to know.  Plus, of course, one might entertain a 
false proposition.  Yet it is not a matter of believing or asserting. It would seem to be 
plausible to suggest that what S&W mean is something like considering or 
contemplating a proposition.   But just what is the proposition that one is considering 
or contemplating, when doing so under a practical mode of presentation?  Is doing 
something the same as considering or contemplating doing something under a 
practical mode of presentation? 
 S&W are clear that on their account knowing a way to do something does not 
require being able to describe in any detail how it is that one does that thing, or what 
it is happening when one is doing that thing, only that one acknowledge that one is 
doing that thing.  Indeed, they insist that propositional knowledge known under a 
practical mode of presentation need not be expressable, articulable or recognisable in 
any non-indexical way: 
  
 Even if Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle, there need be no  
 informative sentence of the form ‘I ride a bicycle by Fing’ which  
 she would recognise as true.  That is for [Hannahi knows PROi  
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 how to ride a bicycle59] to be true, there need be no sentence  
 she understands and accepts containing a purely non-indexical  
 description of riding a bicycle.             (S&W 2001: 432) 
 
This suggests that the only proposition that Hannah need be entertaining or thinking 
(ie. considering or contemplating) when she knows how to ride a bike, is something 
like: 
 
 (26) I’m doing this in this way. 
 
So whilst Hannah knows how to ride a bike, the propositional knowledge in which 
that actually consists need consist of nothing more than (26).   Presumably, then when 
Hannah skis or tells jokes, she need only entertain or think the following items of 
propositional knowledge: 
 
 (26a) I’m doing this (skiing), in this (ski-ing-ly) way. 
 (26b)  I’m doing this (telling jokes) in this (telling jokes-ly) way. 
 
It is not clear that this amounts to any kind of illuminating way to consider what it 
might be to entertain not just a proposition, but the different propositions presumably 
entertained when engaged in various different activities.  It simply looks like a 
potential propositional accompaniment to any such activities, or a sentence whose 
utterance one would accept, as true, whatever one were Ving, whenever one were 
Ving.  But is a sentence that accompanies an activity, or that might be acceptable 
when suggested as an indexical description of an activity, the very same thing as 
entertaining the proposition (the propositional knowledge)?  Is it constitutive of that 
knowledge?60 
                                                
59 Here the shared subscript i is a conventional linguistic indication that PRO qua pronoun refers back 
to Hannah, ie. that Hannah knows how (she) could ride a bike. 
60 See Cath’s “Seeming Analysis” (2011) for an intellectualist account in the spirit of S&W that 
embraces, without comment, this same notion of ‘entertaining’, whilst replacing their “knowledge-that” 
relation between person and proposition be replaced by a “seeming relation”.   The result being that “if 
knowledge-how is not a knowledge-that it could still be the case that knowledge-how is proposition in 
nature,” (2011, 135) a conclusion that looks to deepen the confusion, rather than alleviate it.  Whilst 
remaining true to the intellectualist paradigm inherited from cognitive science. 
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 The only suggestion S&W offer here is that entertaining a proposition under  
practical mode of presentation is a case of being in some kind of mental state.  “Some 
still believe that all mental states can be characterized in nonindexical terms.  We are 
not sympathetic to this view.” (2001, 433)  But are they implying some kind of 
isomorphism here?  And how is this supposed to work?  This issue takes us back to 
the cul-de-sac of dispositions, where the explanatory trail initiated by S&W, goes 
abruptly cold.  Given this minimalist indexical content of the relevant propositional 
knowledge entertained or thought under the practical mode of presentation, it is hard 
not to conclude that the relevant propositional knowledge, on S&W’s account is 
anything other than entirely trivial.  It is unclear why S&W go to great lengths to 
bring in a raft of linguistic apparatus if this is the result. 
 Secondly, an analogy is drawn between the non-entailment of the truth of 
propositions entertained under the demonstrative mode of presentation, to the truth of 
propositions entertained under the first-person mode of presentation, and the non-
entailment of the truth of propositions entertained under the demonstrative mode of 
presentation, to the truth of propositions entertained under the practical mode of 
demonstration.  This analogy supposedly provides further justification for the 
argument for a practical mode of presentation.  But when considering the first-
personal knowledge had by John when, for example, he knows that he is tired, S&W 
admit “There may very well be no way to analyze away John’s first-personal mode of 
presentation of himself in third-personal terms.”  (2001, 434)  By analogy, then, one 
would expect the practical mode of presentation to be similarly unanalysable in third-
personal terms. Indeed, it perhaps offers the potential for a snug fit with the non-
indexical point just made.  In which case, however, on the terms of S&W’s own view, 
there must be a distinction between (putative) third-personal ascriptions of know-how 
to a person and the first-personal nature of a person’s own know-how.  But this is an 
unacknowledged distinction.  What it is to ascribe of Hannah the knowledge how to 
ride a bike (under a practical mode of presentation) is not, therefore, the same as her 
own first-personal knowledge. That this mistake can be made is, I suggest, that in the 
cases of standard (third-personal modes of presentation) there is no difference 
between the ascriptions of a particular item of knowledge, say about penguins:  
 
 (2)  Hannah knows that penguins waddle. 
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and the knowledge Hannah has about penguins.  Both the ascription of Hannah’s 
knowledge and the knowledge Hannah has are propositional.  So having exploited a 
disanalogy between first- and third-personal modes of presentation, the further 
disanalogy is now ignored, at precisely the juncture where it might be utilised to 
capture the distinction under consideration. 
 Further, if one holds the view that know-how is not propositional knowledge, 
one might also hold the view that whilst ascribing know-how is propositional, the 
know-how had by the ascribee is not, itself, propositional.  Thus there is a entirely 
reasonable explanation for the first- and third-person disanalogy.  Of course S&W, 
who hold that there is only one kind of knowledge, have no reason to hold that there is 
a distinction between propositional knowledge and ascriptions of propositional 
knowledge.  The consequences of this are evident throughout their article, as they 
move seamlessly, and repeatedly, between claims about knowledge and claims about 
ascriptions of knowledge.   At times S&W state, “We contest the thesis that there is a 
fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that.  Knowledge-
how is simply a species of knowledge-that” (2001, 411), but then presume no change 
of meaning occurs when shifting to, “We take our view of ascriptions of knowledge-
how to be the default position” (2001, 431 emphasis added).  The point I emphasise 
here is that the proposal of a practical mode of presentation is supported by arguments 
from analogy with the first-personal mode of presentation.  Yet, when those parallels 
are either surplus to, or counter to, requirements, they are ignored. This suggests that 
the use of the arguments from analogy is sufficiently and strategically ad hoc to fuel 
increasing concerns over the general viability of the notion of a practical mode of 
presentation. 
 On the third issue, of opacity, S&W draw on the familiar appreciation that the 
truth of: 
 
 (27)  Hannah knows that Hesperus is Hesperus 
 
“intuitively does not entail” (2001: 438) the truth of: 
 
 (28) Hannah knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus 
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Their suggestion is that given propositional knowledge is know-how, it too should be 
similarly opaque.  Their example, features dancer Hannah who performs a dance 
routine she has christened Headbanger, such that:  
 
 (29)   Hannah knows how to perform Headbanger. 
 
The movements of Headbanger are, however, exactly the same movements as 
Harvey, which just so happens to be a semaphore rendition of Gray’s Elegy.61 It “does 
not seem to follow” (2001, 438) S&W suggest, that (29) entails: 
 
 (30) Hannah knows how to perform Harvey. 
 
This conformity to the general opacity of propositional knowledge is offered as 
further justification of S&W’s general account.   
 But is there not a way to use the very apparatus S&W offer, and remain with 
the constraints of their account, yet arrive at a different view about (30)?  
Remembering that the relevant propositional knowledge need only be indexical, it 
would seem feasible to suggest that in knowing how to perform Headbanger, all that 
Hannah needs to do is to entertain the relevant proposition under a practical mode of 
presentation, whilst stating: 
 
 (31)  I’m doing this (performing Headbanger), in this (Headbanger-ly) way. 
 
Presumably this indexical proposition does not require Hannah to have yet named her 
dance Headbanger, (or had it so named by a cruel critic).  She need only be dancing 
and entertaining the proposition: 
 
 (32) I’m doing this (performing), in this (performing-ly) way. 
 
under a practical mode of presentation. Now, were Hannah to be performing Harvey 
she would be doing exactly the same movements, in exactly the way. Insofar as 
knowing-how is but a species of propositional knowledge, that need only be such 
                                                
61 See Carr (1979, 407) for the original presentation of this example. 
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indexical knowledge, as long as it is known under practical mode of presentation, then 
it is not clear that it makes any sense to claim that Hannah knows how to perform 
Headbanger but not how to perform Harvey.  
 What is actually pertinent to S&W’s example, but they fail to appreciate, or 
acknowledge its relevance, is that, according to their scenario description, not only 
does Hannah know-how to perform Headbanger, but also: 
 
 (33)   Hannah knows that the dance she performs is Headbanger. 
 
and indeed (if this makes sense): 
 
 (34) Hannah knows that Headbanger is Headbanger. 
 
whereas: 
 
 (35)   Hannah does not know that Headbanger is identical to Gray’s Elegy 
  in semaphore. 
 
But these are not ascriptions of the supposed propositional knowledge entertained 
under a practical mode of presentation that is Hannah’s knowledge-how.  They are 
associated claims one might make about Hannah’s knowledge of the names, features 
and further descriptions of her, and others’ activities.  Knowledge that is, itself, 
unambiguously propositional.   S&W’s use of opacity to justify their account piggy-
backs on the genuine propositional knowledge available in comparable situations.  
 The fourth reason I suggest that modes of presentation are more problematic 
than S&W require, is offered by the distinction between knowing how to V and not 
knowing how to V. Consider Ruth who both enjoys listening to pianists and 
clarinetists, but although she knows how to play the piano, she doesn’t know how to 
play the clarinet.  On S&W’s account, then: 
 
 (36) Ruth knows that w is a way to play the piano, under practical mode of 
  presentation. 
and 
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 (37) Ruth knows that w is a way to play the piano, under a demonstrative 
  mode of presentation. 
 
What, though is the relevant semantics of the sentence: 
 
 (38) Ruth does not know how to play the clarinet.  
 
Whilst this looks likely: 
  
 (38a) Ruth does not know that w is a way to play the clarinet, under a  
  practical mode of presentation. 
 
It is also the case that, as a fan of Mozart’s Clarinet Quintet: 
 
 (38b) Ruth knows that w is a way to play the clarinet, under a   
  demonstrative mode of presentation. 
 
So it looks like Ruth both knows, yet doesn’t know that w is a way to play the 
clarinet, depending on which mode of presentation is being considered.  If this is the 
case then it would appear that the mode of presentation is a necessary and not 
optional, element of S&W’s account, as claimed. Furthermore, their claim to, “remain 
neutral on the question of whether these modes of presentation have semantic import” 
seems premature.  
 In addition to the concerns I raise, circularity worries are pressed by many 
commentators.  John Koethe takes the practical mode of presentation to require 
knowledge of how “to instantiate a way”, thus S&W’s account “appeals to the very 
notion it seeks to explicate” (2002: 326).  Alva Noe also points out that S&W’s proof 
for the existence of a practical modes of presentation is nothing other than the claim 
“If there were no practical modes of presentation of propositions, then it couldn’t be 
true that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.  But it is.  Therefore, there 
must be such modes of presentation.” (2005: 287)   In seeking responses to this range 
of worries about the practical modes of presentation, S&W’s cupboard does look bare. 
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2 Propositional Intellectualism: Responding to the Challenge 
 
In Section 1, I presented an exposition of S&W’s positive account of know-how and 
articulated a variety of pressures I take to be invited by the commitments and 
conclusions of each of its interim stages.  These particular worries are not, however, 
amongst the eight objections considered, preemptively, by S&W (2001).  Recently, 
Stanley has re-entered the dialogue initiated by S&W’s (2001) paper, and superceded 
those particular objections by identifying “three of the most pressing issues in the 
debate, [in order to] show that their resolution weighs in on the side of the 
Intellectualist.” (2011c, 208) I will name these three issues, for ease of reference, the 
Objection from Explanation, the Objection from non-Gettierization, and the Objection 
from Other Languages.  I now show, in Section 2.1, that whilst Stanley’s responses to 
these three objections are acceptable, on the terms of S&W positive account, they 
nonetheless fail to add up to a genuine defence of Propositional Intellectualism.  For 
not only are they silent in response to the specific, stage-related concerns explored 
above, but there four key additional challenges remain unacknowledged, and  
outstanding.  I take a closer look at these in Section 2.2. 
 
2.1  Three Objections 
 
The Objection from Explanation, that one should be able to explain what one knows 
how to do, has various critical manifestations62. “The premise behind these arguments 
against the Intellectualist position is that if knowing how to do something is 
propositional knowledge, then knowing how to do something entails being able to 
explain how to do it.”  (2011c, 213)  But as detailed in Section 1.3, this is not a claim 
S&W make.  By acknowledging that the propositional knowledge in question need be 
limited to a modest indexical claim, this objection has no purchase on the detail of 
S&W’s actual account.  Knowing how to V need not entail being knowing how to 
explain how to do something.63  “The 8 year old Mozart can assert the proposition that 
constitutes his knowledge how to compose a symphony; he can just say, while 
                                                
62 See Schiffer (2002) for variations on this theme. 
63 Knowing how to do something and knowing how to explain how to do that thing are distinct.  “On 
Stanley & Williamson’s theory, x knows how to explain how to ride a bicycle if and only if for some 
way w, which is a way in which x could explain how to ride a bicycle, x knows that w is a way in 
which x could explain how to ride a bicycle.” Stanley (2011c, 214) 
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composing it, the German translation of “this is how I can do it”. (2011c, 212 
emphasis added) Indeed, this is no different to the case Stanley makes for other kinds 
of knowledge: “I know that the table I write on is this shade of brown, and the 
cupboards are that (different) shade of brown.  But the only way I have of expressing 
my propositional knowledge about the shades of brown is in demonstrative involving 
terms.”  (2011c, 215)   Thus pressing Intellectualism by requiring the person who 
knows how to do something explain their supposed propositional knowledge is 
merely creating a straw man to attack64.  Actually, S&W’s intellectualist account 
shares the typical anti-intellectualist presumption that there need be no demand that 
know-how be explicable in specific propositional detail.65  So whilst Stanley’s 
successful rejection of this objection, does deflect an objection to propositional 
intellectualism, it no more tells in favour of a propositional account of know-how, 
than it might serve a non-propositional, or anti-intellectualist view.   
 The Objection from Gettierization exploits S&W’s thesis that know-how is a 
species of propositional knowledge and thereby should be open or amenable to 
Gettierzation. As such, then their propositional account of know-how should be 
similarly vulnerable.  And indeed S&W do offer an example of Gettierized know-
how.  Consider trainee pilot, Bob, who wishes to learn to fly on a simulator. 
Unbeknownst to Bob, Henry his instructor has inserted a randomizing device that 
jumbles the information supplied by the simulator’s controls. Whenever Bob uses the 
simulator, however, the randomized information just happens to be correct, a feature 
that Henry is too incompetent to realise.  After the appropriate number of flight 
training hours, “Bob passes the course with flying colours.  He has still not flown a 
real plane.  Bob has a justified true belief about how to fly.  But there is a good sense 
in which he does not know how to fly.” (2001, 435)  
 Ted Poston (2009) does not draw the same conclusion for S&W’s scenario.  
He considers that Bob does indeed know how to fly, offering an argument that turns 
on equating the justified belief condition of propositional knowledge with intelligently 
doing an intentional action, and the truth condition of propositional knowledge with a 
                                                
64 See Sgaravatti & Zardini (2008) for further criticisms which focus on the nature of closure and 
inferential isolation, and which mis-describe S&W’s commitments by ignoring their modest 
indexicality constraint. 
65 See Snowdon for agreement on this point. “We might call the assumption that knowledge that 
involves being able to express completely and linguistically what is now, ‘the Myth of the 
Proposition”. (2003, 27-28)  Having identified this myth, Snowdon manages to judiciously stay on the 
fence on his own view about know-how. 
72. 
comparable success condition. His idea is that whereas Gettier cases are vulnerable to 
intervening luck which can separate the relevant justified belief from the truth of the 
matter; by contrast, when Bob performs an act intelligently, on the basis of the kind of 
correct intelligence base Bob does have, then no comparable luck can deliver a similar 
wedge between acting intelligently and acting successfully.  “If the intelligence base 
is known and is accurate, he will be successful.” (2009, 744)  Poston’s challenge is 
easily dismissed by Stanley, though not I suggest for the right reason.  Stanley 
responds by finessing the issue as to whether or not acting intelligently need be acting 
intentionally.  His approach is to say that whilst acting intelligently and successfully 
might suffice for being able to do a particular action, it does not suffice for (an 
ascription of) the relevant know-how.66 
 Such Poston-style objections and Stanley-style responses (to the effect that 
any Gettier intuitions need only be “weak or non-existent” (2001, 15)) are, however, 
both misguided.  For there are uncontentious examples of intentional action done both 
intelligently and successfully, which, would appear to be Gettierizable.  Consider, 
Ernest Sosa’s adept archer. He identifies a target, takes appropriate aim and fires. 
Unfortunately, a gust of wind sweeps his arrow off course; then, whilst still airborne, 
a second gust sweeps the arrow back on course, and it hits its mark. In this situation, 
the requisite intentionality is present, the archer is adroit, and the shot is accurate.  
Nonetheless it is not accurate because its adept. Luck has played a part.  Now though 
Sosa uses this proposal for other purposes67, it seems reasonable that such a series of 
events, as in the archer example, might well serve to illustrate the possibility that what 
appears to be a case of know-how may succumb to something plausibly Gettier-like. 
The problem with the entrenched debate over this issue, is that Stanley conducts it on 
the basis that evidence of Gettierization is evidence for an intellectualist account of 
know how.   But as with the Objection from Explanation, this feature does not tell for 
intellectualism, or against anti-intellectualism.  It is a red herring. For the anti-
intellectualist who rejects the suggestion that know-how is but a kind of propositional 
knowledge, is entirely comfortable with the hole-in-one and the lucky shot.  Which is 
                                                
66 This point will be re-approached from a different angle, in Chapter 4, as part of the consideration of 
Bengson, Moffett & Wright’s case of Irina, who is deemed not to know-how to do a particular skating 
jump, even though she is able.   
67 Sosa argues (in 2007) that without accuracy because of adroitness the shot is not apt.  By analogy, an 
apt belief (which is required for knowledge) requires that the belief’s accuracy be because of the 
adroitness of the relevant belief-forming process.  Though, of course, the relevant belief-forming 
process is (often) a sub-personal matter over which the person cannot exercise control.  
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why the criteria for know-how on such anti-intellectualist views as ability accounts, 
often includes the requirement that a putative knower be able to repeat successful 
actions, in order to establish that he or she does indeed know how to do something.  
And repetition is not a feature that can be captured by the discreteness of Gettier 
cases.  For Gettierization only applies to single beliefs, whereas the criteria for any 
ascription of know-how typically involves the repeatability of the exercises of the 
putative knowledge. 
 Finally, with the Objection from Other Languages, Stanley engages with Ian 
Rumfitt’s challenge from divergent “cross-linguistic data” (2011c, 232), drawing 
particularly on French and Russian language constructions.  So, in French: 
 
 (39) Il sait comment nager. 
  (He knows how to swim.) 
 
is a well-formed French sentence, conveying a problem-solving aspect, not unlike: 
 
 (40) Pierre sait comment traverser le fleuve en nageant. 
  (Pierre knows how to swim across the river). 
 
Here (40) “might be true if, for example, Pierre knows that the way to swim across the 
river is to swim to the red buoy and then head straight for the northern bank.” 
(Rumfitt 2003, 161). Thus, it does have a propositional knowledge implication.  There 
is also, however, the (non-embedded question) construction: 
 
 (41) Il sait nager. 
  (He knows how to swim.) 
 
 (42) Il sait parler francais. 
  (He knows how to speak French.) 
 
Contra S&W, savoir faire constructions and savoir comment faire constructions are 
distinct.  In savoir faire constructions, “[T]he semantic function of the infinitive is 
surely to refer to an activity.” (2003, 162)  Furthermore, in Russian, two entirely 
different words are used to ascribe know how уметь (‘umet’) and propositional 
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knowledge знать ('znat’).   The linguistic evidence supporting S&W’s positive 
intellectualist thesis of know-how is, according to Rumfitt, at best “equivocal” (2003, 
165.)    
 Stanley’s response is to restate S&W’s allegiance to a theory of embedded 
questions which takes the wh-words to be “semantically vacuous”.  The crucial issue, 
supposedly, is that that the embedded question refers to a property (as detailed above 
with reference to the Russellian propositions.) Hence, Stanley dismisses Rumfitt 
Objection from Other Languages by a lengthy linguistic analysis of further languages, 
prefaced with the reminder that, “[O]n many accounts of embedded questions, one 
can obtain the embedded question semantics without a question word.” (2011c, 228) 
So not only are there linguistics-guided contortions made in the throws of unpacking 
such an account, it now appears that their theoretical account is flexible enough to be 
applied where there are no questions words present at all.  Credulity at the legitimacy 
of S&W’s method seems to be stretched to the maximum with this response.  
 That said one might still wish to accept that Stanley’s view can cross linguistic 
barriers, on the terms and deliverances of his preferred linguistic theory.   There is 
still no response, and that includes in either Stanley’s recent discussions in (2001a) or 
(2011b), to the two issues already identified as outstanding, i.e., (i) that the particular 
linguistics theory of choice S&W utilise is to be preferred to any rival, and that (ii) 
any of these theories of linguistics are, even in principle, capable of supporting an 
epistemology.  In Chapter 6, I explore the explanatory power that stands behind such 
Chomskyan-inspired linguistics, and the epistemological parallels covertly operative 
there. It is only against this background that the Stanley/Rumfitt debate can be fully 
understood, and what serves to justify Rumfitt’s assertion that S&W’s view is 
ultimately a “metaphysical thesis”.  (2003, 160)  
 Thus, two of three key objections Stanley raises in order to diffuse, are I 
suggest successfully, but trivially, diffused on his own terms.  The third will be 
explored below. 
 
2.2    Fresh Challenges 
 
There is one problematic topic that Stanley gives only a modest amount of space to, 
and two other areas of concern that neither S&W nor Stanley ever consider.  These 
are, I suggest, the gradability, the learnability and the normativity of know-how.  I 
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articulate and evaluate these, before turning to one final issue: the conflation of the 
causal and the constitutive. 
 Firstly, then, what of gradability?  Hannah may know how to ride a bicycle, 
but it seems plausible to suggest that that she doesn’t have the same degree of know-
how as Lance Armstrong; who really does know how to ride a bike.  Ruth may play 
the piano, but she doesn’t know how to play like Horowitz. That said, Hannah’s, and 
Ruth’s knowledge has improved over the time spent practicing. Their know-how is 
greater than it once was.  Know-how seems to come in degrees. One can have more or 
less of it. One person’s can be better or worse than another’s.  One might have a little 
or a lot of know-how (or expertise) about some subject or activity. 
 By contrast, propositional knowledge does not appear to come in degrees.  
Hannah either knows or doesn’t know that penguins waddle.  To say that she has 
knows that penguins waddle, but only a little bit, is nonsensical.  Yet were know-how 
to be propositional knowledge, as S&W propose, then that would seem to demand 
that either know-how not be, or propositional knowledge be, gradable .  In their joint 
work on knowing-how, S&W are silent on this matter.  Stanley, however, has 
discussed his own view in connection with contextualism.  Here he rejects the 
gradability of know-how, because though one person might ‘know how’ better than 
another, what “is better, or more complete” (2004, 129) is the (propositional) answer 
a person has to the relevant embedded question, compared to the answer had by 
another.  But this is still committed to the ungradability of propositional knowledge-
that, and an intellectualist account.  So any support is offers is (tightly) circular.  
Presumably the ordinary way of speaking of know-how as gradable is, then, to be 
understood as a mere facon de parler: one with no impact on the reality of their 
metaphysical thesis of the nature of know-how.  Though Stanley suggests that in all 
cases of knowing-how to do something, the supposed gradability applies to the what it 
is one knows how to do (i.e. the topic or activity itself) not one’s own know-how, this 
dismissal, looks a little quick.  It fails to dissolve the substantial tension had by 
Stanley’s insistence that “If Stanley and Williamson’s proposal is correct, the folk 
notion of knowing how, the one we ordinarily express by sentences of the form “X 
knows how to F”, is the notion of knowing how that philosophers and cognitive 
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scientists have found of significant explanatory use.” (Stanley 2011c, 220)68  
 Related, in certain respects, to this gradability of know-how, is the notion of 
learning-how to do something.  Insofar as one may just have started to learn how to 
do something one’s know-how maybe quite limited, curtailed or modest; limited to 
straight-forward situations, simple demands and attainable aspects and activities.  One 
may also become sophisticated in one’s know-how, yet continue to learn-how to do 
something; as people often discover when attending an advanced driving course with 
the police, having been driving for many years prior to that. Furthermore, there would 
seem to be a wide spectrum of ways in which one might learn how to V, explore ways 
of Ving, and thus come to deepen one’s knowledge-how to V.  Practice with or 
without direct instruction, copying, inventing, dismantling and reassembling, 
investigating, using tips, pursuing trial and error investigation and exploration, 
exploiting luck, etc.; all these seem to methods by which learning-how occurs.  Quite 
how a propositional account is supposed to deal with all of these characteristics of 
learning-how is of limited relevance to S&W’s thoroughly propositional theory.  Yet, 
a non-trivial epistemology of know-how would, I suggest, want to look at the 
connective tissue between the notions of know-how and learning-how (as indicated in 
Chapter 7). In his monograph, Stanley confirms an account of learning-how that 
dovetails with (rather than expands on) their general intellectualism. “[W]hen you 
learned how to swim, what happened is that you learned some facts.” (2011a, vii) 
Stanley’s rhetorical strategy would seem to point to an argument that requires 
clarification about the nature of a fact, not about learning-how or knowing-how.  
“You learned a special kind of fact about swimming”. (2011a, vii)  
 There is also one other, indirect, suggestion about the nature of learning.  This 
is Stanley’s claim that his and Williamson’s view, “predicts that one must first have 
facility with the concept of propositional knowledge before one masters knowledge-
wh.” (Stanley 2011c, 234)69.  Insofar as there is a minimal requirement, as indicated 
                                                
68 Though, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, it is not clear if its ‘explanatory use’ is as an explanandum 
or an explanans.  Furthermore, trading claims as to which account best captures the ‘folk-notion’ is a 
tricky strategy at best, and one that sits awkwardly with Duncan Pritchard’s characterisation of the task 
of epistemologists to provide, “a kind of ‘cleaned-up’ version of the folk notion’”, as a likely result of 
the “significant disparity between the folk usage” and theoretical views of (propositional) knowledge. 
(forthcoming a)  
69 This is a different kind of Priority Thesis than previously explored with Ryle, for whom know-how 
was prior to know-that.  Nonetheless, Stanley seems to be suggesting that we must ‘have concepts’ 
before we can ‘master’ certain types of propositional knowledge.  It is unclear how one comes to be in 
possession of concepts first – unless of course, one’s picture of the mind is the Chomskyian/Fodorian 
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above, on the propositional knowledge required, namely that of being able to state 
truthfully a sentence such as, ‘I’m doing this, in this way’, a knower-how needs to be 
a language-user.  This of course, pushes the account towards the consideration of 
what it is to have semantic knowledge, or knowledge of how to speak and understand 
one’s first language. And indeed it transpires that Stanley is no less a card-carrying 
propositional intellectualist when it comes to semantic knowledge as elsewhere. “So, 
practical knowledge, on my view, is a special of propositional knowledge.  The thesis 
that semantic knowledge is practical is then the thesis that semantic knowledge 
amounts to knowledge of a way of doing something, entertained under a practical 
mode of presentation (2005, 135). 
 Thus, S&W’s account appears to require that semantic knowledge be a pre-
requisite for all other knowledge-that.  This suggests that Stanley’s propositional 
account of semantic knowledge is not just a consequence of, but perhaps a prior 
commitment, informing, indeed dictating Stanley’s intellectualism about know-how, 
in general. In Chapter 6’s discussion of Chomsky, this will be further exposed, as I 
explore the extent to which nativism about semantic knowledge and competence is a 
silent partner to such accounts.  But for now, perhaps it offers a glimpse as to why the 
unexplained methodology of attempting to move from linguistics to epistemology, is 
supposed to have some legitimacy. 
 The other lacuna in S&W’s propositional intellectualism is any reference to 
the normativity of know-how.  Whilst it might be awkward, inappropriate or 
conceptually misguided to regard, as normative, knowing-how to, say, smile, leave 
rooms through doors, get someone’s attention, or flee from predators, there are 
nonetheless many very familiar activities and practices whose normativity is 
constituent of those very activities and practices; from speaking our mother tongue, to 
being able to do basic arithmetic, to playing team games and participating in the 
social and political life of our communities and the wider world. And other such 
examples of things that we come to know how to do.  One might think, however, that 
coming to be a participant in certain activities or practices is a matter of coming to 
know how to do something, where doing that thing involves engaging in normative, 
public, practices.  As such an internal dispositionalist account that reduces know-how 
                                                                                                                                       
picture already hinted at. Once again, Stanley’s picture re-routes the epistemological discussion back  
to the metaphysical thesis Rumfitt worried about. In addition, there is the possibility, in this issue, that 
there is a greater similarity to Bengson & Moffett’s work (operative in this idea of concept mastery) 
than either has thus far noticed.   
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to propositional knowledge and thence to some supposedly (private) direct 
acquaintance with a metaphysical property known under a practical mode of 
presentation, as per S&W, seems not just under-equipped, but radically ill-equipped 
to provide an illuminating appreciation of the epistemology of know-how.  But then 
again, perhaps Stanley’s commitment to certain notions of semantic knowledge and 
universal grammar, free him from feeling any pressure to acknowledge the normative 
dimension of our language facility.  After all an account that rests on the nature, 
indeed the autonomy, of syntax, is ultimately one that focus on intrinsic mental 
contents rather than situated people living in language communities.  This perhaps 
explains why Wittgenstein is excluded, or deemed irrelevant to the discussion. 
 Finally, there is the question of whether or not S&W, and Stanley, are 
providing an account of what causes our knowledge-how, or what constitutes it.  In 
the original 2001 presentation there is no suggestion that what is being proposed is 
anything other than a constitutive account: there is but a single type of knowledge 
constituted by standing in the (appropriate) “knowing-that” relation between a person 
and a proposition.  And indeed this would seem to be the case also in the Preface to 
Stanley (2011a), where he states, “knowing how to do something is the same as 
knowing a fact” (2011a, vii emphasis added).  However, Stanley also writes of being 
“guided by the belief about how to ride a bicycle” (2011c, 219 emphasis added) and 
already in the Preface to his monograph there is a collection of new locutions, which 
threaten a conflation of the constitutive and the causal.  In introducing the 
propositional knowledge learnt by a swimmer, Stanley writes: “Knowledge of these 
facts is what gave you knowledge of how to swim”; “You know how to perform 
activities solely in virtue of your knowledge of facts about those activities”; 
“…knowledge of a fact can so immediately yield knowledge of how to swim” (2011a, 
vii: emphases added).  Such expressions suggest that propositional knowledge is what 
causes, or enables, or provides know-how, rather than, as per the propositional 
intellectualist’s central thesis, is one and the same as that very know-how.  
 
3 Concluding Remarks 
 
Propositional Intellectualism is the view knowing-how is not a kind of alternative, 
non-propositional knowledge, but is merely a species of knowledge-that or 
propositional knowledge. Specifically the relevant propositional knowledge is the 
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answer to the question embedded in any and all knowledge-how ascriptions. 
Ascriptions of know-how are true if and only if the appropriate propositional 
knowledge is known under the practical mode of presentation.  
 Far from being the “default position” (2001, 431), and sitting comfortably 
with the supposed folk notion of know-how, the above challenges indicate the extent 
to which Stanley & Williamson’s account has neither the resources to respond to 
ongoing challenges, nor little evidence with which to support its own claim to be 
entirely in line with ordinary usage of the concept.  (Though plenty of evidence that 
supports an alternative view that it is entirely inline with the cognitive scientific 
intellectualist paradigm by which it is guided.)  Furthermore, their account is fatally 
vulnerable internally, externally, and methodologically. Internally, its preferred 
theoretical position on embedded questions is not, as claimed, in line with standard 
theory, but uses just one of many competing theories concerning the nature of the 
syntax and semantics of embedded questions.  Indeed, the presumption that one can 
ascertain the propositional nature of the relevant sentential features by syntax only, is 
itself a matter of debate, both in detail70 and in principle.  As such, S&W have no 
actual justification for their view; rather they have selected the account that best 
serves their preferred claim. This is not justification but stipulation. Nonetheless, were 
their ‘justification by standard theory’ claim to be correct, however, it would still fail 
to serve their purpose.  This is because the issue at stake is whether or not knowing-
how is always an embedded question. For anti-intellectualist challenges to 
propositional intellectualism do not seek to establish that all know-how is non-
propositional, but only that some know-how is non-propositional.   Perhaps it is this 
very point that C. L. Hamblin71, appreciates when, in his topic-inaugurating paper, he 
identifies the “characteristic” question words of interrogatives as being, “words such 
as ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how many’ and so on.” (1958, 159); picking out ‘how many’ 
rather than ‘how’.   For no anti-intellectualist wishes to deny that, for example: 
 
 (43)  Brian knows how many bicycles are in his shed. 
 
                                                
70 See Culicover, Peter W & Jackendoff, Ray (2006): “The demonstration that PRO is not syntactically 
motivated and that control is best characterized in semantic terms leads to the conclusion that control 
must be semantic.” (2006: 133) 
71 See S&W (2001: 420 and fn. 16) for the acceptability of other frameworks into which their account 
is “easily translatable”. 
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is an ascription of propositional knowledge; the content of which is the answer to the 
embedded question concerning the number of bicycles in the shed.  Ironically, it is 
Hamblin himself, one of the founding fathers of the linguistics of embedded 
questions, preferred by S&W, who suggests that there is more to knowing-how than 
just knowing that:  
 
  [I]t is interesting to compare the distinction made by Ryle  
 between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’.  One part of the  
 distinction can be put as follows: to say that someone “knows  
 that (such-and such is the case)” is to specify a statement  
 and say that he knows it to be true.  But to say that someone 
 “knows how…” (or knows whether…”, or “knowing when…”,  
 or “knows where…” etc.) is at most to specify a question and  
 say that he knows the correct answer to it.  This distinction is  
 valid even if we recognize that “knowing how” is in many  
 cases rather different again, involving for example the possession 
 of a skill.                                         (1958, 161 emphasis added) 
 
S&W’s proposed practical mode of presentation does not help provide a way of 
understanding these different skill-involving cases.  Indeed, they are unsurprisingly 
open to what, by Stanley’s own admission are, “charges of obscurantism” (2011a, 
viii).  Unfortunately for S&W, were the fog to lift over this notion of mode of 
presentation, it might just as equally be a resource for rival views.  Why are modes of 
presentation any less ‘theoretically amenable’ to those who wish to propose that all 
know-that is a species of know-how.  Why not suggest that knowledge-that is merely 
a species of knowledge-how, ‘entertained under a propositional mode of 
presentation’?  Externally there are pressures concerning (as yet) unexplored issues 
such as gradability, learning-how, normativity, and the twin conflations: (i) that of the 
knowledge and its ascription, and (ii) that of the cause of know-how and its 
constitution. 
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 Methodologically, there is no attempt to justify the supposed philosophically 
revealing strategy of arguing from syntax to epistemology72. Indeed, if it is a science 
one might accept that it might legitimately move from observed data to some kind of 
explanation of that data73.  But if this is the case, then why should the data of 
embedded questions be given an explanation in terms of epistemology?  What would 
constitute falsification of this account?  To what extent is the meta-philosophical 
presumption of naturalized epistemology a requisite for this view?  All of these 
questions will be considered in the upcoming chapters.  Is it the case, perhaps, that 
this kind of propositional intellectualism, bestriding the two stools of linguistics and 
philosophy is in danger of falling between both?  Perhaps the argument S&W present, 
such as it is, is not actually one from syntax to epistemology, as claimed, but rather 
from syntax to metaphysics.  That their method is not only legitimate, but necessary, 
is presumed by Stanley’s repeated calls (2011b, 2011c) for rival views to deliver their 
own alternative account of the syntax and semantics.  But as Chapter 7 details there is 
more than just S&W’s way of appreciating how our language may be a resource for 
philosophical insight.  
 Yet at the heart of propositional intellectualism there is an interest and a 
commitment which is also shared by those who are unable to accept its detail, given 
that according to Stanley, “the guiding idea of this work has been that the value of 
knowledge lies in its connection to action.” (2011, viii)  Though Stanley wishes to 
arrogate this commitment for the intellectualist camp, it is not a view that anti-
intellectualists seek to deny; rather it is crucial to such rival proposals.  And perhaps it 
goes some way to explain Stanley’s admission (in discussion)74 that modes of 
presentation might just have to be “ability-involving”.  
 
* 
                                                
72 See Brown (1970) for an early acknowledgement to justify this ‘mixed’ methodology. “Two kinds of 
theory are roughly: (a) old-fashioned analysis or description of concepts, and (b) empirical 
linguistics… I think that the philosophical study of particular concepts must submit to the constraints of 
both kinds of theory at once” (1970: 214)  This being part of the dawning practice of the then recently 
inaugurated Naturalized Philosophy. 
73 See Devitt (2011) on the failure of S&W’s account to fit which the deliverances of psychology.  
Even “the most ‘intellectualized’ picture of procedural knowledge, distinguish this knowledge sharply 
form declarative” Furthermore, “S&W’s methodology of deriving a theory of knowledge-how from a 
linguistic theory of ascriptions, without any attention at all to the science of knowledge-how is deeply 
misguided.” (2011, 207)  Note this is not a pressure I wish to support, but I include it to indicate the 
challenges to S&W’s meta-philosophical stance come from a variety of different quarters. 
74 This from a personal discussion at the Knowing-How Workshop, Geneva University 15.10.2009 
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4 
 
Non-Propositional Intellectualism 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Philosophical debate about know-how is deeply polarised.  Ryle and Rylean-inspired 
anti-intellectualists maintain that knowledge-how and knowledge-that are distinct 
kinds of knowledge, whilst Stanley & Williamson’s paradigmatic version of 
intellectualism claims that knowledge-how is merely a species of knowledge-that. 
Although the scope of knowledge-that is central to the question at issue, thanks to a 
set of shared views about many other aspects of propositional knowledge, the contrast 
between anti-intellectualism and intellectualism can be sharply drawn. Indeed, it is 
precisely because there is a core range of uncontentious views about propositional 
knowledge that the fault line between anti-intellectualism and intellectualism is often 
given a parallel propositional articulation.  Accordingly, anti-intellectualism and 
intellectualism about know-how is taken to be a matter of the non-propositionality or 
propositionality of know-how.  That is, until very recently. 
 John Bengson and Marc Moffett’s so-called ‘Non-propositional 
Intellectualism’ challenges this presumed parallel.  For though Bengson & Moffett 
share Stanley & Williamson’s commitment to a thoroughly intellectualist construal of 
know-how, they nonetheless reject the suggestion that know-how is a kind, or species, 
of propositional knowledge.  Whilst agreeing that to know how to φ is a matter of 
knowing a way to φ, Bengson & Moffett reject Stanley & Williamson’s proposal that 
knowledge of a way to φ is knowledge-that w is a way to φ.  Instead, they hold that 
knowledge of a way to φ is non-propositional knowledge, or knowledge-of, a way to 
φ.  Key to Bengson & Moffett’s suggestion is their further characterisation of 
knowledge-of as a kind of non-propositional acquaintance knowledge.  This 
particular knowledge-of is not, however, the familiar acquaintance knowledge one 
might have of a person or a place, rather it is a distinct kind of acquaintance 
knowledge they propose; namely an objectual knowledge of concepts.  Using these 
ingredients, Bengson & Moffett (2007), (2011b) and (2011c) construct an alternative 
theoretical approach to knowing-how, which cuts across several of the standard 
demarcations.  Their proposal remains, nonetheless, unabashedly intellectualist. 
Indeed, their own intellectualist orientation is, like that of Stanley & Williamson, 
unequivocally anti-Rylean: 
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 [W]e should not forget that Ryle’s explicit aim was to dispel the  
 “paramechanical hypothesis” of internal mental causes, which he  
 viewed as a product of the “myth” of “hidden” mental “phantasms”  
 that “take place ‘in the head’” … a “doctrine that is wholly preserved  
 in our (relation-neutral) formulations of intellectualism.    
             (2011c, 165, fn. 10) 
 
Bengson & Moffett’s own non-propositional intellectualist account of know-how is, 
then, no hybrid proposal.  Rather it is a substantial theoretical edifice which requires a 
not insubstantial amount of scene-setting, definition, and refining of several more 
familiar notions.  To facilitate this, B&M develop a reservoir of terms of art 
including, ‘ways of φ-ing’, ‘ability-based concepts’, ‘reasonable conceptual mastery’, 
‘correct and complete conceptions’ and ‘objectual understanding’.  Each of these 
terms of art picks out a particular piece in their theoretical jigsaw.  In tandem with this 
is a range of highly detailed individual cases which serve simultaneously as supposed 
counter-examples to anti-intellectualism in general, and as evidence for their own 
theory. In this chapter, I present Bengson & Moffett’s non-propositional intellectualist 
proposal, arguing that not only does it succumb to several of the challenges already 
brought to bear on propositional intellectualism, it is also vulnerable to a range of new 
concerns.   
 In Section 1, I detail Bengson & Moffett’s (henceforth B&M’s) arguments 
against what they take to be anti-intellectualism’s ability-account of know-how. 
Embracing their own detailed focus and reliance on individual cases, I show that all 
their putative counter-examples are open to alternative readings, and argue that the 
supposed structural flaw they suggest anti-intellectualism is prey to, fails to tell 
against anti-intellectualism, per se; it being merely an inevitable and entirely general 
aspect of their very own methodology.  In Section 2, I provide an exposition of 
B&M’s own positive account of know-how, articulating the internal relations between 
their key theoretical notions.  I argue that the concepts, conceptions and concept 
mastery which lie at the heart of B&M’s theory are based on unannounced and 
contentious metaphysical, even Platonistic, commitments. Furthermore, they lead 
B&M to the same impasse faced by Stanley & Williamson. But where S&W appeal to 
the practical mode of presentation in attempting to surmount this difficulty, B&M 
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resort to a not dissimilar solution which employs the very notion of ability they claim 
to eschew.  Further objections reveal that the eponymous non-propositionality of 
B&M’s intellectualism masks an ineliminable propositional aspect.  In admitting this, 
B&M acknowledge it makes their account potentially vulnerable to Ryle’s Regress 
Challenge. I consider their attempt to circumvent this problem in Section 3, and show 
the meta-philosophical implications of their attempted solution.  In Section 4, I argue 
that the supposed neutral framework B&M suggest is applicable to any account of 
know-how imposes an unacceptably intellectualist framework on its rivals, forcing all 
other views into their dualistic schema.  In the final section, I offer some concluding 
remarks to justify why the picture presented by B&M’s so-called ‘two conceptions” 
framework is neither as exhaustive nor uncompromised as announced; two points 
which show why the whole debate is even more important than B&M are keen to 
announce. 
 I begin by considering B&M’s rejection of what they take to be at heart of all 
anti-intellectualist accounts, i.e. an ability view of know-how.  
 
1 Against Ability 
 
B&M deny that to know how to φ is to be able to φ.  Like S&W, they assume that 
Ryle (or indeed any form of anti-intellectualism) is committed to just such an ‘ability 
account’ of know-how, and they seek to undermine it by offering supposed counter-
examples.  In contrast to S&W’s very swift dismissal (using just the Ski-Instructor 
and the Armless Pianist), B&M offer a much more substantial tripartite challenge, 
exploiting: (i) a wider range of examples aimed at demonstrating why ability is 
insufficient, as well as unnecessary, for know-how, (ii) empirical data taken from 
specifically commissioned surveys designed to expose so-called folk intuitions about 
the relation between know-how and ability, and (iii) an irresolvable structural flaw in 
ability accounts of know-how, in general.  I consider these elements individually.   
 In their (2007), (2011c), and their (2009 with Wright), B&M exploit a variety 
of invented scenarios to argue for their claim that ability is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for know-how.  
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I have organised and numbered these cases (Table 1., below) in order to provide a new 
opportunity to discern the similarities, distinctions and connections between the 
examples B&M exploit .75 
  
Table 1.  
(B) (A) (C) (D) 
Know-how Know-how No Know-how No Know-how 
No ability Ability Ability No ability 
1.  Martin the Turtle-
Keeper 
1.  Irina the Adder 1. Sally the Avalanche 
Escaper aka Avalanche 
aka Tropics aka 
Swimmer 
 
1.  No Salchow 
2. Pat the Ski-
Instructor 
2. The Neuro-anatomist 
Ear-Waggler 
 
2. Chris the Hiker 2. Albert the Ski-
Scientist 
3. Irina the Champion 
Skater aka Jane the 
Olympic Skater 
3.  The Five Year Old 
Child Ear-Waggler 
3.  Salchow aka Irina 
the Novice Skater 
 
4.  Pi aka Louis, the 
Competent 
Mathematician 
 4.  Kytoon aka Chris 
the Kite-Builder 
 
 
  
1.1  The necessity of ability? 
 
According to B&M, in (A1) Irina the Adder not only both knows-how to add and is 
able to add, but her know-how entails her ability.  Indeed, they suggest that our 
ordinary talk confirms this point. It would be unusual, if not downright mistaken, to 
say that, ‘Irina knows how to add, but she is unable to do so,’ or, ‘Not only does Irina 
know how to add, she can actually do so.’  B&M take this to indicate that, in the case 
of addition, “our semantic intuitions” about ascriptions of know-how are that such 
ascriptions of know-how are, “neither cancellable nor reinforceable”. (2007, 36)  
This, they claim, confirms the entailment from know-how to ability. A detailed 
                                                
75 Though B&M do provide specific titles for the majority of their examples, I have provided names (or 
alternative names) for those cases I number (A1), (A2), (A3) (C4) and (D2). Please note that (A) is the 
second, not first, column. The reason for this becomes clear in Section 1.3 
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explanation as to the nature of this know-how will be scrutinised in Section 2.  The 
point to note, here, is that though B&M’s claim is that know-how and ability can 
come apart, they are not claiming they must come apart.  Cases where they do not 
come apart, are (A) cases, according to my tabular presentation. 
 By contrast, the candidate counter-examples in the left-hand (B) column, are 
designed to show that know-how need not entail ability.  In (B1), though Martin the 
Turtle-keeper knows how turtles reproduce, such know-how, does not entail that he 
has an ability; indeed, in this particular example, it is not clear just what such 
suggestion might be aiming to capture.  As B&M observe, “It is implausible that 
Martin thereby has the corresponding ability to engage in turtle reproduction 
(whatever that might mean).” (2009, 389)   The other three (B) cases do appear to 
directly, and unproblematically, implicate particular abilities. B&M state that the 
presumption that ability is entailed would be, however, a mistake. Indeed these (B) 
cases are all chosen to exemplify what B&M take to be know-how without ability.  
So, in (B2), Pat the Ski-Instructor is an expert skier and instructor who has twenty 
years standing as a highly sought-after teacher of Olympic-standard stunt skiers, but 
who is personally unable to actually perform the stunts he teaches.  (2009, 391, and 
2011c)  Thus, according to B&M, Pat knows how to perform the stunts, 
notwithstanding his own inability.  Similarly, in (B3) Irina the Champion Skater, Irina 
is an Olympic skating champion who knows how to and can regularly perform a triple 
Salchow; a complicated jump that involves taking off and landing on various 
particular edges of one’s ice-skates, after three mid-air revolutions.  She remains, 
nonetheless, unable to perform a quintuple Salchow, even though she knows which of 
her skate edges are required for take-off and landing and is aware the jump requires 
five airborne revolutions. (See 2007, 34-35, for Irina, or 2009, 393, for Jane. Both 
scenarios share the essential details.)  Irina the Champion Skater is, however, unable 
to achieve this particular jump.  This is not, B&M propose, because of some 
inadequacy in her know-how, but is, rather, the result of an inability to leap high 
enough for long enough in order to be able to revolve five times.  Thus, according to 
B&M, though she knows how to do a quintuple Salchow, she is unable to.   In (B4) 
Louis the Mathematician knows how to calculate the nth number in the decimal 
expansion of π, but in the case of 1046 he is unable to work this out.  Again, this is no 
lack of know-how, but is, instead, “because of principled computational limitations, 
Louis (like all ordinary human beings) is unable to find the 1046 numeral in the 
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decimal expansion of π.” (2011c).  He knows how to calculate the numeral at issue, 
but is unable to do so.  
 I take it that one might reasonably split these (B) cases into two sub-
categories:  In the first, here exemplified by (B1), the very idea of an associated 
ability seems nonsensical. Martin the Turtle-keeper’s turtle-related know-how seems 
to be a matter of knowing a particular set of facts, only.  In the second category, (B2), 
(B3) and (B4), the know-how identified does appear to be associated with a potential 
tandem ability.  In (B2), Pat the Ski-Instructor fails to have what is actually a 
potentially achievable physical ability, whereas in (B3) Irina the Champion Skater, 
unsurprisingly, fails to have what is anyhow an unachievable, physical ability.  Whilst 
in (B4) Louis the Competent Mathematician does not have (what might be described, 
somewhat awkwardly, as) an unachievable mental ability.  Yet Pat, Irina and Louis, 
nonetheless all putatively know how to perform stunts, do the quintuple Salchow, and 
find the 1046 numeral in the decimal expansion of pi.  (B1), (B2), (B3) and (B4) are all 
deemed, each in their own way, to provide counter-examples to the claim that know-
how must entail ability.  B&M conclude that ability is not a necessary condition for 
know-how and thus that,“the anti-intellectualist view that knowing how to ψ requires 
the corresponding ability to ψ” (2007, 33) is undermined.  
 But does this follow from the (B) cases presented? One may think that it is 
part of the very question at issue as to whether or not case (B1) is the kind of case 
anti-intellectualism aims to account for, or that cases (B2), (B3) and (B4) are 
legitimately identifiable as cases of know-how.  In their very construction as 
examples of ability-less know-how it might look that a particular view on the nature 
of know-how, has already been taken.  These are not theory-neutral cases.  If, instead, 
the presence of know-how and the absence of ability are merely stipulations, it 
remains unclear as to how they can provide justification for B&M’s view, as opposed 
to simply supplying a fit, that is strategically engineered.  This is, undoubtedly, a 
question that can only fully be answered in the light of B&M’s own positive account 
of know-how. B&M do, however, use (B) and  (C) cases, which I consider in a 
moment, to motivate the need for their own account. In so doing, they are taking the 
cases to provide pre-theoretical, licit challenges to the ability account.  But, just how 
viable are these pressures? 
  In (B1), Martin the Turtle-keeper’s knowledge how turtles reproduce is, better 
described as his knowledge of the ways in which turtles reproduce.  This brings out the 
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propositionality of his knowledge, i.e., that turtles reproduce at particular times, in a 
variety of habitats, etc.  Martin’s supposed knowledge-how is the kind of knowledge 
one has of a subject or a topic, in this case, knowledge of the natural history of turtles.  
In suggesting that this kind of know-how ought to entail a tandem ability, which it 
then somehow fails to do, B&M are suggesting that their anti-intellectualist target 
requires that all know-how be a matter of ability.  But this is to misrepresent the anti-
intellectualist proposal (as discussed in the previous chapters) presuming it seeks a 
singular account of all know-how and ‘knows-how’ locutions.  For the likes of Ryle, 
this is not the case. He appreciates that some knowledge-how is propositional, 
precisely when it is such knowledge of a subject or topic, or is a matter of knowing 
how it is the case that, etc.  Ryle’s own anti-intellectualism focuses on that, distinct 
kind of knowledge-how which is manifest in our normative and intelligent 
performances.  His anti-intellectualist approach starts, already circumscribed and 
limited to, people engaged in activities and practices. (B1) does not therefore work as 
a counter-example to the supposed anti-intellectualist ability account of know-how.  
 In (B2), Pat the Ski-Instructor supposedly knows to perform complex stunts, 
as evidenced by the achievements of his successful pupils, though he is unable to do 
the relevant stunts himself.  As this case directly parallels that of Stanley & 
Williamson’s own Ski-Instructor example, I will not repeat the extensive arguments 
of the Chapter 2, but quickly re-emphasise, again, that it is not obvious that one would 
say that the Ski-Instructor does know how to perform complex stunts given he is 
unable to do so.  To suggest that he does, is to conflate knowing how to perform 
stunts, with knowing how to teach someone to perform stunts, or knowing how to 
train someone to do so, or coach, or guide, or advise, etc.   
 In (B3), Irina the Champion Skater’s inability to do a quintuple Salchow, 
similarly echoes S&W’s Armless Pianist. In (A3), Irina can do (by implication) a 
single Salchow and a double Salchow, as well as the stated triple Salchow.  There is 
no mention of her ability to do a quadruple Salchow (which has, apparently, been 
recently achieved by a couple of upcoming skating champions), though no one has 
ever managed a quintuple Salchow.  Presumably this is because it is physically 
impossible to remain airborne long enough to spin five times, given the force of 
gravity.  In one sense, Irina the Champion does know how to do a quintuple, yet is 
unable.  But this sense is merely that of knowing a set of technical facts pertaining to 
the blade-edge requirements for take off and landing.  She might know these before 
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she were able to do even a single Salchow.  What then is the purpose, in this example, 
of insisting that Irina can do a triple Salchow, though not a quintuple?  The only 
answer would seem to be that it permits B&M to trade on an ability-involving know-
how that is distinct from the kind of fact-involving know-how of (B1).  The force of 
(B3) exploits a conflation of know-how and ability, in order to argue that know-how 
and ability can come apart; an awkward tension, to say the least.   
 Consider what happens when this example is extended to more obviously 
impossible cases. It would seem that B&M are similarly committed to saying that 
Champion Irina knows how to do not only a Quintuple Salchow (though is unable to), 
but also she knows how to do a 10-, 50, even 100-turn Salchow. Is there not a danger 
of straying into nonsensical territory?  Do they wish to suggest that Roger Bannister, 
having been the first man to break the four-minute mile knows how to break the two 
minute mile, or the one minute mile? If the answer is, that he does know-how to break 
the one minute mile, then it would appear that what it is to know how to break 
running records is simply to know that one needs to run faster than the current record 
holder has managed. But even the most sedentary couch potato, is aware of this fact.  
Thus (B3) fails to serve the purpose of providing a counter-examples to the supposed 
anti-intellectualist view of know-how. 
 In Pi, (B4), Louis the Competent Mathematician is faced with temporal 
limitations which parallel the physical limitations of Irina in (B3).   Here the sheer 
number of computations required and the available time left in Louis’ life, make it 
impossible for him to calculate the designated numeral.  Once again B&M suggest 
that a wedge can be driven between know-how and ability; a wedge that threatens any 
anti-intellectualist ability account of know-how.  Yet, if accepted, this argument 
would also undermine B&M’s own paradigmatic case of know-how/ability, (A1), 
where Irina the Adder’s knowledge of addition entails her ability.  This is because the 
argument B&M take to justify Louis’ inability should, by the same token, serve to 
show that whilst Irina knows how to add, she isn’t able to do a series of additions, 
starting with one and adding one, until she reached 3,153,600,000.  For this number is 
the number of seconds in a hundred years and would require at least that amount of 
time to be arrived at. As such, B&M’s (B4) Pi case, unwittingly provides a template 
for a super-objection that would ensure no case of know-how could ever entail ability.  
So if (B4) is to be successful as a counter-example to anti-intellectualism it comes at 
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an exceptionally high price, for it is applicable to any and all (A) cases which involve 
any time-consuming activity.   
 To summarise, even if an anti-intellectualist accepts the misrepresentation of 
their view as an ‘ability account of know-how’, he or she has a raft of resources for 
responding to the supposed (B) case counter-examples which seek to show ability is 
not necessary for know-how.  The (B) cases do not therefore tell, either for or against, 
anti-intellectualism.  But given that Rylean anti-intellectualism does start with the 
notion of normative performance, is it perhaps the case, nonetheless, that ability is 
sufficient for know-how?   
 
1.2  The sufficiency of ability? 
 
B&M’s (C) cases are proposed counter-examples aiming to show that ability is 
insufficient for know-how.  In (C1), Sally the Avalanche Escaper, Sally finds herself 
walking in the mountains when she believes a nearby dam has broken and that she is 
being engulfed in the overflowing water.76  She is a good swimmer, however, and 
manages to swim her way out of this predicament. Actually she has, in fact, been 
caught up in an avalanche and it just so happens that making swimming movements is 
a way to survive avalanches. So though her swimming ability helps her escape the 
avalanches, B&M claim she does not know how to escape avalanches.  (2009, 395-
396 and 2011c) 
 In (C2), Chris the Hiker aka Hiker, Chris has been out walking in a National 
Park for several hours. When the time comes for her to return to her car all she knows 
is that she needs to cross the nearby ridge, though she does not know its name or 
know what will be revealed as lying beyond it. When she gets to the top of this ridge, 
she sees the direction she then needs to take: a pattern that is repeated at subsequent 
ridges, until Chris arrives successfully back at her car. According to B&M, “Chris is, 
at the time of her decision, reliably able to get back to her car […] plainly an 
intentional action of Chris’s”  but at the time of her decision, she does not know how 
to.” (2011c) 
  In (C3), Irina the Novice Skater is able to do a (single) Salchow, but this is 
despite the fact that her knowledge of which ice-skate edge to use for take off and 
                                                
76 Cf. Hawley (2003) for original articulation of this case.  
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landing, is hopelessly confused.  According to B&M’s scenario description, she also 
has “a severe neurological abnormality that makes her act in ways that differ 
dramatically from how she thinks she is acting.” (2007, 48, and 2009, 397, and 2011c)  
It just so happens that though confused about her skate edges she nonetheless ends up 
doing her Salchow correctly.   Performing the jump, Irina does not, however, know-
how to do it.  B&M claim that (C3), together with (C1) and (C2), “demonstrate the 
possibility of ability without intelligence, skill, sensibleness, and cleverness,” (2011b, 
32) thus confirming ability is insufficient for know-how.  But are B&M’s readings the 
only, or even the most likely options? 
 In (C1), Sally’s swimming escape from the avalanche might be better 
described as a case of her not knowing that what she is currently up against is an 
avalanche.  Sally does not know that making swimming movements is a way to 
escape avalanches; she does not know that what she is doing is escaping an avalanche 
by swimming. (C1) might be usefully compared to S&W’s dancer case.  Just because 
a dancer doesn’t know that her dance is also a semaphore version of Gray’s Elegy, 
doesn’t mean she doesn’t know how to perform a semaphore version of Grey’s Elegy. 
Similarly Sally knows how to escape an avalanche even though she doesn’t know that 
she knows how to do so. These opacity-involving cases have already been extensively 
explored in Chapter 3, Section 1.3.  I will not therefore rehearse those challenges 
again.  I trust it suffices to suggest that many of those criticisms are equally applicable 
to (C1). As such they remain unaddressed, challenging B&M’s assumption that (C1) 
is an unproblematic counter-example to the sufficiency of ability for know-how. 
 In (C2) there are comparable issues relating to opaque contexts and mis- or 
other-description in play.  Is Chris’s ability in question the ability to return to her car, 
or to navigate unfamiliar countryside?  To describe what she is doing a matter of 
some skill-less, sensible-less, ‘mere’ ability, risks so trivialising her achievements, 
that they become unrecognisable.  I suggest, instead, that Chris’s activity manifests a 
flexible, creative and dynamic response to developing circumstances and situations.  
Her reflective negotiation of a fresh environment in the service of a clear goal, might, 
itself be described as a paradigm example of know-how; of know-how in practice. Its 
power as a counter-example to the contrary is tenuous at best.    
 In (C3) Irina the Novice Skater is able to do a Salchow, but according to 
B&M’s scenario she is confused about which edge of her skate blades she is supposed 
to use, and thinks she is using; though she still manages to do the jump.  Once again, 
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this case might be dealt with by considering opacity issues, and raising questions 
about the entailments between first and third person ascriptions of know-how. But a 
full understanding of why B&M take (C3) as an example of ability-without-know-
how can only be achieved in the light of their own positive account, below.  The (C) 
cases are, therefore, either vulnerable to anti-intellectualist challenge or rely on the 
architecture of their own concept-based account, as will be seen.  This throws doubt 
on their supposed authority as counter-examples, and undermines the extent to which 
the cases can be taken to motivate B&M’s own account, as opposed to be exemplars 
of that very account, reflecting its particular requirements.  This latter point will be 
dealt with in detail in Section 2.  
 The very strategy of attempting to provide counter-examples presumes that 
anti-intellectualism seeks, or is committed to establishing, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for know-how. Furthermore, the consequences of relying on what I 
identify as the Domino Strategy (Chapter 2, Section 2.1, i.e., the creation and use of 
outlying ‘hard case’ examples to undermine familiar linguistic usage) are counter-
productive, given that they threaten the stability of meaning.  Like S&W, B&M’s 
heavy reliance on the methodology of argument-by-counter-example risks sawing off 
the very branch on which they sit.   
 That said, unlike S&W, B&M do admit to the need for caution in the use and 
scope of putative counter-examples. They claim to be alert to a recent warning from 
Dan Bonevac, Josh Dever and David Sosa.  Though Bonevac, Dever and Sosa’s focus 
is on the use of supposed counterexamples in connection with conditional analyses of 
dispositions, they argue that, as a methodology in general, it is flawed.  Indeed, it 
“badly overestimates the effect of counterexamples, as if the Gettier example were 
sufficient to refute the possibility of [sic] conjunctive analysis of knowledge.” (BD&S 
2011, 1143).  They go on to point out that though there may be a role for 
counterexamples in refining positions, one must only use them to counter specific 
proposals.  To do otherwise is to succumb to what Bonevac, Dever & Sosa call, ‘the 
counterexample fallacy’.  Yet though B&M do acknowledge this risk, they simply 
insist that, “our argument… does not commit a ‘counterexample’ fallacy” (2011c, 
174, fn. 29). Whether or not what I identify as the Domino Strategy is one and the 
same as this Counterexample Fallacy, the two raise similar worries about the value of 
claims which are based on supposed counter-example cases.  
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 Bearing these caveats about such cases in mind, I now examine the 
experimental testing of intuitions done by B&M, together with Jennifer Wright: the 
second of their three strategies to undermine ability accounts of know-how. 
 
1.3 Empirical Data 
 
Stanley & Williamson’s Ski-instructor and B&M’s Pat the Ski-Instructor are both 
supposed by their proponents to indicate the extent to which know-how need not 
entail ability.   In the tug-o’-war of suggesting alternative readings, one might respond 
that the inability in both cases serves, instead, to indicate a lack of know-how, rather 
than show that ability can be missing in the face of know-how had.  Indeed Alva Noe 
(2005) claims that the strength of such competing intuitions is an empirical matter and 
that were they to be tested, he suggests his own, more anti-intellectualist, evaluation 
might prevail. At the very least, “the outcome of such a poll would depend on how 
well we tell the backstory.” (2005, 283)   
 In the wake of this comment, B&M teamed up with psychologist Jennifer 
Wright (henceforth BM&W) and conducted a number of surveys seeking to establish 
the extent to which the general public77 would or would not assign either know-how 
where ability was given, or ability where know-how was given.  To do this, they 
presented two (B) cases and two (C) cases to 194 people.  Specifically they described 
in rich detail, (B2) Pat the Ski-Instructor, (B3) Jane the Olympic Skater, (C2) Sally 
the Avalanche Escaper and (C3) Irina the Novice Skater.   In the case of (B2), 
BM&W declare, “[b]ecause the vignette explicitly states that Pat has never been able 
to perform the stunts, the possibility of telling a “back-story” which could rationalize 
an ability-attribution… is effectively ruled out.” (2009, 391-392)  And indeed, 
BM&W claim to apply this non-biased strategy in the presentation of all cases.  
 The results of their survey are as follows.  Re: (B2) Pat the Ski-Instructor, 
“81% judged both that Pat knows how to perform the student and that he is unable to 
do them.” (2009, 392)   Re: (B3) Jane the Olympic Skater, 76% judged Jane knows 
how to do the quintuple Salchow but is unable, (2009, 393).  Re: (C2) Sally the 
                                                
77 The general public, (or ‘we’ as one might say) is increasingly referred to as ‘the folk’ in 
philosophical discussion which contrast pre-philosophical ‘ordinary talk’ and ‘ordinary intuition’ with 
philosophical or theoretical talk, intuition or reflection.  I take this terminology to come with a set of 
meta-philosophical presumptions that are themselves open to question. I will therefore avoid using the 
term myself, except where quoting BM&W, who remain unworried about the expression, as seen in the 
title of this particular paper, ‘The folk on knowing how’.  
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Avalanche Escape, 76% judged Sally is able but doesn’t know how to escape the 
avalanche, (2009, 395), and re: (C3) Irina the Novice Skater, 86%  judged Irina is able 
but doesn’t know how to do a Salchow. (2007, 397) 
 BM&W take these results as vindicating the status of their cases as successful 
counter-examples to the view that ability is necessary and sufficient for know-how.  
But is Noe’s backstory worry diffused?  To what extent is the presentation neutral?  If 
one is told in the scenario description that, as they say, Pat is unable to do stunts, to 
what extent can the participants even be described as then judging whether or not he 
is able to do stunts. If someone says, as part of the story, that there is no table in the 
room and then asks you whether or not there is a table in the room, something already 
seems amiss.  And to what extent does the implicit separability of ability and know-
how not already pre-judge one of the central beliefs at the heart of the debate?  Might 
the separability of know-how and ability in the construction of the survey not bed in 
the very presumption of dualism that Ryle was seeking to question? Furthermore, how 
might the participants have answered questions about whether or not Pat knows how 
to perform the stunt or whether he knows how to teach the stunt, or both, and what 
might their answer(s) be?  Would they say that Chris is doing something skillful, or 
not?  How might a survey even begin to engage with the kinds of objections proposed 
earlier concerning alternative descriptions, opacity issues and the interchangeability of 
first and third person ascriptions?  I will not, however, push BM&W further on these 
points, but focus instead on an alternative important worry which BM&W do 
acknowledge, which I take to be even more fundamental than all these more detailed 
concerns.  This relates to their explanation as to why there is no complete consensus 
in the participants’ attributions.  According to BM&W, the main reason a substantial 
number of participants do not share the views of the majority, or of B&M, is that, “the 
stereotypical individual who knows how to φ is, in addition, able to φ.  This suggest 
that know how attributions will stereotypically implicate the corresponding ability 
attributions”.  (2009, 394)   
 BM&W’s acknowledgement of the very idea that there is such a stereotypical 
relation between know-how and ability, is not only a late-arriving admission, but it is 
then one they go on to suggest need not be taken seriously.  Instead, when considering 
the survey results, they suggest, “It seems more natural to attribute the minority anti-
intellectualist responses to some form of misunderstanding.”  (2009, 394)  In 
dismissing solicited empirical responses as the products of misunderstanding, 
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BM&W’s treatment of anomalies raises a host questions about the legitimacy of their 
supposed experimental method and the philosophical value of its data.  Ironically, 
elsewhere Bengson is alert to the need for caution when engaging with empirical 
studies, going as far as issuing thirteen warnings to be born in mind when testing 
intuitions in general, including a reminder that, “not all answers are created equal.” 
(2010 MSS)  No comparable tentativeness is exercised here. 
 Having said all that, let BM&W be allowed their results, on their own terms. 
For even with this concession, it would still not be the case that BM&W are correct in 
claiming, “the present findings go decisively against anti-intellectualism.”  (2009, 
3998)  On the contrary, there is no principled reason why the survey should not 
support the anti-intellectualist view that ascriptions of know-how and ability do not 
and need not always overlap. Anti-intellectualism is not a view that seeks to supply an 
account of some singular notion of know-how.  It is rather (at least for Ryle)78 a 
matter pertaining to a specific aspect of our intelligent performances.  This does not 
deny that there are propositional or theoretical kinds of know-how.  One knows how 
to get from London to Leeds when one knows that you can catch a bus from Kings 
Cross or a coach from Victoria.  I conclude that BM&W’s survey tells as much for 
anti-intellectualism, as against it; and that it does so is, ultimately, unsurprising.  After 
all, according to anti-intellectualism ‘know-how’ and ‘ability’ are non-synonymous 
terms, usage of which is likely to be a matter of fine distinctions and discriminations 
depending on the context, the presentation of the context and a host of other rhetorical 
and narrative features and devices. 
 
1.4   A Structural Flaw 
 
The third of B&M’s trio of strategies to challenge the relation between ability and 
know-how is to identify a so-called ‘structural flaw’ at the heart of anti-
intellectualism. Their suggestion is that (B) and (C) cases each pull in different 
directions, generating a tension, which is, in principle, irresolvable.  Specifically, the 
‘know-how-without-ability’ (B) cases manifest “the problem of pervasive inability”, 
(i.e. the assumption that no additional know-how will deliver the ability, for whatever 
reason) whereas the ‘ability-without-know-how’ (C) cases are subject to “the problem 
                                                
78 Nor is a singular notion the pursuit of Wittgenstein (see Chapter 5), or myself (see Chapter 7). 
96. 
of ignorant reliability”, (2011c, 173) whereby one (supposedly) is able to do 
something without knowing-how to do it. See my modified table, Table 2., below. 
 
Table 2. 
(B) (A) (C) 
Know-how Know-how No Know-How 
No ability Ability Ability 
Pervasive Inability  Ignorant Reliability 
 
Any ability-account theorist supposedly faces this predicament:  
 
 The problem of pervasive inability counsels us to weaken the  
 ability condition: we must require less than a reliable ability to φ,  
 since a reliable ability to φ is not necessary for knowledge how  
 to φ. But the problem of ignorant reliability counsels us to strengthen  
 the ability condition: we must require more than a reliable ability to φ,  
 since a reliable ability to φ is not sufficient for knowledge how  
 to φ.                                                                         (2011c, 174) 
 
This putative situation is not a problem, let alone a structural flaw, with anti-
intellectualism.  Rather it is a feature which is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to any 
attempt to conflate two non-synonymous terms or provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for two separate notions.  Consider the ways in which Fs and Gs might be 
co-extensive, i.e. an (A) case.   This need not rule out there being examples of Fs 
which are not Gs, i.e., (B) cases, or examples of Gs which are not Fs, i.e., (C) cases. 
B&M’s structural flaw would apply no less in such a situation.  (See Table 3.,  
below.)  This is not a structural flaw, it is merely a general feature of the relations of 
any such triple sets of cases.  It is not therefore a structural flaw, or even a problem 
for anti-intellectualism, per se.79   
 
 
 
                                                
79 Indeed one can reconfigure this table, using any of B&M’s terms of art in place of F and G, and 
generate exactly the same ‘flaw’ for non-propositional intellectualism. 
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Table 3. 
 
(B) (A) (C) 
F F Not F 
Not G G G 
Not G, F-ness  Not F, G-ness 
 
B&M go further, however, declaring this structural flaw to be the product of a more 
profound mistake, one which, “goes deeper, and can be traced to the project of trying 
to force knowledge how, which is cognitive into the mold of ability, which is 
behavioral-dispositional.” (2011c, 174).  Now though there are difficulties in Ryle’s 
appeal to the notion of dispositions, his focus on the rule-involving, practice-based, 
normative aspect of our performances and activities is hardly behaviorist. 80  Added to 
which, given Ryle’s catalogue of dispositions includes, “addictions, ambitions, 
missions, loyalties, devotions and chronic negligences,” (1949, 128), I suggest that to 
identify such a list as mere abilities seems not only inaccurate, but churlish. B&M are 
correct in identifying the mistake, but it is of their own, not anti-intellectualism’s, 
making. 
 I suggest that the identification of this spurious structural flaw in anti-
intellectualism and its tenuous association with some kind of behavioural-disposition 
is more of a rhetorical manoeuvre designed to distance B&M from ability, prior to the 
need to call upon the notion of successful performance, as a means of escaping a 
problem in their own positive account; a matter I consider in the next section.  What is 
worth noting here is that for this manoeuvre to gain any purchase, B&M need to drive 
a deep wedge between the notions of ability and skill.  This they do by (i) stipulating 
that “[a]bilities…are at most reliable dispositions to intentional behaviour” (2007, 46) 
and (ii) declaring, somewhat sotto voce, that it is, “important to recognize that 
intellectualists will distinguish sharply between skills and abilities or dispositions. 
Skill is a state of Intelligence… skills but not abilities or dispositions must be at least 
partially grounded in propositional attitudes.” (2011b, 9, fn. 12).  This new category 
division between abilities and skills turns them into technical notions, making it 
                                                
80 Cf., Ryle: “The general trend of this book [The Concept of Mind] will undoubtedly, and harmlessly, 
be stigmatized as ‘behaviourist’. (1949 308) 
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impossible to characterise Ryle’s philosophy, or anti-intellectualism in general, using 
these (now) theoretical terms. 81   Furthermore, in stipulating such a categorial 
distinction between abilities and skills, B&M provide  further clues as to the thinking 
behind the characterisation of their various cases.    
 What, though, of B&M’s own positive account of know-how?  The next 
section sets out the detail of this apparently fresh new approach. 
 
2 Understanding, Concepts and Conceptions  
 
According to S&W’s propositional intellectualism: 
 
 (1) S knows how to φ 
 
is not a matter of S having an ability to φ, or engaging in some kind of normative 
performance of, or associated with, φ-ing.  Rather it is a matter of: 
 
 (2) S’s knowing w is a way to φ 
 
On their own positive account of know-how, B&M’s share S&W’s view that knowing 
how is knowing a way.  But whereas for S&W’s knowing a way to φ is propositional:  
 
 (3) S knows that w is a way to φ under a practical mode of presentation 
 
for B&M knowing a way is not propositional knowledge-that, but non-propositional 
knowledge-of, or acquaintance knowledge.  B&M distinguish (at least) two kinds of 
acquaintance knowledge.  There is the more familiar notion of the knowledge had for 
people or places, e.g., my knowledge of my own, but not B&M’s neighbours, or my 
knowledge of Central London, but not downtown Denver.  There is, they suggest, a 
further kind of acquaintance knowledge; one that involves understanding.  This kind 
of acquaintance knowledge, B&M take to be objectual knowledge or objectual 
                                                
81 This ability/skill stipulative distinction, with the propositional attitude grounding of skill might be 
taken as yet further evidence that the ‘non-propositionality’ heralded in the name of B&M’s position, is 
a not insubstantial piece of mis-direction. 
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understanding.  Specifically, it is the objectual knowledge or understanding of 
concepts. 
 Armed with this distinction, B&M propose that what it is to know-how to φ, is 
a matter of having (i) an objectual understanding of concepts, (ii) a guiding 
conception of a way of φ-ing, (iii) a correct and complete (possibly implicit) 
conception of that way of φ-ing, and (iv) reasonable concept mastery of the relevant 
ability-based concepts.   All of these elements, ‘objectual understanding’, ‘a guiding 
conception of a way of φ-ing’, ‘a correct and complete conception of a way of φ-ing’, 
‘reasonable concept mastery’ and ‘ability-based concepts’ have precisely tailored 
identities and roles in B&M’s theoretical edifice.   
 
 Against thinking of knowledge-how as either a propositional attitude or  
 an ability, the paper (Non-Propositional Intellectualism) [2011c]  
 proposes a third way: to know how to perform a given activity is to have  
 some understanding of a way of a performing that activity, where  
 such objectual understanding (understanding of, not understanding-that)  
 is grounded in but distinct from propositional attitudes and involves  
 having  reasonable mastery of the concepts in some (possibly implicit) 
 conception of  that way.                                                (Bengson, 2011) 
 
I now examine these elements individually, raising critical issues en route.  
 
2.1   Understanding 
 
B&M’s decision to ascribe know-how but not ability in their (B) cases, i.e., to Martin 
the Turtle-keeper, Pat the Ski-Instructor, Irina the Champion Skater, and Louis the 
Mathematician, is both evidence for, and consolidation of, the supposedly distinction 
between genuine know-how and ability.  In eschewing ability as a feature of know-
how, not withstanding their own admission about their natural intimacy in 
stereotypical cases, B&M are faced with two broad options.  They could take the 
know-how at issue in both the (A) and (B) cases to invite further analysis or they 
could reject the idea that know-how has any such further analysis.  In the latter case, 
there would be no single property, element, aspect, feature, essence, characteristic or 
criterion shared by all the cases of know-how.  Instead, following a suggestion from 
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Ludwig Wittgenstein, know-how might be recognised to be a “family resemblance” 
(PI §67) notion.82 
 In his associated work on the nature of intuitions, Bengson’s philosophical 
preference is for, “a unitary (as opposed to “family resemblance”) theory of intuition”, 
being more capable of offering “significant theoretical advantages” (MSS 2010).  
Given B&M’s substantive theoretical ambitions, it is perhaps unsurprising that they 
forgo the family resemblance option. “[I]t seems implausible to deny that knowing 
how, skill, and other states of Intelligence have something important in common; 
what is needed is an account of this commonality.”83  (2011b, 19, fn. 19)  B&M claim 
to identify understanding as the desired and presumed commonality shared by all 
cases of know-how.  This is not the conclusion of an argument based on attempts to 
excavate the syntax and semantics of know-how-involving sentences, (à la S&W).  
Indeed, it is not the conclusion of an argument at all.  In sharp contrast to the 
methodology of their fellow intellectualists, B&M’s proposal that understanding is the 
shared characteristic of all examples of know-how, is the deliverance of intuition, 
backed up by the observation of ordinary language usage.   
 Using intuitions about Irina’s knowledge of addition, in (A1), B&M propose 
that, “she must simply possess a minimal understanding,” because, “[i]ntuitively, 
knowing how to perform select activities entails a minimal understanding of them.” 
(2007, 41) Having articulated this “intimate relation between know-how and 
understanding” B&M now take themselves to be equipped with “the motivation” and 
indeed the wherewithal, to provide “a general intellectual analysis of the former in 
terms of the latter.” (2007, 31 and also 46)  As well as now having an available 
rationale for their various counter-examples.  
 Three preliminary objections might be raised at this juncture.  First, one might  
claim it is a mistake to simply presume there must be a commonality to know-how; an 
avoidable error brought on by too narrow a diet of examples, an over-enthusiastic 
ambition to system-build, the urge to naturalistic reduction, and such like.  All of 
these are symptomatic of what Wittgenstein identifies as, “[o]ur craving for 
generality.” (BB, 18)   B&M might respond that there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest that know-how is a candidate family resemblance notion, or present evidence 
                                                
82 I return to this in Chapter 5 to take a closer look at Wittgenstein’s insight.  But here, I will continue 
to use Bengson’s intuitive understanding of what is meant. 
83 And of course, without the assumption of just such a commonality, naturalized philosophical theory-
building loses its rationale. I look more closely at this methodological demand in Chapter 6. 
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to warrant their claim for a commonality. They might, perhaps, go on to raise the 
stakes to a discussion of the merits of different meta-philosophical ambitions and 
approaches (as I do in Chapter 6).  Whilst, however, they do discuss the important 
ramifications for their (or any) theory of know-how for a vast range of philosophical 
topics (a point which can’t be faulted) they never question the task and principles that 
shape naturalized philosophy.  
 Secondly, one might suggest that even without committing to a family 
resemblance approach, there might be crucial differences between (A) and (B) cases. 
Just because understanding might be a useful tool in considering (A1), it needn’t be 
applicable to any, let alone, all, (B) cases.  After all why should addition be the 
paradigm example of knowledge-how?   Why not politics, sport, dancing, looking 
after a child, caring for animals, creating a garden, running a country, a business or a 
household? 
 Thirdly, in seeking to analyse know-how in terms of understanding, B&M 
select a notion which is, itself, the subject of major controversy. According to Stephen 
Grimm, the majority of philosophers of science take it to be entirely uncontentious 
that understanding is a matter of understanding why things are as they are; a kind of 
propositional knowledge about the understanding of causes. (2006, 515-516)  
Epistemologists Jonathan Kvanvig and Linda Zagzebski disagree, holding that though 
understanding may well be related to knowledge, it is not some kind of species of it, 
propositional or otherwise.  Their arguments involve appreciating the extent to which 
understanding can not be Gettierized and may or may not be compatible with luck.  In 
stark contrast to either of these two general trends in the philosophy of understanding, 
B&M hold that understanding is not to be regarded in terms of being (or not being) a 
kind of propositional knowledge, but of being a kind of acquaintance knowledge.  
Specifically, it is a “type of objectual knowledge, theoretically speaking […]  not 
mere objectual knowledge or ‘knowledge-by-acquaintance’. Rather, it is a kind of 
understanding.” (2011c, 180) 
 As such, B&M propose an account of know-how which takes it to be a kind of 
understanding, where understanding is held to be a sub-species of acquaintance 
knowledge.  This latter is not only a deeply contentious point, but perhaps the detail 
of B&M’s account provides the very resources needed to help illuminate these 
problems.  I move on, therefore, to consider the concepts and conceptions which are 
relata of this objectual understanding and the relevant relation of grasping.  For, 
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together these establish the core of B&M’s theory of know-how.  
 
2.2   The Three Cs 
 
Having agreed with S&W that to know-how to φ is to know a way to φ, but having 
disagreed with S&W that to know a way to φ is to have propositional knowledge of a 
way, B&M propose instead that: 
 
 (4) x knows how to φ when x minimally understands a way of φ -ing. 
      (cf., 2007, 41) 
 
B&M then offer the following necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal 
understanding: 
 
 (5) “x minimally understands a way of φ-ing if and only if x has a correct   
 and complete (possibly implicit) conception ξ of w and x has reasonable 
 mastery of the concepts in ξ (and their mode of combination)”  (2007, 50) 
 
 ‘Concepts’, ‘concept mastery’ and ‘conceptions’ are all terms of art, as I now 
indicate. 
 
2.2.1 Concepts  
 
B&M claim concepts can be ability-based (2007, 32 & 2011c, fn. 68), demonstrative 
(2007, 51), proprioceptive (2009, fn. 28) and relevant.  “[B]y ‘relevant concepts’ we 
simply mean the concepts reasonable mastery of which is necessary and sufficient for 
understanding the select activity in question.” (2007, fn. 20)  
  
2.2.2 Concept mastery  
 
According to B&M, concept mastery comes in qualitatively distinct degrees: (i) 
minimal mastery (i.e., mere concept possession), (ii) reasonable mastery (i.e., solid 
grasp of a concept) and (iii) full mastery.  To understand a concept, it need only be 
reasonably, rather than fully, mastered.  Such reasonable mastery is deemed to be a 
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cognitive state84 which “occupies the middle ground between mere possession and full 
mastery”, involving having a “sufficiently solid grasp” (2007, 42) of the relevant 
concepts.  Furthermore, “Intuitively, x has reasonable mastery of the relevant concepts 
only if x has the ability to correctly employ those concepts in simple ways.” (2007, 
43) 
  
2.2.3 Conceptions 
 
According to B&M, “one’s conception of some δ is how one conceives or thinks or is 
somehow inclined to think, of δ.” (2011c, 190).  Such conceptions can be correct or 
incorrect, complete or incomplete, there can be different conceptions of the same 
thing, and “necessarily equivalent conceptions need not be identical” (2011c, 191). 
Conceptions can also be wholly or partially demonstrative, implicit or explicit, 
publically shareable and one person can have more than one distinct conception of the 
same thing.  B&M name these properties respectively the “non-correctness, non-
exhaustiveness, diversity, fine-grainedness, unsophisticatedness, covertness, publicity 
and non-exclusivity” of conceptions. (2011c, 190-191). 
 Though these properties would seem equally applicable to beliefs, and thus 
suggest that conceptions are beliefs, B&M insist that conceptions are neither beliefs, 
nor sets of beliefs.  Were they to be beliefs, this would invite, or perhaps demand, the 
very propositional account of know-how they seek to reject.  That said, B&M do 
acknowledge there are deep similarities. Conceptions, they admit, “are not identical to 
beliefs – at least not outright beliefs – or collections thereof (though they may 
supervene on beliefs and their kin).” (2011c, fn. 50)   Given, however, that 
conceptions are not, on this account, beliefs, they cannot be believed, thus (on some 
epistemological view) a fortiori, not known.  Instead, they are (as are their constitutive 
concepts) grasped.  Objectualist intellectualism says that, “To know how to φ is to 
                                                
84 B&M’s ‘cognitive state’ is, as might be suspected the same as Stanley’s ‘standing epistemic state’.  
This was confirmed in personal discussion with John Bengson at the 2011 Arche Knowing-How 
Conference at St Andrews University, where interestingly, the expression “epistemic standing state” 
swiftly became the single most important term of art, though as already pointed out, its very existence 
(and not its nature) is what Ryle sought to criticise.  Note also that to presume that propositional 
knowledge is any kind of state is for some to have already made a mistaken step in the wrong direction, 
c.f., Hacker (2001) and (2004), and Wittgenstein. 
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stand in an objectual understanding relation to a way of φ-ing.” (2011, 189)  This is 
done in two steps with the introduction of the notion of a guiding conception: 
 
 (6)  A conception ξ of a way of φ-ing is correct and complete only  
        if it is possible for ξ to be some individual guiding conception  
        in φ-ing in way w. (2011c, 192)85 
 
and, then: 
 
 (7)   ξ is a guiding conception for an action φ for an individual x  
         if ξ is for x a conception of a way of φ-ing and, in attempting  
         to φ, x tries to at least implicitly to make x’s behaviour conform  
         to ξ. (2011c, 192) 
 
With this, B&M complete a concept-theoretic account of know-how.  This, they 
claim, provides an “escape” from the “false dichotomy between the identification of 
knowing how either with propositional knowledge or ability.” (2011c, 195)  To know 
how to φ is to stand in the appropriate objectual undertanding relation to a way to φ, 
which requires having a (possibly) implicit correct and complete conception, that is, a 
guiding conception of a set of ability-related concepts of which one has solid grasp, or 
reasonable mastery.   
 Armed with the detail of B&M’s proposal, I now argue that this is not only 
propositional in all but name, it is also fundamentally flawed. 
 
2.3 A Fourth C: Concerns 
 
B&M’s view that know-how is objectual knowledge crucially requires highly 
specific, indeed stipulatively defined notions of concepts, concept mastery and 
conceptions.  I consider the first, and then third of these, individually; incorporating 
issues pertaining to the second, concept mastery, where best applicable. 
 
 
                                                
85 For B&M, this is the relation between a way of acting and a conception. 
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2.3.1 Concepts   
 
According to Maurice Weitz, there is “an astonishing variety of theories of concepts”, 
which variously claim that concepts are, “supersensible entities, such as universals, 
meanings, abstract objects, definitions, predicates and relations”, “mental entities or 
states, such as composite images, ideas, thoughts, conceptions or innate ideas”, or 
“neural entities”, “somewhere between words, thoughts and things” or “abstractible 
items from families of sentences” or “human or animal skills or abilities”, etc. (1988, 
260)  Georges Rey’s more recent overview offers an equally diverse range of 
candidate suggestions for the ontology of concepts, from the “constituents of thought” 
to ,“sets of real and possible objects, and functions defined over them” to, “properties, 
‘senses’, inferences rules or discrimination abilities”. (1998, original emphasis).  In 
attempting to structure this sprawling contemporary diversity, Eric Margolis & 
Stephen Laurence identify “two dominant frameworks” which understand concepts to 
be either, “mental representations or [...] abstract objects.” (2007, 561, see also 2008)  
Jerry Fodor’s theory is an example of the former framework; the latter stems from 
Frege and is the orientation that best captures the work of Christopher Peacocke. 
 In their own writings on know-how, B&M offer no direct view on the nature 
of concepts, eschewing any engagement with this maelstrom.  There is a clear 
commitment in Bengson’s current work on perception, however, to the view that 
concepts are abstract senses.  In their (2011), Bengson (together with Enrico Grube & 
Daniele Korman) states, “We shall understand concepts to be abstract senses, as 
opposed to abilities or mental representations (e.g. words in a langauge of thought).” 
(2011, 175)86  This sits comfortably with the views of those two concept theorists 
B&M reference most, i.e., Peacocke and George Bealer.87 “On Bealer’s (1998) 
analysis of concept possession, the relevant propositional attitudes are intuitions.  On 
                                                
86 Nonetheless, in the complex theoretical environment of contemporary work on concepts, there 
remain a number of similarities between B&M’s views and those of Fodor (1998 and 2008).  These 
include, (i) B&M’s apparent amenability to Fodorian-style concept atomism, as seen in Novice Irina’s 
vulnerability to discrete, rather than holistic, conceptual confusions; particularly concerning skate-
edges, (ii) B&M’s worries over concept learnability (see 2011b, the ‘rational practice question’) and 
Fodor’s rejection of concept-learning, (iii) apparent resonances between B&M’s objectual knowledge 
and Fodor’s proposal that concept acquisition involves ‘locking onto’ properties in the world, and (iv) 
B&M’s externalism and Fodor’s suggestion that, “having a concept (concept possession) is constituted 
by being in some sort of nomic, mind-world relation.” (1998, 146)   
87 In personal communication, Bengson confirmed that his own view of concepts has “differences, but 
also relevant similarities (in approach as well as content)” to that of “Bealer, Burge and Peacocke”.  
(email, 8th June, 2011)  
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Peacocke’s (2007) most recent analysis of concept possession, the relevant attitudes 
are states of tacit propositional knowledge. Either way, the basic idea expressed is 
that, “to fix a subject’s propositional attitudes plus the subject’s conceptual situation, 
is to fix their knowledge how.” (2011c, fn. 55).  So whilst it is the case that B&M do 
not specifically identify or offer their own account of concepts, per se, I take it to be 
uncontroversial that their views can be situated alongside these Fregean theorists.   
 One might bring a range of objections to bear on the view that concepts are 
some kind of Fregean abstract objects, but I limit myself to focussing on the 
demanding metaphysical implications of the view favoured by B&M.88 These are 
apparent in Bealer’s claim that, “concepts are sui generis irreducible entities 
comprising the ontological categories in terms of which propositions (thoughts, in 
Frege’s sense) are to be analyzed”. (1998, 261)  This is the “ante rem view of 
propositions and concepts... the view that they are mind-independent entities which 
would exist whether or not they apply to anything.” (1998, 261, emphasis added)  As 
mind-independent entities, concepts do, of course, fit well into B&M’s theoretical 
requirements that one have objectual (acquaintance) knowledge of concepts, that 
concepts are graspable relata.   But though this indicates the extent to which B&M are 
radical89 concept objectivists, it trades on the view that concepts not only can be, but 
are, and indeed need to be substantial, stand-alone metaphysical entities.   
 But need B&M’s view be quite so metaphysically demanding?  Perhaps, 
B&M’s objectivism is simply a matter of relations to some social, rather than Platonic 
realm.  After all, B&M do share Tyler Burge’s view that a patient who mistakenly 
believes she has arthritis in the thigh does share the same concept, arthritis, with her 
doctor (see 2009, 399, fn 31).  And as Burge points out, “Every man is a piece of the 
social continent, a part of the social main.” (1979, 86). Perhaps B&M’s view that 
concepts are abstract objects or senses, is the more metaphysically innocuous 
observation that concepts are but part and parcel of our human language activities, 
and that concept possession and mastery comes with our inculcation into, and ongoing 
involvement in, public language practices. 
 There is no evidence, however, that B&M’s view about the nature of concepts 
is involved with our being, or coming to be, language-users.  No connection is 
                                                
88 Cf., Margolis & Laurence (2007) for a raft of further objections. 
89 B&M also refer to their own non-propositional intellectualism as ‘radical intellectualism’ (2007, fns. 
1 & 24), though this nomenclature has been dropped in (2011a). 
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considered, let alone exploited, between language mastery and concept mastery.90  
Indeed, there is indirect evidence that B&M take language abilities to be irrelevant to 
their proposed objectual knowledge of concepts.  In briefly considering the 
applicability of their know-how theory to animals, B&M state, “We believe the status 
of animal know-how is best left to experts on animal cognition”, though they admit, 
“we are comfortable with the corresponding attributions of propositional knowledge, 
and minimal understanding.” (2007, 399)91  Leaving aside the immediate worry that 
this suggests B&M might be taking know-how to be the explanans not the 
explanandum, this confirms my point that B&M take any putative internal connection 
between language-use and concepts to be misguided.92   
 The viability of B&M’s account of know-how rests on the (as yet absent) 
clarification and justification of this ante-rem view of concepts. But just what are 
concepts such that they are in the world prior to our grasp of them?  How do they 
relate to our new and developing practices?  Before there were poets and 
philosophers, artists and sportsmen, dancers and demolition experts, were the required 
ability-based concepts, ‘out there and waiting’ to be grasped?  Without doubt, the 
required concepts that figure in B&M’s theory are far more metaphysically 
demanding, and obscure than their presentation acknowledges.  In foregoing the 
connection between know-how and abilities in favour of know-how and concepts, 
B&M escape the difficulties of (what they claim to be) the frying pan for those (I 
would suggest) of the fire. 
 
2.3.2 Conceptions 
 
Following Burge, B&M are committed to the view that two people might share the 
same concepts, whilst nonetheless having difference conceptions. Given that the 
default view of conceptions is that they are beliefs or sets of beliefs, this looks to push 
B&M towards a propositional approach.  B&M’s non-propositional form of 
                                                
90 This indicates a further Fodorian parallel, given his view that “concepts are prior to and independent 
of natural language” (Margolis & Laurence, 2008) 
91 In this B&M are even more closely associated with Burge, for whom, “even where social practices 
are deeply involved in individuating mental states they are not the final arbiter.” (1986, 707) 
92 When questioned specifically about whether being a language-user is a pre-requisite for having 
concepts, Bengson replied, “I'd prefer to remain neutral on this issue if I can. At any rate, the answer 
might depend on what is meant by 'language-user' (e.g., one who does vs. could use a language).” (e-
mail 8th June, 2011) 
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intellectualism requires, by contrast, that the relevant guiding conceptions are not 
propositional.  As non-propositional entities, conceptions (and indeed concepts) are 
not believed, but are grasped.  But just what is this grasping? 
 According to Jason Stanley, “Grasping what it is [to] know how to do 
something involves understanding what it is to know the answer to a question.  As we 
have seen this is an ability that presupposes mastery of propositional knowledge.” 
(2011, 233-234)  In contrast, B&M claim that, “grasping a correct and complete 
conception of a way of acting involves conceiving of that way in an appropriate 
manner – conceiving of it as such.” (2011c, 188).  This ‘as such’ qualification gets a 
further mention, in connection with B&M’s insistence that objectual understanding 
“is neither propositional knowledge nor merely objectual knowledge (acquaintance, 
familiarity) alone: rather it is objectual-knowledge-of-a-way-of- φ-ing-as such-with 
reasonable-conceptual-mastery.”  (2011c, 188 fn. 54)  
 So, just as believing or knowing is to propositions, so grasping is to be 
regarded as a conceiving-as-such to non-propositional conceptions, or an objectual-
knowledge-as-such to a way of φ-ing, for B&M.  This ‘as such’ qualification is, 
therefore, doing most, if not all, the work in distinguishing the desired non-
propositional conception, from the presumed default propositional view of 
conceptions.  But can it be that this ‘as-such’ rider is all that stands between B&M’s 
non-propositional, objectual intellectualism and propositional intellectualism?  Not 
quite.  For B&M do offer one further distinction in denying the apparently 
propositionality of their view. This is their suggestion that the grounds of know-how 
are distinct from, and should not be conflated, with the nature of know-how.  For 
though it is the case that know-how is, propositionally grounded, B&M claim that its 
nature is not.93  
                                                
93 Although B&M use the ‘in virtue of’ locution, solely in connection with the grounding relation, and 
acknowledge both Kit Fine and Jonathan Schaffer as the source for their own (undetailed) views on the 
grounding relation, the views of Fine & Schaffer, however, pull in different directions. Fine (2001) 
states that, “The notion of ground should be distinguished from the strict notion of reduction” (2001, 
15) thus enabling Fine (and B&M) to remain metaphysically neutral. Whereas for Schaffer, grounding 
is a “primitive… unanalysable but needed notion – it is the primitive structuring conception of 
metaphysics.”  (2009, 364, original emphasis).  Further evidence for B&M’s more Fineian view is 
perhaps to be found in Fine’s commitment to the role, importance and metaphysically illuminating 
power of intuitions; something found Bengson’s other related work,(e.g., his (2010) & (2011 with 
Grube & Korman)  Note Fine’s view that the, “two main sources of evidence for making judgments of 
ground” are firstly, “our wealth of intuitions” (2001, 21) and secondly the, “simplicity, breath, 
coherence or non-circularity” which provide “the most metaphysically satisfying” explanation. (2001, 
22)  Again, this dovetails nicely with Bengson’s other work on intuitions. (2010 MSS) 
 
109. 
 This propositional grounding relation is, “x knows how to φ in virtue of x’s 
having some propositional attitudes(s) regarding φ-ing”. (2011c, 162).  By contrast, 
“the nature of knowing how to φ (or, if you prefer, what it is: its analysis, definition, 
or essence”. (2011c, 163)  And this is not propositional. In light of this, B&M take it 
to be the case that one might accept intellectualism without propositionalism. And this 
is, indeed, what B&M propose.   Thus, as a matter of the grounding of know-how, 
B&M share with S&W a propositional view: know-how is grounded in propositional 
attitudes.  As a matter of the nature of know-how, B&M take know-how to be non-
propositional, a view not shared by S&W.  For where S&W’s propositional 
intellectualism takes the person who knows how to be do something to be in a 
knowledge-that relation to the proposition that w is way to φ, B&M’s non-
propositional intellectualism takes the person to be in a knowledge-of, objectual 
relation to way to φ.   
 Of course it is important to note that S&W do not recognise the distinction 
between grounds and nature which B&M are suggesting. They do, though, talk about 
the nature of propositions and their account’s commitment to a “metaphysics of 
ways” (2001, 427).  Were one to attempt to appraise S&W’s propositional 
intellectualism using B&M’s distinction between grounding and nature, then I suggest 
that S&W’s declared commitment to Russellian propositions would result in their 
position similarly qualifying as ‘non-propositional’.  For this is non-propositional 
because it picks out the metaphysically robust constituents of propositions, rather than 
the propositions themselves. A further step that S&W could, but don’t actually make 
in their account. The distinction then turns on B&M willingness to take a final 
naturalizing step in their epistemology.  All of which confirms the deep commitment 
that has been running through each stage of their theoretical proposal. Namely, that 
B&M’s account is, fundamentally, a metaphysics-driven account of know-how.  I 
return to these issues in the next section. 
 A second worry concerns a tension connected to the degree of richness needed 
for a guiding conception.  A correct and complete conception looks to be something 
of a substantial notion, yet a much more modest, indeed, minimalist notion is all that 
actually seems to be required.  As with S&W’s requirement that one might know how 
to φ, but under a practical mode of presentation that need only be indexical, (I can do 
this like this, or in this way), so B&M accept and allow that the knower’s relevant 
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concepts, concept mastery, and guiding conception need only be demonstrative.94  As 
such, B&M’s required guiding conception that w is a way to φ, need be a matter of 
merely having the objectual understanding that, ‘this is a way to do this’.   
 To illustrate this point B&M provide us with two cases: a neuro-anatomist 
(A2) and a five year old child (A3) both of whom know-how and are able to waggle-
their ears.  The neuro-anatomist’s guiding conception includes, “reasonable mastery 
of the concepts muscular contraction and auricular muscles”, though the child’s 
conception is, “more likely proprioceptive and demonstrative: by doing this to these 
muscle (parts of my body).” (2007, 51)  To be deemed to know-how to do something 
merely because one knows how to do this, in this way, looks to make the need for a 
‘correct and complete conception’ even more irrelevant. Furthermore, given such an 
acceptance of demonstrative guiding conceptions and concepts, it is unclear why the 
three (C) cases Avalanche, Chris the Hiker, and Irina the Novice are any different 
from the child in (A3) who both is able to wiggle his ears and knows how to.   They 
can all do what they do, in the way that they do, i.e., in “this” way. Why then aren’t 
Sally, Chris and Novice Irina all people who both are able and know how to do what 
they do?   Why are (C) cases not (A) cases? Or conversely why is (A3) an (A) and not 
a (C) case?  
 Not withstanding the permissibility of demonstrative concepts and 
conceptions, a connected worry emerges from the requirement that whilst different 
people may all know-how to φ, they need not all have reasonable mastery of the same 
concepts, or indeed have the same correct and complete conception of a way of φ-ing.  
For if a guiding conception needs to be a correct and complete conception, in order to 
suffice for know-how, how is it the case that one person’s correct and complete 
conception could be both correct and complete, yet different to another’s?  If my 
guiding conception is not the same as yours, yet mine is correct and complete, and 
yours is equally correct and complete, then either the supposed completeness is not 
the case, or correct and complete conceptions need not be identical.  In which case the 
very idea of a correct and complete conception, appears to be, if not incoherent, at 
least surplus to requirements. 
                                                
94 Cf., Peacocke’s comparable view that one might be, “unable to make its [an implicit conception’s] 
content explicit.” (1998, 49), or that “thinkers sometimes mischaracterize the content of their implicit 
conceptions.” (1998, 51)   
111. 
 One possible response might be that there are as indefinitely many complete 
and correct conceptions as there are people φ-ing: each guided by what are distinctly 
different ways of φ-ing.95  B&M’s theory now looks to collapse back into an ability-
involving account of some kind.  But then again the final piece in their theoretical 
jigsaw does indeed appeal to action, to the notion of trying and to behaviour:  
  
 (7)   ξ is a guiding conception for an action φ for an individual x  
         if ξ is for x a conception of a way of φ-ing and, in attempting  
         to φ, x tries to at least implicitly to make x’s behaviour conform  
         to ξ. (2011c, 192 emphasis added)96 
 
Having worked so hard to reject the necessity of any ability features, it now seems 
that B&M need to appeal to ability, or at the very least, people doing things, in order 
to provide any sense to the very idea of a guiding conception.   
 This indicates the extent to which B&M have a gap in their intellectualist 
theory; a gap which ultimately requires that they, like S&W, must appeal to 
something beyond either static objectual acquaintance, (B&M), or inert propositional 
knowledge (S&W). Indeed, I would argue, that B&M account faces an impasse, and 
that it does so at exactly the same juncture as that faced by S&W.  When S&W need 
to distinguish between Hannah’s knowledge of a way Bill rides a bike, and her own 
knowledge how to ride a bike, they appeal to propositional knowledge known under a 
practical mode of presentation. When B&M need to distinguish between a person 
who knows how others waggle their ears, and his or her own knowledge how to 
waggle their own ears, they resort to as such qualifications of objectual knowledge 
and ability-involving guiding conceptions.   
 I conclude that having rejected ability involving accounts of know-how, 
B&M’s theoretical approach is guilty of kicking our human actions, activities, 
abilities, and practices out the front door only to invite their return through the back. 
                                                
95 Cf., Peacocke’s own view of implicit conceptions he considers to invite a (parallel) criticism that, 
“implicit conceptions… are simply projected backwards from the actual inferential and classificatory 
dispositions of thinkers” (1998,  54), and are “no more than a summary of truths about inferential 
dispositions” (1998, 57) with neither explanatory power, nor metaphysical reality. 
96 Though this is to miss the point that is only because one knows how to do something that one can 
one can know how to refrain from doing it; and refraining from doing one thing one knows how to do, 
and refraining from doing another thing one knows how to do may thus be, as one might say, 
behaviourally indistinguishable.   
112. 
B&M’s non-propositional intellectualism not only shares an ineliminable 
propositionality with S&W’s intellectualism, it similarly confronts a theoretical 
Rubicon that can only be crossed with resources drawn from the anti-intellectualist 
reservoir.  
 Furthermore, in grounding know-how in propositional attitudes, B&M do 
accept their account needs to answer Ryle’s Regress Challenge.  I now evaluate their 
attempt to dispel the challenge this poses. 
 
3 Responding to the Regress  
 
Ryle’s Regress Objection challenges intellectualism by claiming that a regress is 
generated by the “tandem” operation of considering propositions and then “putting 
them into practice” in intelligent action. (1949, 46)  On this model of knowing-how to 
φ intelligently, the initial step of considering propositions itself would need to be done 
intelligently to serve as the necessary guide to intelligent action.  As an action that 
could also be done intelligently, it requires, first of all, the consideration of (yet 
further) propositions. And so on.  B&M attempt to avoid this regress by turning to the 
same Ginet example97  exploited by S&W.    
 According to Ginet, in his knowledge how to open a door, he claims to, 
“exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the 
knob and pushing it…” (1975, 7 original emphasis)  As already discussed, S&W take 
Ginet’s point to show that one might exercise or engage with propositional 
knowledge, without having to contemplate or formulate it.  Thus the Regress is, 
supposedly, avoided. I have argued already that this is simply helping oneself to the 
desired answer to the question at issue, rather than providing an argument for it. B&M 
adopt a similar tactic; slightly modified.  
 For B&M, “In some cases, a state of engaging propositional content (in 
Ginet’s example...) can be appropriately causally related to the production of 
(‘produce’) an Intelligent action although it is not itself an exercise of Intelligence”. 
(2011b, 22)  The idea here is that there is a kind of non-intelligent exercise of the 
propositional knowledge or propositional attitudes.  There are, according to B&M two 
                                                
97 Cf., Hetherington (2009) for a contrasting view of Ginet on understanding and a priori knowledge in 
which he suggests Ginet can be read as offering an “ability-interpretation of full understanding”; which 
would challenge B&M’s reading from quite a different perspective. (2009, 34) 
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ways this might occur: (i) at the person level, in “applying or utilizing” a proposition 
or propositional attitude or, (ii) sub-personally by “an act of deploying or triggering 
an attitude”. (2011b, 23)   With (i), I take it that B&M mean that the application or 
utilisation of knowledge, at a personal level, is the conscious application and 
utilisation of knowledge or propositional attitudes.  But what might it mean to 
consciously apply or utilize knowledge, non-intelligently?  It is unclear what this 
means, or if it even makes sense.  For were it to mean stupidly, then B&M would be 
suggesting one halts the Regress by saying intelligent action requires the stupid 
exercise of other knowledge. That cannot be right.  But if this is not the case, then 
why involve further exercise or engagement with any such propositional knowledge 
or attitude in the first place.  It looks like B&M now have the possibility that 
intelligent action needs no prior exercises of propositions at all.  But this, of course, is 
Ryle’s position, and is what B&M seek to avoid.  This pushes the thrust of B&M’s 
Regress Response entirely on to (ii), the sub-personal option. And indeed as they say, 
in general: 
 
 [I]n Ginet’s example propositional knowledge regarding the door   
 arguably could be simply triggered or deployed subpersonally… 
 To the extent that these views are able to explain how the relevant  
 attitudes can be non-Intelligently exercised, such views would play  
 a crucial role in helping to elaborate intellectualism in a way that  
 averts regress. (2011b, 23)  
 
B&M are right, here, to point out it would help to avoid Ryle’s Regress were they 
able to explain how the subpersonal, non-intelligent, trigger or deployment of 
propositional knowledge might be appropriately exercised.  But no such explanation 
is actually offered. Yet, without such an explanation, their objectual intellectualism is 
not just short of help or assistance in averting the Regress, it is without any resources 
at all, and must succumb to it.98  Yet in order for B&M to supply a viable explanation, 
                                                
98 For B&M (like S&W before them) the pursuit of sub-personal explanations brings them to the same 
Ginet point, in search of justification for the naturalized philosophical option of ‘going sub-personal’.  
Ironically, B&M (unlike S&W) acknowledge that “Ryle would presumably object to the subpersonalist 
views and hybrid views, which seem to violate the tenet that the locus of Intelligence is always the 
person or agent.” (2011b, 23).  But isn’t just a tenet, it’s the very point that motivates the whole issue. 
Having acknowledged the problem Ryle would have with their position, they say nothing further in 
response to it.  This is a pertinent reminder that what is fundamentally going on in these rehearsed 
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they now need to make sense of the very idea of “the subpersonal, non-intelligent, 
trigger or deployment of propositional knowledge”.   
 At this point, the unresolved issue moves from the philosophical to the meta-
philosophical level.  For an anti-intellectualist in the spirit of Ryle might well say that 
whatever the subpersonal, non-intelligent, trigger or deployment of propositional 
knowledge or attitudes is, or might be, if it is even coherent, it is embroiled in a set of 
metaphysical views about the nature of mind that require an understanding of the 
nature of a philosophy that is deeply (perhaps too deeply) naturalised. Where such 
characterisation identifies that broad church of meta-philosophical commitments 
clustered round the view that philosophy and science run not just in parallel, but share 
the same tasks, methodology and ambitions.99  Any possibility that B&M might 
produce a successful response to Ryle’s Regress Challenge hangs in the air, alongside 
these larger issues.   
 I now bring together some of these meta-philosophical issues that have been 
hinted at throughout this chapter. 
 
4 Framing the debate 
 
In the introduction to their (2011a) edited collection of articles on knowing-how, 
B&M claim that both anti-intellectualism and intellectualism agree there is a relation 
between mind and action, though each offers a different conception100 of that relation.  
B&M take this as an invitation to articulate (i) a shared framework in which the two 
conceptions might effectively be articulated, thus effectively revealing their 
similarities and differences, and (ii) a set of questions they take both conceptions to 
need to answer.  I now consider whether (i) the shared framework, really does offer 
that.  
                                                                                                                                       
philosophical encounters between different accounts of know-how is actually a meeting of two 
paradigms (one naturalized and intellectualist, the other neither) about what philosophy’s tasks and 
methods are.   
99 Cf., Bengson, “[W]e might learn something about the epistemology of a given mental state or event, 
such as intuition, by first reflecting on its metaphysics.” (2010 MSS)  
100 Cf., The title of the introduction is, “Two Conceptions of Mind and Action”. I take it the term 
‘conception’ here is the more familiar usage of the term ‘conception’, rather than B&M’s newly 
reconfigured term of art considered in Section 2 above. 
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  The framework is presented through a collection of paired definitions. All 
these pairings exploit, on the one hand, the notion of a “state of intellect and 
character” and on the other, its exercise.  B&M offer four intellectualist definitions:  
 
 (8)  [IMIND] A state σ is a state of Intelligence101 if and only if σ 
  is or involves a certain type of internal states of engaging with 
  propositional content.102                       (2011b, 7) 
 
 (9) [IACTION] An individual x exercises a state of Intelligence in  
  performing an action φ (i.e. x φ-s Intelligently) if and only if  
  x φ-s and x has some state σ such that (i) σ is or involves a  
  certain type of internal state of engaging propositional content 
  and (ii) σ is appropriately causally (or otherwise explanatorily) 
  related to the production of φ.           (2011b, 7) 
 
 (10) [IKNOW-HOW] A state σ of an individual x is a state of knowing how  
  to φ if and only if σ is or involves x’s having some relevant   
  propositional attitude(s) regarding φ-ing.  (2011b, 8) 
  
 (11) [IKH-ACTION] x exercises knowledge how to φ in performing φ if and 
  only if x φ-s and x has some state σ such that (i) σ is or involves  
  having some relevant  propositional attitude(s) regarding φ -ing 
   and (ii) σ is appropriately causally or otherwise related to the  
  production of φ.      (2011b, 9) 
  
The more general contrast between mind in (8), and action in (9), is consolidated into 
the more specific know-how-related pairing of (10) and (11).  But the contrast 
between a state and its exercise in (8) and (9), which becomes the contrast between a 
state of knowing-how and its exercise in (10) or (11) is not as innocuous as it might 
first appear.   For the distinction between (10) and (11) is not the standard distinction 
between one’s know-how (in general) and one’s specific exercise of that know-how, 
                                                
101 B&M take “Intelligence” with a capital ‘I’ to refer to “all states of intellect and character, including 
(intelligence in the narrow sense), stupidity, and idiocy.” (2011b, 5-6)   
102 It might be worth noting that B&M nowhere offer a ‘theory of content’, though this is clearly 
required by their strategy. 
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at a particular time or on a particular occasion.  Rather it is an in principle separation 
between the having of know-how and its exercise, such that one might have know-
how, yet be unable to exercise it at all.  As such the separation of (10) and (11) 
enshrines the intellectualist possibility, seen in (and now explanatory of) B&M’s (B) 
cases.  The exercise of know-how is not a necessary condition for the having of it.103   
 That [IKNOW-HOW] is autonomous, and in no way constituted by [IKH-ACTION], 
that [IKNOW-HOW] and [IKH-ACTION] are distinct, and that [IKNOW-HOW] is causally 
efficacious in [IKH-ACTION] fits well with B&M’s announced committed to the very 
picture of mind which Ryle wishes to challenge.104  Indeed, the dualism it articulates 
dovetails with their preference for a, “paramechanical” picture of mind, which 
involves “hidden” and “occult” mental “phantasms” that ‘take place ‘in the head.’” 
(2011c, 165, fn. 10)   It also fits well with B&M’s claim that there are causally 
efficacious states of intellect, which, in (8) and (10) “have the profile Producer of 
Intelligence.” (2011b, 24)  
 But might such a framework be suitably reconfigured to enable it to host the 
alternative anti-intellectualist conception? B&M offer the following anti-
intellectualist definitions which supposedly parallel those of (8), (9), (10) and (11): 
 
 (12)  [AIMIND] A state σ is a state of Intelligence if and only if σ is or  
  involves a certain type of ability or disposition (e.g., a trained, 
  trainable, multitrack disposition) to perform some action (or set 
  of actions), rather than propositional attitudes. (2011b, 15)  
 
 (13) [AIACTION] An individual x exercises a state of Intelligence 
  in performing an action φ if and only if x φ-s and x has some state σ 
  such that (i) σ is a certain type of ability or disposition (e.g., a trained, 
  trainable, multitrack disposition) to perform some action (or set 
  of actions), rather than propositional attitudes, and (ii) x’s φ-ing is 
  the actualization of σ.     (2011b, 15) 
 
 
                                                
103 It also hints at a reason why B&M “regard past ability as a red herring.” ( 2011c, 167 fn. 17)  
104 Once again, this picture is comparable to Stanley’s ‘standing epistemic state’ but the very thing Ryle 
challenges. 
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 (14)  [AIKNOW-HOW] A state σ of an individual x is a state of knowing how to   
  φ if and only if s is or involves x’s having a particular type of ability or 
  disposition (e.g., a trained, trainable, multi-track disposition) to φ,  
  rather than propositional attitudes.   (2011b, 15) 
 
 (15) [AIKH-ACTION] x exercises knowledge how to φ  in performing an action 
  φ if and only if x φ-s and x has some state σ such that σ is a certain type 
  of ability or disposition (e.g., a trained, trainable, multi-track  
  disposition) to φ, rather than propositional attitudes, and (ii) x’s φ-ing 
  is the actualization of σ.    (2011b, 15) 
 
Here, B&M reveal as much in the titles of their definitions as they do in their 
definitions, for the titles presume that this rival conception is equally at home with the 
view that mind stands in some sort of relation to action.  But for Ryle, and other anti-
intellectualists, to suggest that the mind and action are relata of any sort, is to already 
indicate confusions are afoot.   
 Putting that aside, though, what of the parallel between [IKNOW-HOW] and [IKH-
ACTION] and their new anti-intellectualist equivalents in (14) and (15)?  If this 
framework is transferrable, as B&M propose, then presumably there is a distinction 
between (14) and (15) comparable to that between (10) and (11).  But if this is the 
case, then it would entail that one might have [AIKNOW-HOW] without ever, in principle, 
ever needing to have [AIKH-ACTION].  Which is to say that one might have an ability, 
but that ability might never be exercised, and indeed need never have been exercised; 
but one would still have the ability, notwithstanding.  Such is the consequence of a 
putative anti-intellectual parallel which holds [AIKNOW-HOW] autonomous from [AIKH-
ACTION], just as [IKNOW-HOW] is autonomous from [IKH-ACTION].  But to say that one has 
an ability that is always and entirely in principle unexercised, but that nevertheless 
one still has that ability, is to sail very close to the winds of nonsense. 
 B&M’s attempt to articulate a shared framework for anti-intellectualism and 
intellectualism not only fails, but it reveals the meta-philosophical commitments at 
work in their view.   Not only is there a deep dualism running through their account, it 
is supported by a range of naturalistic presumptions, which B&M struggle to see 
might be optional. This, from Bengson: 
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 The question of the nature of a given mental state or event, such  
 as intuition, need not be regarded as merely (or even primarily) 
 epistemological, for at bottom it concerns the metaphysics or ontology  
 of mind.  In fact, it is generally possible to engage such a question  
 without taking a firm stand on associated epistemological issues.   
        (2010 MSS) 
 
B&M’s intellectualist account of know-how is not merely a highly naturalized form of 
epistemology, but it is an unrivalled example of what, I suggest, ought to be called 
metaphysics-first epistemology.  
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
B&M’s non-propositional, radical, or objectual intellectualism offers a metaphysically 
substantial, highly elaborate, concept-theoretic account of know-how. It stipulates 
more than describes, requires more illumination than it sheds, and is surrounded by a 
moat of engineered examples in which its own views are enshrined. Its apparently 
non-denominational freshness is not quite as new as supposed, for it remains 
substantially propositional; in line with S&W, if not for the same reasons.  Much of 
its apparatus is a marriage between the metaphysics of mind-independent concepts 
and a naturalised picture of the relevant neurological correlates in the mind/brain.  
Half-Platonic, half-naturalistic105, B&M’s account offers a new dualism rooted in the 
causal efficacy of so-called ‘producer of Intelligence states of Intellect and character.’ 
 That this is even a candidate epistemological account of know-how shows the 
extent to which naturalism and its theory-constructing methods hold sway over much 
of contemporary analytic philosophy. A point to which I return in Chapter 6. B&M 
are right to suggest that know-how is no marginal topic.  They claim that 
philosophical consideration of know-how is, “a hinge upon which our general 
understanding of mind and action turns”. (2011b, 4)  Know-how is, however, even 
more important than this.  For it not only brings in a range of first-level philosophical 
topics, it crucially highlights key issues in meta-philosophy.  The value, status and 
implications of not just naturalized epistemology but naturalism in general, and are all 
                                                
105 In personal discussion about this suggestion (July 2011) Bengson responded to my characterisation 
with the response that he’d be entirely happy were his views to be regarded as “completely Platonistic”.     
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implicated in this debate.  In the next chapter, I explore an alternative way of 
conceiving of those hinges which constitute our conceptual world, and around which 
our activities and our human life turns. One which also reveals the interdependency of 
the philosophical and meta-philosophical, albeit quite differently. 
 I will also argue that though B&M misappropriate the notions of concept 
mastery and understanding, they are entirely right in wanting to bring them into an 
investigation of know-how.  For these notions are not merely crucial aspects of our 
skills, activities and practices, they are constitutive of them. As Wittgenstein 
observes, “But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the 
words by means of examples and by practice. And when I do this I do not 
communicate less to him than I know myself.” (PI §208)   
 
* 
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5 
 
Wittgensteinian Know-how 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The anti-intellectualist and the intellectualist accounts of know-how explored in last 
three chapters are standardly taken to capture the key contributions to the modern 
discussion.  There is, however, a potentially substantial contribution to this 
philosophical topic, that has yet to be considered by any of the participants in the fore-
going debate. It is to be found in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. For 
according to one particular reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, there is a kind of 
certainty that is actually a kind of know-how. Furthermore, this is a foundational 
know-how which enables our empirical, propositional knowledge, whilst remaining 
categorially distinct from it.  Prima facie, this suggests that there is at least one type 
of knowledge-how which is not reducible to propositional knowledge.  If this were to 
be the case, not only would it provide a new Wittgensteinian perspective on the 
subject of know-how, but Wittgenstein’s insights would themselves be a substantial 
new contribution to it.  In this chapter, I argue that Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s 
understanding of On Certainty offers a springboard to just such a development.   
 Key to this conclusion is an appreciation of Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding 
of what she calls ‘hinge certainty’, which she characterises as a kind of know-how. In 
illuminating Wittgenstein’s insights into this foundational kind of know-how, Moyal-
Sharrock takes us to the brink of a Wittgensteinian breakthrough in understanding the 
relation between (at least some aspects of) knowing-how and propositional 
knowledge. Having correctly identified this non-intellectualist insight, however, she 
adds a qualification to Wittgenstein’s point, which may risk undermining the higher 
grounds she is, otherwise, correctly staking out.  For in going on to distinguish two 
different types of know-how, she suggests that the kind of know-how which provides 
the enabling foundation for our empirical knowledge, whilst non-propositional, is not 
a kind of non-propositional knowledge.  She argues for this on the basis that, for 
Wittgenstein, only propositional knowledge is knowledge, hence any non-
propositional know-how cannot, by definition, be knowledge.  By imposing on 
Wittgenstein what I call the ‘propositional presumption’ (that knowledge just is 
propositional knowledge and nothing else), Moyal-Sharrock makes, I believe, an 
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unnecessary faux pas; one that the rest of her account does not demand.  
 There are a number of reasons why Moyal-Sharrock’s reading adds this 
qualifying caveat to the substantial contribution it offers. Firstly, there is perhaps a 
seeming circumspection in connecting the insights of On Certainty with those of the 
Philosophical Investigations; and secondly an associated resistance to fully 
integrating and involving the insights pertaining to rule-following in her 
understanding On Certainty. A third reason is to be sourced in the epistemological 
surroundings in which Moyal-Sharrock situates her reading.  It is the demands and 
expectations of this environment which, I will argue, may well be contributing to the 
imposition of the propositional presumption on her reading of Wittgenstein. It is the 
intellectualist paradigm, within which contemporary epistemology operates, which 
helps to misdirect this crucial aspect of Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding. For in 
seeking to build an epistemological bridgehead from On Certainty to the more 
mainstream epistemological arenas, and in using their technical terminology, she has, 
I suggest, unwittingly welcomed in their intellectualist Trojan Horse.  In this chapter, 
I argue for the need to re-visit Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding of On Certainty, alert 
to these issues, as a preliminary to accessing the resources that Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy has to contribute to the philosophy of know-how; a contribution 
illuminated by the otherwise unrivalled perspicacity and fecundity of Moyal-
Sharrock’s appreciation.  
 To argue for these points, I begin with a scene-setting introduction to 
Wittgenstein’s engagement with G.E. Moore’s views, and what I take to be common 
exegetical ground shared by the majority of commentators on On Certainty. In 
Section 2, I articulate how hinge certainty (following Moyal-Sharrock) can be 
understood as a kind of know-how, but question her rationale for denying this know-
how the status of knowledge. In Section 3, I turn to the wider environment in which 
all readings of On Certainty find themselves situated; exploring the extent to which 
epistemology is currently dominated by an exclusive focus on propositional 
knowledge.  In the light of this ‘propositional presumption’, what emerges is a limited 
and often distorting philosophical space for any consideration of know-how which is 
not intellectualist. In Sections 4 and 5,  I return, forewarned, to consider Moyal-
Sharrock’s non-propositional know-how by the light of the propositional presumption 
arguing that in seeking to connect with a wider philosophical audience, she falls prey 
to difficulties involved in any non-intellectualist usage of the increasingly ubiquitous 
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term of art: the so-called ‘epistemic’.  In Section 6, I consider challenges, particularly 
from Duncan Pritchard, which question the non-propositional reading at the heart of 
Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding of On Certainty, and reveal that the threat they pose 
is not one that gets delivered. What emerges throughout this critical engagement is 
that Wittgenstein is unquestionably presenting a brand new opportunity for the 
philosophy of know-how; an opportunity which, now identified, cannot be ignored. 
 I begin with the prompt to Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty, namely those 
truisms which G. E. Moore’s claims to know with certainty. 
 
1 Moorean Beginnings 
 
In his 1939 paper, ‘Proof of an External World’, the first stage of G. E. Moore’s proof 
takes the form of a supposed argument that there exists “external things”:  
 
 I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist.  
 How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a  
 certain gesture with the right hand, “Here is one hand” and  
 adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, “and here is  
 another.”  (1959, 144) 
 
Moore insists that the premises of this part of his argument are true.  Furthermore, he 
claims to know with certainty that, “Here is one hand and here is another.” (1959, 
145) To suggest otherwise, he claims, would be absurd. “You might as well suggest 
that I do not know I am now standing up and talking… that it’s not quite certain that I 
am!” (1959, 145)106   
 In considering what it is to, “know that here is one hand” (OC 1) Wittgenstein 
identifies, then pursues the following discrimination: 
  
                                                
106 Wittgenstein considers a variety of other truisms which Moore also claims to “know with certainty 
to be true.” (1959, 32 original emphasis) These are to be found in his 1925 paper, ‘A Defence of 
Common Sense’, and include but are by no means limited to, “There exists at present a living human 
body, which is my body.  This body was born at a certain time in the past, and has existed continuously 
ever since, thought not without undergoing changes…. Ever since it was born, it has been either in 
contact with or not far form the surface of the earth; and, at every moment since it was born, there have 
also existed many other things, having shape and size in three dimensions,” (1959, 33) and, “The earth 
has existed for many years past.” (1959, 36)  
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 I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows,  
 but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely  
 solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry.  (OC 151) 
 
By contrasting ‘standing fast’ with being ‘known’, Wittgenstein drives a previously 
unnoticed and unanticipated wedge between certainty and knowledge; specifically 
empirical propositional knowledge. Standing fast turns out to be unwavering, 
although not in the way that Moore thinks. As Wittgenstein’s next remark sketches: 
 
 I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me.   
 I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a  
 body rotates.   This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything  
 holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.   
 (OC 152)  
 
The possibility that particular propositions might provide axes which enable, license 
or facilitate the doubting of other propositions leads Wittgenstein, in On Certainty, to 
the recognition that there is a categorial divide between empirical knowledge and 
certainty. “‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’ belong to different categories.” (OC 308)  
Though Moore’s truisms are indeed indubitable, the certainty he claims for them does 
not get its purchase from their being maximally secure examples of our empirical 
knowledge; rather their indubitability reveals something about, and is a feature of, 
that which enables such empirical knowledge, in the first place. The indubitable 
certainty which Moore alerts us to with his (literal) hand-waving announcement, ‘This 
is a hand’, is categorially distinct from the empirical knowledge that, ‘This is a hand’, 
gained when one identifies, say, dismembered body-parts at the scene of a terrible 
accident. The truth (or falsity) of the latter is, however, made possible by the certainty 
of the former. Wittgenstein identifies Moorean certainty as located not in the category 
of empirical propositional knowledge itself, but as situated in, as part of, the enabling 
framework of that empirical knowledge.  When Moore asserts his common sense 
beliefs, he is offering exemplifications, or what Moyal-Sharrock illuminatingly 
characterises as “monstrations” (2007, 66), of a part of the very framework which 
makes possible those most firmly held empirical beliefs. Moore is showing us what 
facilitates and enables his truisms, not identifying some feature of those truisms. 
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 Wittgenstein articulates this categorial distinction using a variety of metaphors 
and imagery.  He contrasts the facilitating axes around which empirical propositions 
rotate (OC 152), the riverbeds and the flowing water they channel (OC 96, 97, 99), 
and the static door hinges and movement of the doors themselves (OC 341, 343, 655). 
As he writes, “[T]he questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that 
some propositions [Sätze] are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which 
those turn. (OC 341)  And again, “If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” 
(OC 343) 
 In one sense, of course, a hinge is uncontroversially something to be 
contrasted with its associated door (when the notion of a door is taken to refer not to 
the whole functioning item but to the flat moveable panel which swings open and 
shut).  Equally, the hinge is part-constitutive of the door, for the moveable panel part 
of the door is but an inert flat piece of material which stands in need of a hinge, in 
order to be a door at all.  So, too, with the fixed certainty around which our 
investigations turn, and which enables our empirical inquiries to be pursued. What 
makes those empirical investigations possible is to be contrasted with those inquiries, 
(i.e., categorially distinct from them, as hinge to door panel); yet at the same time 
what makes empirical investigations possible is part-constitutive of the whole process 
of inquiry and its products. After all, a hinge-less door is no door.  Thus empirical 
knowledge with no way of, or framework for, ascertaining empirical knowledge is no 
knowledge at all.   
 The categorial division between door (panel) and hinge is analogous to the 
categorial division between the certainty of empirical knowledge (established through 
evidence and empirical observation) and the certainty of that which enables empirical 
knowledge.  Consider again the body-part example. In the aftermath of, say, a train 
crash and fire, there might well be doubt as to which particular body-part one had 
recovered; perhaps a hand, a foot, or a dismembered shoulder?  The possibility of 
doubt here goes hand-in-hand with the possibility that one might come to know, for in 
coming to know the possible doubts are eliminated. “One says “I know…” where one 
can find out,” (LW 1, 883), i.e., where there is information that will confirm, and/or a 
process, a procedure, a practice for ascertaining what is, or was, the case. One might, 
for example retrieve the rest of the body-parts and through a process of bodily 
reconstruction establish which particular body-parts are which.  One might use X-ray 
photography, and other forensic methods, to establish the underlying bone structure 
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and thus confirm the identity of the specific part. On the basis of such evidence, one 
might then come to (be in a position to) know that the item in question is indeed a 
hand.  One might successfully remove all reasonable doubt, and thus (empirically) 
know with certainty that ‘This [body-part] is a hand.’ 
 In situations like Moore’s hand-waving declaration that ‘This is a hand’, 
however, the very possibility of doubt fails to make any sense.  What might it be to 
doubt ‘This is a hand’, as it is being waved?  One struggles to see just what is being 
brought into question.  Or, indeed what is being attempted or what might be 
‘confirmed.’ The possibility of doubt in the body-part scenario cannot be transferred 
to Moore’s hand-waving situation, and retain either the same, or indeed any, sense. “I 
know how to ascertain that I have two coins in my pocket.  But I cannot ascertain that 
I have two hands, because I cannot doubt it.” (LW 1, 832) What could Moore bring as 
evidence for his hand-waving claim that what he is waving is a hand? The certainty 
Moore claims in his hand-waving example is not the same as the certainty achieved 
through the elimination of genuine doubts as a result of evidence-gathering and 
evaluation en route to empirical knowledge.  Furthermore the certainty involved in 
the Moorean hand-waving situation is a pre-requisite for the certainty involved in the 
body-part situation.  For it is because the body-part investigator has the same certainty 
as Moore (and as we all do) that ‘This [waving] is a hand’, that he or she can then 
come to know that ‘This [body-part] is a hand’.  The ‘hinge certainty’ (as one might 
express it) of the first is required for, and categorially distinct from, the empirical 
knowledge of the second.  What then is this hinge certainty that is exemplified, shown 
or monstrated in ‘Here [waving] is a hand’? 
 
2 Hinge Certainty as Know-How 
 
According to Moyal-Sharrock, the hinge certainty that is exemplified in ‘Here 
[waving] is a hand’ is a kind of know-how.  In coming to know how to speak, 
understand and master language we achieve a certainty that is, “a flawless way of 
acting… an expert and unhesitating grasp”; such certainty “takes the shape of a 
flawless know-how” (2007, 63).   Not only is this certainty, this know-how, 
something on which we are, “unwaveringly and yet thoughtlessly hinged”, and which 
provides an enabling framework for our empirical propositional knowledge, it also is 
that which, “enables us to think, speak or act meaningfully.” (2007, 174)    
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 Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence … is not 
 certainty propositions’ striking us immediately as true, ie. it is  
 not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the  
 bottom of the language-game. (OC 204) 
 
Moyal-Sharrock identifies such non-propositional acting with our hinge certainty; our 
ways of acting, our know-how.  Moreover, the non-propositionality of this know-how 
is required for, and enables it to play its foundational role. “To be sure there is 
justification, but justification comes to an end.” (OC 192) And the justification comes 
to an end in our certain way of acting, our know-how, where, “If the true is what is 
grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.” (OC 205) As such, when Moore 
declares ‘Here [waving] is a hand’, he is not making an empirical knowledge claim; 
he is displaying the certain ways of acting, the know-how on which his empirical 
knowledge stands.  This indubitable certainty is, as Wittgenstein reminds us, none 
other than, “our manner of judging and therefore of acting.” (OC 232)   
 There are readings of On Certainty which do not recognise the non-
propositional know-how that is our certain ways acting.  Instead they interpret 
Moore’s ‘This [waving] is a hand’ to be an example of a hinge proposition.  I will 
consider the challenges these readings may pose below.  
 ‘This [waving] is a hand’ together with ‘This [indicating] is green’, ‘This 
[indicating] is a tree’, ‘This [indicating] is a chair’ are examples of what Moyal-
Sharrock categorises as ‘linguistic hinges.’107  Just as we must learn the correct use of 
our body-part vocabulary before being able to inquire about the identity of an item 
rescued from a crash site, so too with our colour vocabulary.  “A child must learn the 
use of colour words before it can ask for the name of a colour.” (OC 648). On Moyal-
Sharrock’s understanding of Wittgenstein, coming to know how to master the use of 
‘hand’, ‘green’, chair’ and ‘tree’ etc., is a matter of being exposed to and inculcated 
into the language-games in which they feature.  Coming to learn the language-games 
in which they feature is a matter of learning how to do something; mastery of which 
results in knowing how to do something.   Doubt is senseless in the face of such 
                                                
107 Linguistic hinges are one of four types of hinges Moyal-Sharrock (2007) identifies; the others being 
universal hinges (eg. ‘There are physical objects), local hinges (eg. ‘The earth is round’), and personal 
hinges (eg. ‘’I am sitting in a chair).  
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mastery, for as Moyal-Sharrock argues, “I cannot be mistaken or uncertain about the 
use of some108 words.” (2007, 119).  According to Wittgenstein, “doubt about 
existence only works in a language-game” (OC 24) and we need to know how to play 
the various language-games to begin to doubt (within those games.)  Therefore 
mastery of one’s first language is not the product of remembering previously 
ascertained propositional knowledge, or having first ensured one is not ‘mistaken’ 
about what one’s words mean, or empirically confirming whether one’s foundational 
ways of acting, judging, knowing are correct.  Rather language-mastery is a matter of 
knowing how to do something. “In the case of linguistic hinges this know-how, this 
mastery is flawless.” (2007, 120 original emphasis)  
 Through her understanding of Wittgenstein, Moyal-Sharrock therefore 
identifies a relationship between non-propositional know-how and propositional 
know-that, where non-propositional know-how is not reducible to empirical 
knowledge.  In one respect this sounds entirely amenable to, and indeed perhaps an 
important way of understanding the categorial divide Ryle articulates in his own anti-
intellectualist know-how/know-that distinction. But Moyal-Sharrock rejects the  
Rylean view that knowing how to do something and propositional knowledge are both 
kinds of knowledge, albeit different.  For the know-how of our hinge certainty is not, 
she goes on to insist, any kind of knowledge, at all.   
 Instead, Moyal-Sharrock characterises the “objective know-how”, the 
“thoughtless savoir-faire” that is our hinge certainty as being so flawlessness and 
thoughtlessness, so “expert and smooth” (2007, 64) that it requires no attention, no 
maintenance, and thus is a certainty as opposed to any kind of knowledge.  On 
Moyal-Sharrock’s reading of Wittgenstein, this very thoughtlessness and the 
associated characteristics entail that this ‘objective’ know-how is not knowledge (for 
only propositional knowledge is knowledge.) Always successful and “unerring”, the 
hinge certainty that is know-how is “so natural” that is has neither the opportunity or 
need for improvement. (2007, 65)  Again, this serves, she concludes, to ensure that it 
can be no kind of knowledge.  But why should the very expertise with which one’s 
know-how is exercised exclude it from being knowledge, where knowledge might be 
more broadly conceived? Moyal-Sharrock cites a number of Rylean observations as 
                                                
108 Our use of the words such as ‘funambulist’ or ‘phylloxera’ does not, according to Moyal-Sharrock, 
have the hinge certainty that is characteristic of our more familiar vocabulary. They might well be, I 
would suggest, for anyone who has grown up in an erudite circus family or is a vineyard-owning 
biologist with substantial pest-control problems. 
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part of her discussion of this matter, (such as Ryle’s point that know-how is a success 
verb (2007, 64)), but given that her own conclusion about know-how is directly at 
odds with Ryle, it remains unclear why she brings Ryle in to serve a point on which 
she and he fundamentally disagree.  For Ryle never questions the idea that know-how 
might not be any kind of knowledge.  Rather his view, as seen in Chapter 2, is that 
know-how is an irreducible sui generis kind of knowledge.  Why does Moyal-
Sharrock introduce the notion of know-how in the first place, only to then deny that it 
is a kind of knowledge (especially when every other aspect of her view is compatible 
with Ryle’s?)    One could avoid this detour and simply characterising hinge certainty 
as a kind of animal ability, and avoid expressing it in know-how terms at all.    
 Several reasons might be diagnosed for this move.  I focus on three. Firstly, at 
the heart of Moyal-Sharrock’s reading is a deep commitment to the animality of our 
hinge certainty. As Wittgenstein writes, “I want to conceive it [our hinge certainty or 
know-how] as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were as 
something animal.” (OC 359)  For Moyal-Sharrock, it seems that, the animality of our 
know-how is at odds with the its status as a kind of knowledge. 109  Perhaps having 
accurately appreciated the non-propositionality of our foundational ways of acting, 
she is concerned that any subsequent suggestion this know-how is a kind of 
knowledge risks handing back to the intellectualists the very victory which 
Wittgenstein snatches from their jaws.  On this picture, Moyal-Sharrock would seem 
to be working from the assumption that the only way one might protect the animality, 
the confidence, the thoughtless, the immediacy of our know-how is by insisting it is 
no kind of knowledge.  But expert drivers, wine connoisseurs, cartoonists, musicians, 
knitters, mathematicians, multi-lingual people, snooker players etc., exercise their 
know-how with a comparable animal facility.  Might not an appreciation of their 
animal immediacy happily co-exist with the realisation that they are also extremely 
                                                
109 Cf., Coliva’s alternative criticism: “[T]here would be little of philosophical significance in W’s last 
work if he were just trying to bring into focus animal certainty.” (2010, 171) Coliva seems to think that 
what is missing in Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding is a rapprochement between animalistic certainty 
or know-how, and a more human certainty or know-how; which she takes to require “being guided by 
propositional attitudes.” (2010, 171) This indicates that Coliva (possibly like Moyal-Sharrock) seems 
to worry that either one emphasises the animal or one is forced into something propositional. But the 
kind of non-propositional know-how that is knowledge need not be so intellectualistically construed. 
According to my own Know-How Reading of On Certainty (MSS), by considering ourselves not just 
as animals, with a nature; but language-animals with a human nature, we step firmly into the 
normative realm. In language, we are not just animals engaged in sure-footed action but human animals 
participating in normative activities and practices.  In language, we don’t just get around the world 
successfully, but we get on in the world, correctly.  As Wittgenstein reminds us, “The rule-governed 
nature of our language permeates our life.” (RC III-303 and LW II, 72) 
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knowledgeable?  Might not this very animal ease with which such know-how is 
exercised also be the product of extensive training and learning, which has perhaps 
gone through less confident, less successful, more self-conscious stages?110   
 Moyal-Sharrock might respond by agreeing with this point and bringing in the 
only other reference to the animality of hinge certainty/know-how in On Certainty. “I 
want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants 
instinct but not ratiocination… Language did not emerge from some kind of 
ratiocination.” (OC 475)  But if this were to justify the claim that know-how is no 
kind of knowledge, then it would require a dramatic (and unWittgensteinian) 
polarising of the available options.  Either know-how is animalistic and thus not 
knowledge, or it is ratiocinative (thereby propositional) and thus knowledge. But as 
Ryle points out, “Ratiocination is not the general condition of rational behaviour but 
only one species of it.” (1946, 219) To think otherwise is to succumb to 
intellectualism.  As such Moyal-Sharrock’s concern to protect the animal aspect of 
hinge certainty risks being a back-handed confirmation of, or capitulation to, 
intellectualist tenets; something that would be at odds with the very spirit of her 
understanding.  So although, Moyal-Sharrock, reminds us that, “Animals need no 
ghostly propositions to prompt their actions,” (2007, 204) I would add that (often) 
neither do knowledgeable human beings.  Again, Moyal-Sharrock might accept this, 
but still deny that the know-how she has identified is any kind of knowledge. 
Nonetheless, the ‘middle ground’ of know-how as a non-propositional kind of 
knowledge seems to be a no-go area.  
 A second reason why Moyal-Sharrock may wish to deny the status of know-
how as knowledge is, as I suggested in my opening remarks, the exegetical focus she 
gives to On Certainty. It may be that in seeking not just to identify the unique aspects 
of On Certainty but to argue afresh for the fecundity of Wittgenstein’s particular 
insights, found in these last writings, Moyal-Sharrock is concerned to avoid 
undercutting her point by highlighting comparable insights in his earlier work.  
                                                
110 Cf., Dreyfus & Dreyfus’s five-stage theory of the acquisition of skill, (1980) and (1986) according 
to which it is only at the fifth (expert) stage that one achieves a full-blown, non-inferential expertise, 
which resists formalisation.  This “unrationalised know-how” (1986, 41) might reasonably be 
characterised along the lines of the animal surety Moyal-Sharrock wishes to stress. “When things are 
proceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they do what normally 
works. (1986, 30-31 original emphasis)  That is to say, they (we) often exercise our know-how ‘without 
thinking’.  Elsewhere (MSS) I pursue a number of crucial distinctions between Wittgensteinian and 
Dreyfusian understandings of know-how 
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Although she acknowledges that there is no “second recantation” (2004, 1) by 
Wittgenstein of his preceding work, in developing her ‘Third Wittgenstein’ reading of 
On Certainty Moyal-Sharrock does argue for the merits of replacing the more familiar 
‘Early’ and ‘Late’ categories with a triple-phase ‘First’ ‘Second’ and ‘Third’111 
discrimination.  The burgeoning interest in On Certainty in the wake of Moyal-
Sharrock’s book points to the undeniable benefits of this approach. The price to be 
paid for this, however, seems to be a reduced exploitation of the genuine connections 
between On Certainty’s insights and those to be found in the Philosophical 
Investigations.  Keen to show the extent to which Wittgenstein “breaks new ground” 
in his third “masterpiece”, On Certainty (2004, 1), important comparisons between 
what Wittgenstein says about language mastery in On Certainty and the Investigations 
are not pursued. Although Moyal-Sharrock does draw some connections between her 
observations about linguistic hinge know-how and Wittgenstein’s previous discussion 
about language mastery (2007, 117-121) her emphasis is on the ability (in contrast to 
know-how) that is our language mastery, and her textual focus remains on On 
Certainty and only briefly hints at the resources in the Investigations.  Resources 
indicated by such tips of the icebergs as, “To understand a sentence means to 
understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a 
technique,” (PI §199) are not mined as a justificatory source for Moyal-Sharrock’s On 
Certainty reading.  Though, of course, one might add that to understand a technique 
(be it linguistic, mathematical or artistic…) means to know how to do something, to 
know how to go on, to know how to act in certain ways. 
 One reason for this strategy (or perhaps a consequence of it?) is the extent to 
which Moyal-Sharrock’s arguments in Understanding On Certainty do not 
particularly focus on exploring issues pertinent to the heart of our normative practices, 
or to what it is to follow a rule or engage in a rule-following practice. 112 Whilst the 
extensive index of her (2007) accurately reflects the balance of the book’s contents, 
providing 30 page references under the entry for ‘animal’ and 38 page references for 
‘instinct’ (and its cognates), both ‘normative’ or ‘rule’ (or anything related to the 
notion of a rule) are noticeable by their total absence in the index (and their very 
                                                
111 Moyal-Sharrock identifies the corpus of the ‘Third Wittgenstein’ as including what was Part II of 
the Investigations and is now called Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment, together with all other 
writings from 1946 on, i.e., what are now published as the two volumes of Last Writings on the 
Philosophy of Psychology and the two volumes of Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, as well as 
Remarks on Colour, Zettel and, of course, On Certainty. 
112 See Moyal-Sharrock (2010). 
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modest presence in the book.) Yet OC (204), one of the cornerstone key passages for 
Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding is intimately connected with this quote from the 
Investigations: 
 
 “How am I able to follow a rule? – if this is not a question about 
 causes, then it is about the justification for my acting in this way 
 in complying with the rule.  
  Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached 
 bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say, “This  
 is simply what I do.” (PI § 217) 
 
Here Wittgenstein is reminding us that our normative, i.e., our rule- and standard-
constituted practices, are themselves unjustified.113 They ground, without themselves 
being grounded, and the ground they provide is our ways of acting.  Our linguistic 
ways of acting being themselves normative. As Wittgenstein goes on to say, “When I 
follow the rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule blindly.” (PI §219)  Why does 
Moyal-Sharrock not use the insights of Investigations to help articulate the kind of 
hinge certainty that she identifies in On Certainty, given that the blindness with which 
we participate in our normative practices readily dovetails with the animality that she 
takes to best characterise our linguistic hinge certainty or know-how? 
 One possible answer is that Moyal-Sharrock may have too intellectualist an 
understanding of rules; though prima facie this looks to be at odds with her emphasis 
on the animal.114  Is she perhaps succumbing to that tempting picture which (the 
Second/Later) Wittgenstein attempts to dislodge, i.e. that, “there is an inclination to 
say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation”, from which it is a short hop 
to a mistaken intellectualist assumption that ways of acting are themselves founded 
upon consciously considered and propositional interpretations.  Whereas, for 
Wittgenstein, once rid of this misguided picture, one appreciates, “There is a way of 
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of 
                                                
113 This point is even more obvious in the original manuscript source for this passage, “When 
justifications run out one hits the bedrock of a normative regularity – this is what I do, this is what I 
call ‘…’” MS 179 quoted in Baker & Hacker (2009, 194 original emphasis)  
114 See Coliva (2010) for an unambiguously propositional/intellectualist view of rules. 
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application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it.”  
(PI §201)115  
 Is not Moore’s ‘This [waving] is a hand’ just such an exemplification of the 
grasping (and expressing) of a rule which is not some kind of pre-considered 
interpretation, but is nonetheless a display of normative linguistic know-how?  Not 
only is it the case that, “To use a word without a justification does not mean to use it 
wrongfully,” (PI 289) in Moore’s case, though there is no further, more foundational 
justification in virtue of which what he does in ‘This [waving] is a hand’ is correct; it 
is nonetheless correct. Correct, because that is what correct is, at the level of the 
normative bedrock of regularities understood as regularities. In On Certainty, 
Wittgenstein is not denying that our linguistic know-how is a normative practice, nor 
is he committed to an intellectualist construal of the rules that constitute our linguistic 
practices. For, “Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a 
practice.  Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.” 
(OC 139)  When one looks to the Investigations for help in further understanding such 
linguistic hinge certainty or know-how, one reads: 
 
  One has already to know (or to be able to do) something  
  before one can ask what something is called.  But what does 
  one have to know? ….. We may say: it only makes sense 
  to ask what something is called if he already knows how to  
  make use of the name. (PI §30-31) 
 
Is Moyal-Sharrock really suggesting that know-how is not a kind of knowledge 
(contra Ryle) and indeed, as it might seem contra Wittgenstein?  If she is, and the 
source of this conclusion is exclusively a matter of how she reads On Certainty, then I 
suggest that the one possible rationale for this conclusion is that she is concerned to 
ensure that no backdoor is left open to any intellectualist construal of rules, and may 
be swinging a strategic pendulum in the opposite direction.116 But this suggestion gets 
                                                
115 Wittgenstein repeatedly warns, “The danger here, I believe, is one of giving a justification of our 
procedure when there is no such thing as a justification and we ought simply to have said: that’s how 
we do it.” (RFM III-74)  But, for the avoidance of doubt, we still do it this way, and not that way. 
116 Space prohibits any detailed exploration of intellectualist construals of rules, but I hope the 
following serves as a useful reminder of the distinction between those autonomous rules of our 
grammar which are part-constitutive of our language-use, and those rules that are merely prescriptions 
for practical reasoning.  Here is Wittgenstein.  “Why don’t I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I 
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purchase only through the substantial distortion of the spirit of Moyal-Sharrock’s 
understanding of On Certainty.  Especially, as I have already pointed out, almost the 
entirety of Moyal-Sharrock’s view is consistent with (and indeed the platform for) the 
view I argue for, namely that hinge certainty is a kind of know-how that is both non-
propositional and (yet still) a kind of knowledge.  
 At the very least, however, she has illustrated that that if certainty is a matter 
of know-how, and this kind of know-how is not a kind of knowledge, then the anti-
intellectualist/intellectualist debate in epistemology about the nature of know-how is 
not (as previously thought) a simple bifurcation between know-how being a sui 
generis kind of knowledge (à la Ryle) or being reducible to another kind of 
knowledge (propositional, à la S&W, or objectual à la B&M).  Moyal-Sharrock now 
raises issues about a further kind of know-how, one that is neither sui generis, nor 
reducible to another kind of knowledge, because it is not a kind of knowledge at all; 
yet it is required for our empirical propositional knowledge.  This is a fresh 
Wittgensteinian alternative that cannot be dismissed; whether one agrees or disagrees 
with Moyal-Sharrock as to whether this know-how is knowledge at all.  
 A third possible reason for Moyal-Sharrock’s rejection of the view that know-
how is a kind of knowledge, is to be sourced in the wider (non-Wittgensteinian) 
epistemological environment in which she finds herself working.  For contemporary 
epistemologists are, I will now demonstrate, committed to the all-pervasive 
propositional presumption that knowledge just is propositional knowledge.  Amid this 
landscape, know-how is only knowledge insofar as it reduces to propositional 
knowledge. Yet according to Wittgenstein, the kinds of things we know include not 
only, “how many metres high Mont Blanc is” but, “how the word “game” is used” 
and, “how a clarinet sounds.” (PI §78)  For Moyal-Sharrock to appear to take no 
succour from so much in the Investigations and On Certainty which chimes with (PI 
§78) there must be powerful intellectualist paradigm at work.  And there is.   
 It is now necessary to take a side-step into the epistemological neighbourhood 
in which Moyal-Sharrock is operating, before returning to explore this point further. 
                                                                                                                                       
tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary?  Because ‘cookery’ is defined by its end, whereas 
‘speaking’ is not.  That is why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and 
washing are not.  You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by rules other than the right ones; 
but if you follow other rules than those of chess you are playing another game; and if you follow 
grammatical rules other than such-and-such ones, that does not mean you say something wrong, no you 
are speaking of something else.” (Z 320) 
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3 Epistemology: An Intellectualist Enterprise? 
 
There is a prima facie tension in the contemporary practice of epistemology.  This 
tension is between what contemporary epistemologists declare their topic to be and 
where their philosophical focus is, in actual practice.  This is perhaps most apparent 
in the introductions and textbooks to the subject. In presenting the philosophical study 
of knowledge to undergraduates and other interested readers, such general books 
characterise epistemology, roughly, as the examination of, and investigation into, the 
nature, sources, possibility, extent, types and value of our human knowledge. In the 
prefaces and/or opening pages of such books, authors typically initiate discussion of 
the subject by highlighting the fact that there are three types of knowledge: 
propositional knowledge, acquaintance knowledge and know-how (sometimes 
referred to as ability knowledge).  Coming to the subject completely fresh, one might 
reasonably anticipate that what follows would be divided equally between this trio, 
with time spent considering the individual features of each kind of knowledge, 
together with similarities, differences and inter-relations between them.  This is not, 
however, what occurs.  For once textbook authors have announced the existence of 
this knowledge trio, it is then standard procedure to set aside both acquaintance 
knowledge and know-how. Typically, an announcement is usually made that the focus 
of the remainder of the book will be entirely on propositional knowledge; which is 
what then transpires. 
 This is both a consequence of, and further fuel to the intellectualist paradigm 
which informs naturalized philosophy in general.  But paradigms are not only 
powerful, they are often so when at their most invisible.  In what follows I lay out the 
evidence for these claims, in an attempt to make the day-to-day practices of 
epistemology momentarily visible. I take this to be a task, which though potentially 
laborious to do (and, with apologies, to read) is nonetheless a necessary prerequisite 
for appreciating the constraints that any discussion of know-how (not just Moyal-
Sharrock’s) is under.  If, as I will conclude there is a propositional presumption in 
place despite (occasional) claims to the contrary, it can only be shown by taking a 
look at actual epistemologically practice. I begin with a look at some of the leading 
(and best) textbooks.  
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 In Duncan Pritchard’s What is this thing called Knowledge (2006)117 he writes, 
“Ability knowledge is clearly different from propositional knowledge.  I know how to 
swim, for example, but I do not thereby know a set of propositions about how to 
swim.” (2006, 4)   Pritchard continues with the suggestion that an ant, “might 
plausibly said to know how to navigate its terrain,” but we would not want to say, 
therefore, that it has propositional knowledge.  This, he immediately concludes, 
“marks out the importance of propositional knowledge over other types of knowledge, 
over ability knowledge.” (2006, 4)  This argument is deemed sufficient to warrant the 
setting aside of ability knowledge for the rest of the book.  And indeed on the 
following page, Pritchard announces, “Henceforth, when we talk about knowledge, 
we will have propositional knowledge in mind, unless explicitly stated otherwise.” 
(2006, 5)  Out of a total of 188 pages, the time spent on considering ability knowledge 
or know-how, totals roughly one-third of a page.  The rest of the book is devoted to 
propositional knowledge. 
 Nicholas Everitt & Alec Fisher’s Modern Epistemology (1995) is another rare 
example of a textbook which, after the initial introduction of know-how, does offer 
some modest argument for its swift dismissal. “There are clearly some complex 
interconnections between these three types [the aforementioned trio] of knowledge,” 
but because propositional knowledge, “has attracted most attention from philosophers, 
probably because it connects with such philosophically interesting concepts as 
rationality and truth… We shall follow this tradition and focus on propositional 
knowledge.” (1995, 12) The time spent on know-how is less than a single page out of 
252.  Note also the assumption that rationality is, and perhaps is only, related to 
propositional knowledge and not to know-how.  Again, this links back to the 
(intellectualist) collapse of rationality into ratiocination, already touched on. 
 In Keith Lehrer’s Theory of Knowledge (part textbook, part an expression of 
his own views), he readily gives examples of the, “many sorts of knowledge” (1990, 
3) there are.  These include his own knowledge of how to play the guitar.  On the 
same page, Lehrer declares, “In our study we shall be concerned with knowledge in 
the information sense.  It is precisely this sense that is fundamental to human 
                                                
117 Pritchard’s textbook is already in its second (2009) edition. The general policy of this section is to 
quote from first editions, so as to give some sense of the evolution of historical attitudes; albeit a 
modest one. 
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cognition…”118 (1990, 3)  The time spent on know-how: less than half a page out of 
212.  In Noah Lemos’ An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Lemos 
acknowledges that, “‘how to’ knowledge” is one of the “three most significant … 
senses of knowledge.” (2007, 2) Know-how’s significance only manages to earn it, 
however, one eighth of a page, out of 232; the remainder of Lemos’ book being 
dedicated to the exploration of propositional knowledge.   
 Several classic textbooks and introductions to the epistemology make no 
mention of know-how or ability knowledge at all. They simply characterise the 
subject matter of epistemology solely in terms of propositional knowledge. John 
Pollock embraces this approach in his Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.  “In 
asking how a person knows something we are typically asking for his grounds for 
believing it… Epistemology might better be called ‘doxastology.’” (1986, 7 emphasis 
added)  Jonathan Dancy’s Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology makes no 
mention of either acquaintance knowledge or know-how at any point. Its opening 
paragraph announces, “Epistemology is the study of knowledge and the justification 
of belief.” (1985, 1)  Michael Williams’ Problems of Knowledge similarly offers no 
acknowledgement that knowledge is or could be anything other than propositional 
knowledge.  On the opening page he introduces, “The analytic problem.  What is 
knowledge?” and fleshes out the question by asking, “[H]ow is (or should) knowledge 
be distinguished from mere belief or opinion?” (2001, 1)  
 Whether philosophers introduce know-how (albeit momentarily) as a sui 
generis kind of knowledge or it goes entirely unmentioned, the focus of introductory, 
overview and general textbooks (and indeed encyclopedia entries119) is entirely on 
propositional knowledge.  In all of these books, either the synonymity of ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘propositional knowledge’ is immediately announced or just assumed. 
 The prima facie tension in epistemology is then this: on the one hand the 
majority of textbooks and introductions to the subject readily acknowledge that there 
are at least three types or kinds of knowledge: propositional, know-how (or ability 
knowledge) and acquaintance knowledge.  Yet, on the other hand, epistemology’s 
preoccupations and practice is so dominated by the focus on propositional knowledge 
                                                
118 I pursue this intellectualist construal of ‘the cognitive’ in Section 3.1 in the next chapter.  
119 Encyclopedia entries standardly follow this textbook pattern. After the briefest of opening 
admissions concerning the knowledge trio of propositional, acquaintance and know-how (or ability 
knowledge) all attention turns to propositional knowledge.  Matthias Steup spends one sentence out of 
17,500 words on know-how in his Stanford Entry for Epistemology.  Peter Klein manages half a 
sentence out of over 2,000 words in the Routledge Encyclopedia entry on Epistemology. 
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that the regular dismissal of non-propositional knowledge (both know-how and 
acquaintance) is not only acceptable, it is expected.  Perhaps, though, textbooks are 
not the appropriate place to establish the extent of the propositional orientation of 
contemporary epistemology.  What of collections of classic readings in the subject, or 
anthologies of important articles: are they comparably intellectualist? 
 In Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology Sven Bernecker & 
Fred Dretske write, “[O]ur goal was to provide a full review to date of contemporary 
epistemology, including frequently neglected topics.”  (2000, Preface, emphasis 
added)  Know-how does not feature, however, in the 41 selected articles chosen, nor 
in an additional list of 16 candidate topics which the authors declare they would have 
liked to include but space would not permit. In the 2nd edition (2008) of Ernst Sosa, 
Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath’s Epistemology: An Anthology, 
there is nothing in 917 pages on know-how, and no mention of know-how in the 
index; not even given the post 2001 resurgence of interest in Ryle’s distinction 
between knowing-how and knowing-that.  In the recent 911 page, state-of-the-art, 
Routledge Companion to Epistemology (2011) edited by Pritchard & Bernecker, there 
are 78 especially commissioned articles. The cover heralds the book as, “a 
comprehensive and up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing 
a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, addressing enduring questions 
and contemporary research in the field.” Gilbert Ryle’s unique work on knowing-how 
does not merit a chapter. There is no article on knowing-how, and I can find only five 
mentions of know-how, all en passant.  The challenge, and of course the achievement, 
of such books is almost inevitably doomed to leave certain enthusiasts disappointed at 
not finding a window for their own preferred, possibly more obscure, area of interest. 
But why should the subject of the nature, status, scope and value of knowing how to 
do something, as opposed to knowing that such-and-such is the case, be deemed a 
niche topic? Especially given the not uncommon standard textbook opening 
announcement that it is one of three types of knowledge. 
 In moving from textbooks to edited collections and anthologies what is 
quickly apparent is that know-how is no longer noticeable by its absence, rather its 
absence now goes completely unnoticed.  That knowledge just is propositional 
knowledge I call, ‘the propositional presumption’.  This propositional presumption has 
two powerful (and powerfully intellectualist) consequences.  The first of these is that 
the study of knowledge is assumed to be the study of propositional knowledge and 
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propositional knowledge only; thus epistemology itself just is the study of 
propositional knowledge.  
 Some monographs in epistemology are, of course, specifically about 
propositional knowledge120, e.g., Jennifer Lackey’s Learning from Words (2008).  
One doesn’t expect philosophers working in areas particularly related to propositional 
knowledge to introduce references to, or offer caveats about, their non-engagement 
with non-propositional knowledge.121 There are epistemologists, however, whose 
monographs set out to explore knowledge, more richly conceived. One might 
reasonably anticipate that these monographs would perhaps acknowledge know-how 
and acquaintance knowledge, alongside propositional knowledge, before pursuing 
their own particular lines of exploration.  The realpractik is that monographs, 
however broadly conceived, follow the pattern of anthologies and collections, i.e., it is 
assumed that any contemporary book-length inquiry into knowledge, however, 
broadly envisioned, is to be explored through the singular lens of propositional 
knowledge; a point taken to need no justification nor any prefacing caveats. 
Monographic evidence that the propositional presumption prevails is available at any 
and every turn.   
 Laurence Bonjour confirms that, “the central question of epistemology… 
concerns the rational status of our beliefs about the world in relation to the 
independent world that they purport to describe.” (Bonjour & Sosa 2003, 5) Ernest 
Sosa and Bonjour together write, “Epistemology is the theory of episteme, of 
knowledge. Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one’s belief 
hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification.”122 (2003, Introduction: 
opening sentence).  Jonathan Kvanvig insists, “[K]nowledge requires truth... and 
always will”. (2003, xi)  Pritchard, Millar & Haddocks’ recent investigation into the 
                                                
120 I move interchangeably between ‘knowing that something is the case’, and ‘propositional 
knowledge’, with the following caveat: ‘Propositional knowledge’ is not the knowledge of a 
proposition, it is knowledge of what a proposition states to be the case.  Just as one is not frightened of 
the proposition that the tiger is running towards you, one is frightened of the tiger which is running 
towards one or that one believes is running towards one; so too, what one knows is not a proposition 
that the tiger is running towards you, what one knows is that the tiger is running towards you. 
121 As will be seen, however, in the final chapter, we can describe some exemplifications of know-how 
with sufficient accuracy that one come to learn how and thus know how to do things by being in receipt 
of good descriptions.  So the radical separation of know-how and know-that in matters relating to the 
transmission of knowledge, is by no means as simple as this dichotomy suggests.   
122 In Aristotle’s distinction between episteme, techne, nous, sophia and phronesis (Nichomachean 
Ethics Bk. 6) which echoes Plato’s usage, the object of episteme is knowledge only of the unchanging.  
It’s not clear how Sosa & Bonjour’s Greek reference serves their desired purpose, as opposed to 
flagging up unanswered questions about the status of (particularly) techne and nous, given that 
episteme, (as originally conceived) does not extend to contingent truths.  
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value of knowledge, declares that its, “core issue about value” is, “of course, not 
whether knowledge is better than ignorance, but whether knowledge is better than true 
belief.” The propositional presumption is embraced without explanation or qualm.  
 One might anticipate that the propositional presumption would be less at home 
in so-called ‘Virtue Epistemology’, with its emphasis on the agent and agency.  After 
all, it looks like ability knowledge or know-how might be central for John Greco, 
given his summary claim that for that, “The central thesis of this book [Achieving 
Knowledge] is that knowledge is a kind of success from ability.” (2010, 3).  It 
transpires that the ability in question, here, is sub-personal tacit propositional 
knowledge and outside the agent’s voluntary control. (A view that is sourced in a 
wholly intellectualist Chomskyan picture of the mind; as will be explored in the next 
chapter.)  This is a quintessentially intellectualist view about know-how.  Even Linda 
Zagzebski’s distinct kind of virtue epistemology is, however, similarly propositional. 
The opening line of her own On Epistemology announces, “Epistemology is the 
philosophical study of knowledge and other desirable ways of believing and 
attempting to find the truth.” (2009, 1 original emphasis)  And in his Epistemic Luck, 
Pritchard paraphrases what it is, “to engage in an epistemological enterprise at all” as 
an, “attempt to track the truth.” (2005a, 243)  Thus even for the supposedly agent-
centred, excellence-encompassing virtue epistemologists, knowledge still just is 
propositional knowledge. In its contemporary practice, there seems to be no other 
conclusion to draw: the propositional presumption is entrenched. Epistemology is 
intellectualist through and through.   
 It is unsurprising therefore that having suggested that hinge certainty is a kind 
of non-propositional know-how, Moyal-Sharrock (or any know-how reader of On 
Certainty) might be under some (typically unacknowledged) environmental pressure 
to resist the idea that as non-propositional it might nonetheless be a kind of 
knowledge.123  
 
                                                
123 Pritchard suggests (in discussion, 16th January 2013) that the prevailing view of contemporary 
epistemology is not actually intellectualist. Whilst this may be the case in informal philosophical 
discussion and/or may indeed inform philosophers’ unarticulated assumptions, it remains camouflaged 
by the focus, priorities and volume of epistemological writings which are thoroughly intellectualist and 
propositional. This prompts the question (not pursued here) as to whether or not future generations of 
epistemologists, with access only to the written record of our contemporary philosophical activities, 
will have much evidence for such a supposed ‘prevailing view’.  
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4 Know-how Meets the Propositional Presumption 
 
Having appreciated that Wittgenstein recognises Moorean certainty to be a kind of 
non-propositional know-how, Moyal-Sharrock is under two identifiable pressures to 
conclude that this know-how is not knowledge.  The first is from Wittgenstein, the 
second from the propositional presumption constitutive of contemporary 
epistemological practice.    
 In the first case, as already noted, Wittgenstein understands that that 
knowledge and Moorean certainty are not of the same categories.  As this kind of 
certainty turns out to be know-how, then Moyal-Sharrock’s position looks to be a 
presentation of the following argument: 
 
 (1) Knowledge and certainty are categorially distinct. (cf. OC 308) 
 (2) Certainty is a kind of non-propositional know-how.  
 (3) Therefore, non-propositional know-how is no kind of knowledge. 
 
What this requires, however, is that Wittgenstein be using the term ‘knowledge’ in (1) 
as not merely elliptical for ‘empirical propositional knowledge’, or ‘empirical 
knowledge’ but for anything that might be regarded as knowledge, or that humans 
might know. But is he?  One might reasonably think that an ellipsis here is to be 
expected, given that the motivation for Wittgenstein’s investigations in the On 
Certainty passages, are all examples of apparent empirical propositional knowledge, 
such as ‘This is a hand’, ‘That is a tree’ ‘This is green’. etc.  The limitation in scope of 
‘knowledge’ starts from the passages’ already circumscribed focus on Moore’s 
empirical knowledge claims.  Were any philosopher’s focus to be on religious or 
aesthetic knowledge (for example) one would not expect his or her unpublished 
indeed un-reworked notes to keep using the relevant adjectival qualification, when the 
focus of attention is clear, and there is no reading audience to bear in mind.  Instead of 
this conclusion, however, Moyal-Sharrock declares:   
 
 It must first be noted that Wittgenstein adheres to the standard view 
 of knowledge as justified true belief, and therefore sees not only 
 the claim to knowledge, but also the possession of knowledge as 
 conceptually linked to justification. (2007, 15) 
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At this point she might qualify her point, for the avoidance of doubt, by writing, 
“Wittgenstein adheres to the standard view of propositional knowledge as justified 
true belief…”, but this option is not taken, and the possibility of a reasonable ellipsis 
is not explored.124    Were this option to be taken, however, then the argument above 
would then proceed: 
 
 (1*) Empirical propositional knowledge and certainty are categorially  
  distinct. 
 (2*) Certainty is a kind of non-propositional know-how. 
 (3*) Therefore, empirical propositional knowledge and a kind of non- 
  propositional know-how are categorially distinct. 
 
In this version of the argument, (3*) does not entail that non-propositional know-how 
either is a kind of knowledge, or that it is not a kind of knowledge.  In taking her 
reading of Wittgenstein to rule out restricting (1) to (1*) Moyal-Sharrock cannot 
(indeed does not wish to) access the opportunity that (3*) offers and thereby take 
know-how to be a kind of knowledge.  And she is right to argue that there are reasons 
in On Certainty which point in this direction.  For Wittgenstein does write, “‘I know 
it’ I say to someone else; and here there is a justification. But there is none for my 
belief.” (OC 175)  As already pointed out, however, he is already focussing on the 
kind of knowledge Moore takes his truisms to be, i.e., empirical propositional 
knowledge (supposedly but mistakenly thought to be) known with certainty.125 That 
he wants to distinguish certainty from clearly propositional conceptions of 
knowledge, does need not mean that he need limit knowledge tout court to just to 
propositional knowledge.   So although Wittgenstein does observe that, “One says 'I 
know' when one is ready to give compelling grounds. 'I know' relates to a possibility 
of demonstrating the truth.” (OC 243)  This is not the same as saying ‘I know’ only 
relates to the possibility of demonstrating the truth.  
                                                
124 See Coliva (2010) for a reading of On Certainty which is at odds with Moyal-Sharrock on the non-
propositionality of our hinge certainty, as a result of the view (which Moyal-Sharrock shares) that  
Wittgenstein’s notion of knowledge is limited to justified true belief. “Wittgenstein adhered to a 
classical internalist and tripartite conception of knowledge.” (2010, 221 fn. 26)   
125 Other pro (1) citations might include (OC 181, 406, 407, 245, 438) but all of these show the extent 
to which Moore and his claims to specifically propositional knowledge are being obviously used to 
provide a robust interlocutor and interlocutory content. 
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 As noted in Section 2, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein specifically reminds 
us that amongst the kind of things we know are not merely empirical facts (such as the 
heights of mountains), but things we are acquainted with and are able to recognise 
(like the sound of a clarinet), and things we can do (explain how words are used).  
Indeed, in the Investigations, there is plenty of evidence that he regards ‘knowledge’ 
as a family resemblance term.126 
 
  When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”,  
  “object”, “I”, “propositions/sentence”, “name” – and try to  
  grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself:  
  is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in  
  which it is at home? –  
   What we do is to bring words back from their  
  metaphysical use to their every day use.  (PI §116)      
 
In restricting Wittgenstein’s notion of knowledge to justified true belief, Moyal-
Sharrock appears to simultaneously announce her straightforward denial that 
knowledge is a family resemblance notion; or at least she seems to reject the 
possibility that the knowledge family is elastic enough to encompass non-
propositional know-how. Furthermore, one might reasonably think that this goes 
against her own advice.  “As a rule of thumb in reading On Certainty, I suggest 
systematically regarded the word ‘know’ as under scrutiny, even where it is neither 
underlined, nor otherwise emphasized by Wittgenstein.” (2007, 25)  This scrutiny 
does not, for Moyal-Sharrock, extend to the possibility that non-propositional know-
how (that is our hinge certainty) might be a kind of knowledge.   
                                                
126 According to Wittgenstein, the same nose, the same eye-colour, and other such characteristics, are 
often shared amongst members of a particular family, though not each characteristic is had by every 
member.  Thus, not all family members have the same set of essential traits in virtue of which they are 
members of the same family.  Analogously, Wittgenstein reminds us that in the case, for example, of 
games, there is no essential property in virtue of which each and every game is a game.  Instead, there 
is, “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing,” between all games. (PI §66) 
When explaining what a game is, descriptions are offered, examples are indicated, and, according to 
Wittgenstein, “we might add to the description: ‘This and similar things are called ‘games’,” (PI §69 
emphasis added). Just as all games need not involve winners (ring-a-ring-a-roses), or boards (hide-and-
seek) or more than one player (solitaire), so in the case of family resemblance concepts there need be 
no set of necessary or sufficient conditions which constitute our knowledge; just examples, together 
with what Hacker calls ‘a similarity rider’.   
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 Yet the family resemblance notion of knowledge is not just limited to the 
Investigations, it makes its way into other writings which Moyal-Sharrock identifies 
as belonging to the work done by the Third Wittgenstein.  When considering the 
interrelations between knowledge, understanding and experience, Wittgenstein 
reminds us that in music when it comes to, “The knowledge of metre. One who knows 
the metre, hears it differently.” (RPP I, 740 original emphasis)  Is not Wittgenstein 
here picking out a kind of non-propositional knowledge; one which has nothing to do 
with justified true belief?  And again, Wittgenstein reminds us that, “In one sense 
knowing is to have learned and not forgotten.  In this way it hangs together with 
memory.” (RPP II, 300)  This view also fits comfortably with the idea that (non-
propositional) knowing how to do something is a kind of knowledge.127  
 For Moyal-Sharrock to reject the possibility that non-propositional know-how 
is knowledge, on the grounds that for Wittgenstein knowledge is just justified true 
belief requires not only some rather circumscribed readings of key passages from On 
Certainty,128 it needs a reading quarantined from much of the rest of his work.  For in 
rejecting the idea that knowledge can be a family resemblance notion, generous 
enough to include non-propositional know-how, Moyal-Sharrock (or other any 
Moyal-Sharrock-inspired views) will need to advance views as to how best to 
appreciate such evidence, apparently to the contrary, as: 
 
  “To know” can mean something like “to be able”  
  (to know by heart, eg.) or it can mean something like  
  “to be sure” (RPP II, 736)129 
                                                
127 Moyal-Sharrock has expressed concern (personal communication September 2012) that unless one 
restricts Wittgenstein’s idea of knowledge to justified true belief then in On Certainty, he would he’d 
“be saying in the selfsame work, hinge certainty is not a knowing, but it is a knowing.”   But on my 
own view, there is a case to be made to say that what he’s saying is hinge certainty is a know-how and 
that’s not a propositional knowing, but it is a kind of knowing, nonetheless.  Once again, though, I 
point out that either way, the philosophy of know-how, as a debate conducted in the terms of the three 
preceding chapters, needs to engage with these issues. 
128 “I would like to reserve the expression “I know” for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic 
exchange.” (OC 260) Presumably this includes, “Do you know Johnny?... Yes, I know him,” and “Do 
you know how best to prepare a roast chicken?... Yes, I know what the best way is, here let me show 
you.”  Here again, is Wittgenstein, “I know all that”. And that will come out in the way I act and in the 
way I speak about the things in question.” (OC 395)   “But is it wrong to say: “A child that has 
mastered a language-game must know certain things?  If instead of that one said “Must be able to do 
certain things”, that would be a pleonasm.” (OC 534)  
129 In reference to this passage, Moyal-Sharrock writes (in personal communication, September 2012) 
“Yes, here again, as always before OC, he is using the word [know] broadly. But he comes to the 
decision in OC not to because doing so leads to the kind of confusion Moore was in…”  I do not see 
that this is a counter-argument, but as a reading of On Certainty which takes Wittgenstein to be doing a 
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Yet, at the same time, Moyal-Sharrock’s reading is eager to embrace the family 
resemblance option for the notion of belief.  Indeed, she suggests that the know-how 
that is our hinge certainty, be understood as a kind of non-propositional belief-in, 
rather than a propositional belief-that.  Were she to be consistent here, she should 
have to then go on to say that this non-propositional belief-in, though a basic belief, is 
not doxastic, but some other kind of non-doxastic belief.  But this does not happen.  
Instead she tells us that “objective certainty’ (ie. hinge certainty or know-how) is both 
“a doxastic category” and “a doxastic attitude” (2007, 53).  So why resist the 
substantial evidence in Wittgenstein (and the standard Rylean assumption) and deny 
that non-propositional know-how is another kind of knowledge?  
 Perhaps these concerns about some features of Moyal-Sharrock’s reading are 
if not a direct consequence of then facilitated by the propositional presumption of the 
contemporary epistemological climate.  For when Moyal-Sharrock refers to, “the 
standard view of knowledge as justified true belief”, she is undoubtedly correctly 
identifying the views of today’s epistemologists and their colleagues of the last 
several decades.  (Though note the caveat identified in footnote 123, p. 139) And 
there is an obvious tension between the “plethora of riches” (2004, 3) On Certainty 
offers for epistemology, according to Moyal-Sharrock’s view, and Coliva’s claims 
that, “Wittgenstein’s work both in philosophy of language and epistemology is often 
considered of interest only to Wittgensteinians nowadays.” (2010, 5)  Furthermore, 
Coliva acknowledges that, “the current debate on scepticism in contemporary 
epistemology […] generally rejects Wittgenstein’s concepts of meaning and 
philosophical discourse.” (2010, 104)  
  I now argue that contributing to the difficulties in unpicking these issues is a 
shift in the philosophical notion of the term ‘epistemic’.  For its meaning has been 
increasingly restricted in scope to the point where it now precludes the possibility that 
any non-propositional know-how might be a kind of knowledge.  So any attempt to 
characterise a Wittgensteinian (or any other) notion of know-how as knowledge, 
becomes deeply problematic, if one uses the vocabulary of today’s professional 
epistemologists. But if our propositional knowledge is enabled by non-propositional 
know-how and that non-propositional know-how is a kind of knowledge, then the 
                                                                                                                                       
lot more, than he claimed we should be doing. “Philosophy may in no way infringe upon what is really 
said; in the end it can only describe it. Neither can it justify it… It leaves everything as it is.” (BT 417)  
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whole intellectualist project of epistemology (not to mention intellectualism about 
know-how itself) is potentially brought into question. 
 
5 Intellectualising the Epistemic 
 
Moyal-Sharrock correctly discerns in Wittgenstein the appreciation that there is a 
non-propositional know-how that enables our propositional knowledge. She then goes 
on to rule out classifying this non-propositional know-how as a kind of knowledge, on 
the grounds that, for Wittgenstein (and herself) knowledge is limited to the 
propositional; only justified true beliefs can be knowledge. As such, the hinge 
certainty that is this non-propositional know-how is to be characterised, Moyal-
Sharrock claims, as a “nonepistemic certainty.” (2007, 27)   
 I now take a more detailed look at what is meant, in general, by this notion of 
‘the epistemic’.  Not only is this crucial to understanding Moyal-Sharrock’s 
characterisation of Wittgenstein’s notion of know-how, it serves (simultaneously) as a 
necessarily prequel for the engagement with the criticisms of the non-propositional 
view of hinge certainty to which I will shortly be turning.   
 As indicated in the discussion of the propositional presumption, the operative 
notion of knowledge (in the practice of contemporary epistemologists) is 
interchangeable with that of propositional knowledge. One consequence (or 
reflection) of this is that epistemology has subtly shifted from being the study of 
knowledge to being the study of propositional knowledge.  A second consequence of 
this is a shift in the meaning of the associated adjective ‘epistemic’.   Here is the 
opening of Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath’s ‘Pragmatic Encroachment’, 
“According to the received tradition in analytic epistemology, whether a true belief 
qualifies as knowledge depends only on purely epistemic factors – factors that are 
appropriately “truth-related”.”  (2007, 558 emphasis added)  To characterise 
something as epistemic is not, as one might have thought, a matter of highlighting its 
knowledge-relevant, or knowledge-pertinent features: features potentially shareable by 
acquaintance knowledge and/or non-propositional know-how.  Rather, to characterise 
something as epistemic is to characterise something as having a particular 
propositional knowledge-relevant or propositional knowledge-pertinent feature: i.e., 
something truth-related or truth-apt. That Fantl & McGrath are able to describe this 
as being part of the “received tradition” shows the extent to which this shift has 
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become embedded and accepted. And whilst the phrase ‘received tradition’ suggests a 
substantial use beyond that of the last few decades, but there is little evidence that it 
extends beyond the era (and the activity) of naturalized philosophy ushered in by 
Quine.  As Jonathan Kvanvig confirms, “[T]he epistemic goal standardly taken in 
epistemology over the past fifty years or so to be that of getting to the truth and 
avoiding error.” (2005, 295 emphasis added). This burgeoning use of the term 
‘epistemic’ not only confirms the propositional presumption in play, it consolidates, 
extends and crucially, appears to require the propositional presumption.   
 Haddock, Millar & Pritchard’s recent Epistemic Value (2009) echoes this 
point; adding a further nuance.  In the opening paragraph of their introduction they 
confirm the propositional orientation and parameters of their task, identifying their 
starting point as the question, ‘How can knowledge be more valuable than merely true 
belief?’ (2009, 1)  They immediately gesture to a further “theme” they wish to 
explore; one which “concerns epistemic value in a broad sense.” (2009, 1 emphasis 
added)  Haddock, Millar & Pritchard’s use of the term ‘epistemic’, in their declared 
broader sense remains, however, firmly within the boundaries circumscribed by 
propositional knowledge and its associates. “Epistemic appraisal conceived broadly” 
expands only as far as, “evaluation of beliefs not just with respect to whether they 
amount to knowledge, but also with respect to whether they are, for instance, justified, 
or reliably formed, that is formed through methods or processes that reliably yield true 
beliefs.” (2009, 1)  Even though ‘the epistemic’ might, then, be understood as having 
both a broader scope, and (I will call it) a narrow scope standard usage, both remain 
firmly anchored to the propositional. The former retains its connections (albeit at one 
step removed, rather than immediately) to that which is either truth-related or truth-
apt. On neither of these conceptions, does the remit of ‘the epistemic’ extend as far as 
being able to characterise features had by acquaintance knowledge or non-
propositional know-how.  
 Contrast such uses of the narrow and broader scope ‘epistemic’, with one from 
just a few decades ago.  Paul Ziff’s Epistemic Analysis (begun in 1962 and published 
in 1984) begins, “Epistemic analysis, as I conceive of it, is concerned with the 
analysis of knowledge.” (1984, 5) Immediately, Ziff assumes that knowledge is a 
broad church including acquaintance knowledge and know-how and weaves examples 
of all three types of knowledge throughout the book; also devoting a whole chapter to 
know-how.  Ziff’s understanding of what he calls, “epistemic terms ‘know’ and 
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‘knowledge,’” (1984, 109) goes unqualified, assuming the widest possible scope.  
This more liberal understanding of the notion of epistemology and ‘the epistemic’ 
found in Ziff’s work is also found, I suggest, in the philosophical inauguration of this 
area of philosophical interest: Plato’s Theatetus.  When Socrates asks Theatetus 
“What do you think knowledge is?” (146c) his focus is by no means limited to 
propositional knowledge.  In preparation for tackling the ‘what is knowledge 
question’, Theatetus gives examples of the kinds of things we know. These, he 
declares are, “geometry and the subjects you enumerate just now”, being “astronomy 
and music and arithmetic” together with, “the crafts such as cobbling.” (145d and 
146c-d) Socrates immediately adds, “the knowledge of the making of wooden 
furniture.” (146e) Socrates, Theatetus and Theodorus all appear to assume that 
knowledge encompasses not only what we know to be the case, but what we know 
how to do.  Knowledge includes the mastery of methods and techniques of our artistic 
activities and crafts.130   
 From this brief, and I trust non-contentious descriptive overview, it appears 
that the adjectival characterisation ‘epistemic’ has three distinct degrees of scope: 
narrow, broad(er) and wide.  Narrow scope readings of the epistemic are limited to 
those factors which are directly truth-related; broader scope readings incorporate 
indirectly truth-related factors, such as the justification and reliability of 
propositional-knowledge candidates, and wide-scope readings are open to any 
knowledge-related factors, including but not limited to truth-related factors. This 
disambiguation also reveals that both the narrow and broader scope readings are 
thoroughly propositional and intellectualist, whilst the wide scope reading has no 
intellectualist nor anti- or non-intellectualist implications or allegiances.  Furthermore, 
for active epistemologists wide scope usage now no longer seems to be appropriate 
(perhaps because of the all-dominant propositional presumption.)  Yet, for 
philosophers further afield, the (more regularly used and assumed) wide-scope 
meaning of ‘epistemic’ does not have the narrow-scope links to truth and truth-related 
factors. Instead, like ‘artistic’ (meaning pertaining to art) or ‘political’ (meaning 
pertaining to politics), ‘epistemic’ is not used with any technical overtones, or an ear 
                                                
130 It is perhaps ironic that at the end of the Theatetus when the answer that knowledge is true belief 
plus an account is rejected, the standard view of modern epistemologists is to think that what needs 
philosophical attention is the account that might best supplement true belief; not the possibility that 
there might be something problematic about understanding knowledge in purely propositional terms. 
The Theatetus can be read, however, as a challenge to this very point.  
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for the restrictions it has as a term of art for contemporary epistemologists.  It has no 
connotations that restrict its meaning to propositional knowledge; it simply means 
‘pertaining to knowledge.’ 
 Given these variants, how is one to answer the question: Is know-how 
‘epistemic’?  At the very least, the answer to this question depends on two separate 
considerations: (a) whether one is an intellectualist about the nature of know-how and 
(b) what one takes to be the scope of the meaning of the term ‘epistemic’.  Four 
options would seem to be available: 
 
Table 4. 
 
 
               
             Is know-how ‘epistemic’? 
 
(a) (a*) 
 
Intellectualist about know-
how (ie., know-how reduces 
to or is just a version of 
propositional knowledge) 
Anti-intellectualist about 
know-how (ie., it is a sui 
generis kind of knowledge) 
that is non-propositional. 
 
 
 
(b) 
Narrow-or broader-scope 
usage of ‘epistemic’ meaning 
pertaining to propositional 
knowledge or truth-related 
factors only 
 
 
 
Know-how is ‘epistemic’. 
 
 
Know-how is not (or non-)    
‘epistemic’. 
 
 
 
(b*) 
Wide scope usage of 
‘epistemic’ meaning 
pertaining to knowledge, in 
general 
 
 
 
Know-how is ‘epistemic’. 
 
 
Know-how is ‘epistemic’. 
 
 
 
What emerges from this is: 
 
 (4)  Claims that know-how is ‘epistemic’ may be justified in three 
  different ways; based on three different reasons: 
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  (i)  because know-how can be reduced to propositional knowledge 
   and ‘epistemic’ is the pertinent adjective for propositional  
   knowledge or knowledge involving truth or truth-related 
   factors.  [a + b] 
 
  (ii)  because know-how can be reduced to propositional knowledge 
   and ‘epistemic’ is the pertinent adjective for knowledge in  
   general. [a + b*] 
 
  (iii)  because know-how is a (sui generis and non-propositional)  
   kind of knowledge and ‘epistemic’ is the pertinent adjective for  
   knowledge in general.   [a* + b*] 
 
Reasons (i) and (ii) are intellectualist, whereas reason (iii) is not.  Therefore, 
characterising know-how as epistemic need not entail that it is intellectualist (or 
propositional).  
 
 (5) Claims that know-how is non-epistemic are based on one reason: 
 
  (iv) because know-how is a (sui generis and non-propositional)  
   kind of knowledge and ‘epistemic’ is the pertinent adjective 
   only for propositional knowledge. [a* + b] 
 
Yet Moyal-Sharrock’s claim that non-propositional know-how is not knowledge and 
non-epistemic is not based on reason 5(iv).  This is, I suggest, because Moyal-
Sharrock is using as her guide to the meaning of the term ‘epistemic’, the thoroughly 
intellectualist usage which is according to Fantl & McGrath is that currently used by 
contemporary epistemologists. She writes, “Is this concept of certainty epistemic, or 
does Wittgenstein’s dissociation of it from knowledge exclude our foundational 
certainty from the realm of epistemology?” (2007, 13)  But this usage of ‘epistemic’ 
no longer acknowledges any other square of the above table, other than the top left 
hand one [a + b].   Thus if one wishes to engage in philosophical discussion about 
know-how, and use the terms of art familiar to and expected of today’s 
epistemologists, one has no choice other than to perpetuate the view that limits 
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knowledge to the confines of square [a + b], and, on these terms one must declare 
know-how to be non-epistemic.  This is what, I conclude, Moyal-Sharrock is doing. 
 In today’s epistemological environment one cannot, therefore, use the term 
‘epistemic’ without reinforcing intellectualist views about knowledge. For the option 
that existed only a few years ago, i.e., [a* + b*] falls on deaf ears; notwithstanding 
that [a* + b*] is non-other than Ryle’s view.131  If one attempted to use the option [a + 
b*] in order to state that non-propositional know-how was a kind of knowledge,132 
one would find oneself having to declare that non-propositional know-how was ‘non-
epistemic’, which would not only be not what one might which to claim, but whilst 
appearing to be making the same point as that made by Moyal-Sharrock, would 
actually be its contrary.  These entanglements go by unnoticed for intellectualists, for 
whom there is no contretemps consequent upon using the term, for they no longer 
acknowledge the four options available.  The problem is only brought to light if one 
wishes to pursue Wittgensteinian, anti- or non-intellectualist views about know-how.  
I suggest this why the problem has (thus far) slipped under the radar.  
 There seems no way to avoid the conclusion that one might use the term 
‘epistemic’ and be understood by contemporary epistemologists without 
simultaneously perpetuating the propositional presumption and the intellectualist 
paradigm.133  This can be seen in the work of self-professed anti-intellectualist Kieran 
Setiya.  In his July 2012 Aristotelian Society talk on ‘Know-how’, he worries that 
unless know-how can be shown to be directly related to (propositional) belief there is 
no justification for know-how to be regarded as any kind of knowledge at all.  He uses 
an Ascombean picture of  propositional belief about one’s intention (the details of 
which are irrelevant to this point) in order to articulate his own worry that, “Unless we 
accept his Anscombean conception [i.e. something which has the required 
propositionality], we cannot explain what is epistemological about knowing how; why 
                                                
131 A set of parallel quandaries would be faced when considering the question of the epistemic status of 
acquaintance knowledge.   
132 In ‘The Know-How Reading of On Certainty’ (MSS), I take our linguistic hinge certainty to be just 
such a non-propositional know-how, which (contra Moyal-Sharrock) is an example of knowledge.  
133 Nowhere are the entanglements prompted by the seemingly innocent term ‘epistemic’ revealed more 
starkly than in Coliva’s account.  On her reading, ‘hinge propositions’, although propositions, do not 
have a truth value at all, thereby ensuring that, “we bear no epistemic relation to them” (2010, 11), and 
they cannot be “epistemically assessed.” (2010, 133 original emphasis) Nonetheless, she suggests, they 
do have an, “epistemically normative role” because they “contribute to the …possibility of acquiring 
evidence for or against genuinely empirical – that is verifiable propositions.” (2010, 86), and, “our 
acceptance of hinges… is itself constitutive of epistemic rationality.” (2010, 174)  
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knowing how to φ is an authentic form of knowledge.”134  This is an example of the 
extent to which an anti-intellectualist has succumbed to the propositional presumption 
that knowledge is (limited to) propositional knowledge.  In his talk, Setiya presumes 
that the burden of proof is on him to argue that know-how is any kind of knowledge 
all; rather than starting from this assumption. The result is an (entirely un-Rylean) 
anti-intellectualist about knowledge who agrees with the intellectualist paradigm.  
Such are the levels of confusion generated by the unacknowledged scope ambiguities 
of the term ‘epistemic’.  If anti- and non-intellectualists, in general, were to share the 
principle at work in Setiya’s view then they would be condemned to accept that in 
having something to say about know-how, they are not thereby saying anything yet 
about knowledge, nor making a contribution to epistemology.  This is not merely to 
marginalize know-how, it is to ensure its exile.  
 Might one conclude that the dominance of the intellectualist paradigm and the 
commitment to a reading of Wittgenstein that holds knowledge to be limited to 
propositional knowledge that is justified true belief, explains Moyal-Sharrock’s 
rejection of the idea that the know-how (which is our linguistic hinge certainty) is 
knowledge?  I can see no other option. Before concluding, however, I return to the 
strategy employed by Moyal-Sharrock in setting up two types of know-how in her 
original reading.  Having stipulated there are two types of know-how (i) ‘ordinary’ 
and (ii) ‘objective’ or hinge certainty know-how, the latter being the non-
propositional certainty that is no kind of knowledge, because of its animal surety, 
Moyal-Sharrock never returns to this distinction.  The status of the ‘ordinary’ know-
how is not given.  Yet it is hard to see what further clarification Moyal-Sharrock 
would be able to offer about this kind of know-how.  For should she concede it is 
knowledge or not? 
 If Moyal-Sharrock concedes that ordinary non-propositional know-how is 
both non-propositional and yet knowledge, then she opens up the option that being 
know-how need not per se rule out the possibility of being knowledge; thus a 
backdoor to the possibility that hinge certainty know-how (qua knowledge) becomes 
available. Yet if she denies ordinary know-how is knowledge, then what is it?  On this 
second option, Moyal-Sharrock now appears to have identified two types of non-
propositional know-how, neither of which are any kind of knowledge. So why make 
                                                
134 The citation is from the pre-publication draft of Setiya’s talk, with permission. 
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the discrimination between them in the first place?  The distinction, once made, would 
seem to fall by the wayside.  Again, this issue is unproblematic for a non-
propositional know-how reading that takes know-how to be a kind of knowledge 
(albeit not in any propositional, Moorean sense.) 
 On these grounds, I conclude that in order to reject our linguistic hinge 
certainty being a kind of know-how that is non-propositional knowledge, Moyal-
Sharrock must deny Wittgenstein’s acknowledgement that knowledge is a family 
resemblance notion capable of embracing non-propositional know-how.  This risks 
undermining the very opportunity she has identified of bringing Wittgenstein’s 
insights to bear on the (misguided) hegemony of the propositional presumption. That 
said, she has opened up a vast new philosophical territorial landscape, previously 
unexplored by the participants in today’s philosophy of know-how debate.   
 There are, however, critics for whom Moyal-Sharrock’s reading of On 
Certainty makes a faux pas not in failing to appreciate that know-how is a kind of 
knowledge, but by suggesting, in the first place, that for Wittgenstein hinge certainty 
is any kind of know-how.  I now turn to consider just how deep these challenges 
might bite. 
 
5 Hinge Propositionality 
 
According to Duncan Pritchard’s latest taxonomy of On Certainty readings, only one 
of the six types of interpretations (thus far offered and characterised) is non-
propositional.  This is the reading which he takes Moyal-Sharrock’s understanding to 
exemplify. So far removed is it from Pritchard’s own view of Moorean certainty and 
what he calls ‘hinge propositions’, that he entitles the position, ‘Radical Non-
Epistemicism’.   
 
Here is my own summary overview of Pritchard’s taxonomy:135    
 
(See over the page) 
 
 
                                                
135 See Pritchard (2005a, p 249 end note 1) for his now-superceded non-epistemic/epistemic taxonomy.  
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Table 5:  
 
 
Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: Pritchard’s Taxonomy  
(extracted & collated from his 2011a) 
 
 Non-
Epistemicist 
Non-
Epistemicist 
Non-
Epistemicist 
 
Epistemicist Epistemicist Epistemicist 
 
“Hinges” 
including 
Moorean 
Truisms 
Radical 
 
 
 
 Simple Contextualism Neo-
Mooreanism 
 
(Internalist) 
Neo-
Mooreanism 
 
(Externalist) 
 
       DM-S 
  
             DP 
Knowable? 
 
          X           X           X           ✓          ✓          ✓ 
Propositional? 
 
          X             ✓          ✓          ✓          ✓          ✓ 
Factual /  
Fact-stating? 
 
          X           X 
(rule or norm    
       stating) 
         ✓          ✓          ✓          ✓ 
 
 
According to Pritchard, non-epistemicist (unlike epistemicist) views take at “face-
value” Wittgenstein’s appreciation that, “hinges are unknown.” (2011a, 533) The 
strongest of these readings is the “radical” non-propositional reading, which Pritchard 
suggests captures the interpretations offers by Avrum Stroll136 and D. Z. Phillips, as 
well as Moyal-Sharrock.  There is a less strong account on which hinges are 
propositional, but “non-factual,” (2011a, 535) and which Pritchard takes to 
characterise the views of Crispin Wright (particularly his work in the 1980s), 
McGinn, Stroll (again, but under a different light), Conant and Minar.  The weakest of 
the non-epistemicist readings is the, “simple non-epistemic” (2011, 536) view that 
hinges are both facts and propositions, though still not knowable.137  
 All Epistemicist readings regard so-called ‘hinge propositions’ as knowable; 
(where that term is deemed to pertain to propositional knowledge) and thereby fly in 
the face of what Wittgenstein would seem to be saying.  Pritchard suggests these 
come in three varieties: Contextualist, Neo-Moorean and Pritchard’s own version of 
Neo-Mooreanism.  Contextualism supposedly holds hinges are supposedly knowable, 
                                                
136 I would agree with Pritchard’s assignation of Stroll to this category. He is perhaps the first (indeed 
the breakthrough) non-propositional reader of On Certainty. “Wittgenstein is steadily moving away 
from thinking of certainty in propositional terms at all.” (1994, 7) I also think that that Norman 
Malcolm may be added to this list; though I take Phillips’ views to be too metaphysical to sit 
comfortably alongside those of Malcolm, Stroll or Moyal-Sharrock. 
137 The simple non-epistemicist view appears to be a ‘place-holder’ view; its purpose to carve out a 
possible (thus far untaken) option in a schema of options. It is not a view Pritchard ascribes to anyone; 
though, as he points out, it might be understood as a way of sketching out scepticism. 
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“just so long as one does not enter a context where such hinges are brought into 
question,” (2011, 538) a view Pritchard takes to be held by Michael Williams. On 
Neo-Moorean readings, particularly those of Wright (from 1991 on), hinges have 
unearned but nonetheless, “positive epistemic support,” (2011a, 542) and on 
Pritchard’s own contrasting externalist version of Neo-Mooreanism, whilst hinges, 
“lack direct epistemic support in the form of reflectively accessible grounds” they 
still, “count as instances of knowledge.” (2011a, 546).138  
 In what follows, I consider the critical pressure Pritchard’s propositional 
reading of hinge certainty brings to a non-propositional (and thus non-propositional 
know-how) understanding of our hinge certainty.  As such, I concentrate my attention    
on the two outer columns of Table 4.  This not only allows an engagement with the 
account most diametrically opposed to that offered by Moyal-Sharrock, but it also 
brings to the table what I take to be the strongest available challenge to any non-
propositional understanding. In considering the challenges posed by Pritchard’s 
propositional conception of Moorean certainty, I draw mainly on his (2005a), 
(2005b), (2011a) (2011b) and (forthcoming b).  
 On Pritchard’s reading of On Certainty, Moore’s truisms such as ‘Here 
[waving] is a hand,’ is a hinge proposition.  As such it is knowable, it states a fact, 
and it is propositional. ‘Here [waving] is a hand’ is, however, different to ‘Here 
[body-part] is a hand’ because whilst it is possible to provide suitable justification for 
the belief ‘Here [body-part] is a hand’, no justification can be provided for ‘Here 
[waving] is a hand’, for any putative justification would be less warranted than ‘Here 
[waving] is a hand’ is itself.  So whilst Pritchard’s reading agrees that Wittgenstein 
                                                
138 Pritchard’s own selection of references for the various interpreters can be found throughout 532-
547, but specifically on pp 539, 542 and fns. 5, 6 and 22. Note that Pritchard’s taxonomy uses different 
discriminatory criteria to one previously offered by Moyal-Sharrock & William Brenner. According to 
Moyal-Sharrock & Brenner, the contributors to 2005 edited collection Readings of Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty, can each be assigned to one of four possible readings (though this does not preclude a degree 
of overlap.)  The framework reading examines the, “foundational and grammatical views” (2005, 3) 
and is pursued by Moyal-Sharrock herself together with Stroll, Williams and Schulte. The 
transcendental reading found in Mounce, Brenner and Rudd, “offers neo-Kantian and neo-Realist 
interpretations.” (2005, 3)  The epistemic reading focusses on the epistemic status (or otherwise) of the 
so-called ‘hinge propositions’ and is favoured by Morawetz, Pritchard, Kober; whilst the therapeutic 
reading is, “less theoretical, more dialectic and open-textured” as in the writings of Minar, Cracy, 
Read. (2005, 3)  By these criteria, I suggest Marie McGinn be regarded as another framework reader, 
not least because of her continued emphasis on, “judgements that form the frame of our practice,” 
(1989, 101) though her use of the term ‘judgement’ is at odds with other framework readers.  Coliva 
(2011) and Wright’s work (in general) are perhaps best regarded as epistemic readers.  In the wake of 
Section 4 conclusions, the very decision to characterise readings as ‘epistemic’ or otherwise, is, I think, 
itself a problematic move. 
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identifies a categorial distinction, in On Certainty, between propositional knowledge 
and certainty, this is to be understood as a difference between types of propositional 
knowledge, and not between propositional knowledge and something that is not 
propositional knowledge. I suggest this might reasonably be regarded as a modest 
construal of Wittgenstein’s notion of a ‘categorial difference’.  Indeed, Pritchard 
frequently describes the content of On Certainty as being a new proposal, from 
Wittgenstein, about “the structure of reasons.” (2011a throughout; 2011b, 273; 2005a, 
Sec 9.2; forthcoming b) 
 Adherence to such a propositional reading, requires that a number of 
commitments are maintained and a number of challenges are rejected.  I now take a 
look at just four of these.  In the first place, one needs to ignore the argument 
presented by Moyal-Sharrock (2007, 33-34) that ‘Satz’ in German is too often 
translated as proposition and not sentence; the former being the ubiquitous choice in 
the Paul/Anscombe translation.  Pritchard is silent on this matter. That said, the 
philosophical thrust of these issues will not turn, I suggest, merely on questions of 
translation.   
 Secondly, any fact-stating propositional reading needs to either explain or 
ignore Wittgenstein’s numerous observations that whilst sentences may have the form 
of empirical propositions they are nonetheless not empirical propositions. As seen 
already in (OC 308) the worry is raised, and in (OC 494) Wittgenstein writes: 
 
 “I cannot doubt this proposition [Satz] without giving up all  
 judgement.”  But what sort of proposition is that? … It is certainly 
 no empirical proposition…It has the character of a rule.   
 
According to Moyal-Sharrock, “hinges are grammatical rules”; rules which retain 
their non-propositionality precisely because they are “rules in action: logic in action.” 
(2007, 99)139 Pritchard’s reading does not proffer a propositional understanding of 
rules, or indeed wrestle with what rules are.  He does briefly engage with what he 
describes as the non-radical, non-epistemicist view that hinges might be propositional 
                                                
139 Hence Moyal-Sharrock’s characterisation of Wittgenstein’s overall position in On Certainty as 
“logical pragmatism” (2007, 173)  In my own Know-How Reading I avoid characterising 
Wittgenstein’s position as any kind of pragmatism, because of the familiar practice of contrasting ‘the 
pragmatic’ with ‘the epistemic’.  (More about which below).   Also given the extent to which the latter 
is now a technical term, any contrastive use of the former with it, fuels a comparable technical shift in 
the usage of ‘pragmatic’ to which I do not wish to contribute. 
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but non-fact-stating, suggesting that this finds, “strong support” in the “river bed 
passages” (2011, 535). Yet he does not offer an alternative way of understanding the 
river bed passages, or open up any potential Pandora’s Box pertaining to rules.  
Instead Pritchard claims that any non-propositional reading is left, “to contend with 
the problem of explaining how a proposition like ‘I have two hands can be non-fact-
stating and this is no easy task.” (2011, 535)  This is not an argument against the non-
propositionality of hinges, it is an acknowledgement that he has does not intend to 
pursue one. 
 Were he to attempt to counter Moyal-Sharrock’s particular non-propositional 
view, Pritchard might turn to Peter Hacker’s propositional reading of grammatical 
rules.  According to Hacker (contra Moyal-Sharrock) rules are grammatical 
propositions. But where Moyal-Sharrock reads Wittgenstein as holding that a 
proposition must be bipolar (i.e., capable of being both true and false), Hacker has a 
looser notion of proposition, according to which bivalency (i.e., being either true or 
false) is acceptable.  On Hacker’s view grammatical propositions are (bivalent) 
necessary truths whose negations are not false, but nonsense.  Were Pritchard to 
pursue this more overtly propositional approach, it would require him to articulate 
some view about the nature and status of rules which, as noted, he does not.  That 
said, having identified his own position as ‘epistemicist’140, it would appear that 
Pritchard, like Moyal-Sharrock (and unlike Hacker) is committed to the bi-polarity of 
propositions.  
 On my Know-How Reading of On Certainty, I take the Moyal-Sharrock/ 
Hacker non-propositional/propositional clash to be less divisive than it might first 
appear. This is because, for Hacker, the point that our rules of grammar are 
propositional does not entail that they are fact-stating empirical propositions.  Rather, 
it is simply the point that what are actually our rules, which are themselves non-
propositional, can be formulated or expressed in language. Here is Hacker: 
 
                                                
140 Epistemicism is a metaphysical position  (originally articulated in considerations relating to 
vagueness, and then logic) that the world is constituted by facts, and that all propositions are either true 
or false, because of the way the world is or isn’t.  So, for example, it just is either true or false that a 
particular is bald, and this has nothing to do with the norms of description we use and have developed 
to describe the world.  Although one might hold that such a view could comfortably fit with Pritchard’s 
(or any) externalist views (in epistemology), according to discussion with Pritchard (16th January 2013) 
no such association is entailed or sought, indeed the selection of the term ‘epistemicist’ seeks to bring 
nothing further into play than the term ‘epistemic’.  
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 The truth of ‘The chess king moves one square at a time’  
 does not consist in its corresponding to the fact that this chess  
 piece moves thus (since it is not a fact that it does, but a norm)  
 or things in reality being as the sentence describes them as being  
 (for the sentence is not a description), but rather in it correctly  
 articulating a rule of our game of chess.   
            (2009, 263 emphases added)   
 
Pritchard’s defence of his own propositional views does not, as already identified, 
find him delving into any rule- or norm-involving territory. Perhaps this is because he 
reads On Certainty not only with an eye on sceptical issues, but from an externalist 
perspective.  Given that epistemological externalism is a more naturalized approach to 
philosophy; it is an orientation that might be expected to resist, in general, the idea 
that there are irreducible norms.  
 Pritchard is not, however, unaware that his, “discussion of non-epistemicism is 
inevitably glib,” readily acknowledging that he, “leaves out a number of important 
considerations that are relevant to this topic (such as how best to understand the very 
notion of a proposition.)” (2005a, 538, fn. 13 emphasis added)  Yet one might suggest 
that how to understand those assertoric sentences which appear to have the form of 
fact-stating propositions (but which are not) is not simply the motivation for, and the 
substance of, the On Certainty passages, but one possible description of 
Wittgenstein’s life’s work.  Even if one wishes to promote a steadfastly propositional 
reading, then Wittgenstein’s point that, “the concept ‘proposition’ itself is not a sharp 
one.” (OC 320) would seem to demand a more substantial response.141  
 In taking for granted the unproblematic and univocal nature of the proposition 
Pritchard is conforming to the standard practice of all contemporary epistemologists. 
That is to say, that in pursuing a theory of the knowledge or a theoretical explanation 
of the ‘knows that’ relation expressed in the schematic ‘Skp’ (Subject S knows that 
proposition p), the nature of p itself may be taken for granted.142 That Pritchard 
                                                
141 See Moyal-Sharrock (2007, 79-80 and 147-8) for her importantly criticial engagement with Quine’s 
thoroughly propositional picture of beliefs which are held to different degrees of strength; a picture 
which could apply equally well to Pritchard.  
142 Cf., Harrison (2011) in which I identify and challenge the questionable Singularity and 
Metaphysical Presumptions built into this schema. 
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appreciates there is such a lacuna at the heart of his engagement with the readings of 
On Certainty is already an unusual concession.  
 The third commitment that is required in order to maintain a propositional 
reading of hinges is a number of quite idiosyncratic interpretations of some of 
Wittgenstein’s key passages.  Consider, for example, Wittgenstein’s realization that, 
“If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false” (OC 205) 
Here Pritchard ignores the obvious relevance of this for any appreciation of the 
categorial distinction under discussion. Moreover, he describes this passage (along 
with paragraphs OC 199-200) as being “ambiguous since neither of them explicitly 
states that hinge propositions are neither true nor false.” (2005a, 250 end note 1.)  If 
(OC 205) is ambiguous on this point then the rigours of disambiguation Pritchard 
seeks are not just extraordinarily high, but, I am afraid, opaque. It is unclear how this 
passage could fail to mean that our empirical knowledge is grounded in something 
which does not itself have truth values.  Especially when one considers that, “the 
ground is not true, nor yet false” follows straight on from the following key 
paragraph:  
 
 Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - 
 but the end is not certain propositions’ [Sätze] striking us immediately 
 as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which  
 lies at the bottom of the language-game.  (OC 204) 
   
Undaunted, Pritchard offers a unusual reading143 of this associated passage which 
denies our justifying comes to an end in our practices or ways of acting. Rather, he 
claims that Wittgenstein is pointing out that our justifying bottoms out in a “visceral 
conviction.”  (2011a, 534)  I admit to struggling to see how this captures what 
Wittgenstein is articulating.  It looks, instead, to be a strategy for diffusing the central 
thrust of Wittgenstein’s insights; drawing attention away from the foundational 
dynamism that is our acting, to some more static conviction, presumably to help 
promote a characterisation more amenable to capture in propositional terms.  Our 
ways of acting, are on this reading, not different in kind to the empirical knowledge 
                                                
143 For the avoidance of doubt, I am not suggesting that Pritchard (or indeed Williams or Wright) are 
offering interpretations (comprehensive or otherwise) of On Certainty, rather their readings of 
particular passages are perhaps best appreciated as articulations of views inspired by Wittgenstein’s 
writings. 
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they enable, but rather they are, and thereby offer, “a backdrop of claims which are of 
their nature ungroundedly held.” (2005a, 226 emphasis added)  
 This is not so much a challenge to the non-propositional view so much as the 
articulation of an alternative incompatible intellectualist orientation.  The assumption 
that our intelligence and our mindedness (and thus our knowledge) must be 
propositional all the way down (as it were) is a cornerstone of the intellectualism 
paradigm.144  Again, this is perhaps to be expected from any epistemologist focused 
on sceptical concerns; especially someone like Pritchard, who in seeking ways to 
combat sceptical “angst,” (2005a, Sec 9.4) takes this to require, by definition, a 
propositional ‘solution’.  The irrelevance of the non-propositional is built into any 
such perspective from the start. This perhaps also explains why Pritchard’s 
characterisation of Moyal-Sharrock’s position acknowledges its non-propositionality, 
but (to my knowledge) remains silent on her suggestion that foundational hinge 
certainty is a kind of know-how. 
 The fourth commitment to which a propositional reading is likely to adhere, is 
a degree of separatism between any pragmatic and (supposedly) ‘epistemic’145 aspects 
or features. In resisting Wittgenstein’s realisation that our ways of acting ground our 
empirical knowledge, it is unsurprising therefore to note that Pritchard rigorously 
polices what he takes to be the discreteness and lack of interdependency between 
‘epistemic’, pragmatic (and in addition, semantic) features or characteristics. Indeed 
he regularly argues that such-and-such a feature cannot be ‘epistemic’ because it is 
pragmatic, (or because it is semantic):   
 
 [I]f one is looking for a primarily epistemic response to scepticism from 
 Wittgenstein’s remarks in this text then one is likely to be disappointed.  
 At best, it seems, all that Wittgenstein offers in this regard is the kind of 
 pragmatic defence of our belief in hinges that Wright was trying to pass  
 off as being a genuinely epistemic approach to the problem.” (2005b, 217)  
 
                                                
144 This is further pursed in my ‘The Intellectualist Paradigm’ (MSS) where I identify propositionality, 
computationalism and what Hutto has called, “semantic thesis of intentionality” (2012, 41-42) as the 
three cornerstones of the intellectualist paradigm which, having been imported into naturalized 
philosophy of mind and epistemology from cognitive science, have been thoroughly embraced.  
145 I deliberately use the term ‘epistemic’ in scare quotes, henceforth, as a reminder that in light of its 
now-dominant narrow-scope usage, it is unclear how one might use the term whilst attempting to 
pursue an anti- or non-intellectualist approach to knowledge.  
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And again, instead of supplying, “the desired epistemic answer to scepticism” what 
Wittgenstein offers in On Certainty is, according to Pritchard, certain resources which 
may, “help us to identify a possible pragmatic response to the problem.” (2005a, 
242).  If one starts with, and expects to maintain, a separatism between the epistemic 
and the pragmatic, how might one engage with Wittgenstein’s resources, given that 
the substance of these pertain to the interdependency of our propositional knowledge 
and our non-propositional know-how?146  One is left wondering if the description of 
Wittgenstein’s knowledge-related investigations in On Certainty as “Wittgensteinian 
Epistemology” (Pritchard 2011a, Sec 3) is anything more than an honorific gesture.  
 One moral to be drawn from the four requirements to which a propositional 
account is committed, as sketched above, is that propositional and non-propositional 
readings of hinges do not share the same starting point.  From Pritchard’s point of 
view, a ‘hinge proposition’ is something whose categorial difference is not a matter of 
its putative propositionality, but it is, rather, a consequence of it being a proposition 
which, “performs a peculiar epistemic role.”  (2005b ,194, and 2001/2, 97)  The 
challenge of engaging with On Certainty is thereby taken to be the task of 
understanding just what this specific ‘epistemic’ role is; a role that by definition is a 
role played by some kind of proposition. On any such propositional view, the 
‘epistemic role’ is therefore the explanandum in need of an explanans.  By contrast, 
the non-propositional know-how understanding of On Certainty (both Moyal-
Sharrock’s and my own) does not recognise this supposed ‘epistemic role of hinge 
proposition’ as an explanandum of any sort; rather to characterise it as such, is already 
to be engaged in offering an explanans.  This exposes the extent to which 
propositional and non-propositional views are not simply contrasting explanans of the 
same (mutually agreed) explanandum, but two approaches which fundamentally 
disagree on where to begin their philosophical pursuits.     
 That said, as an externalist, there is, of course, no need for Pritchard to deny 
the intellectualist paradigm which informs his reading.  Indeed, any position that 
suggests that, “the grounds that we have for our beliefs” are “encoded in the hinge 
propositions.” (2005a, 227 emphasis added), or that, “certain propositions are 
codifying the hinge conviction,” (2011b, 283) is operating comfortably with the 
                                                
146 Furthermore, if pragmatism and the ‘epistemic’ are to be kept apart is there any putative way of 
characterising non-propositional know-how as knowledge?  Yet again, the nomenclature employed by 
the propositional presumption thwarts the discussion. 
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tradition of with a deeply naturalized perspective informed by intellectualist 
philosophy of mind and (its partner) epistemological externalism.147  But Pritchard, in 
a move rare amongst contemporary epistemologists, does appear to appreciate the 
tension this provokes, admitting, “There is hardly any textual support in On Certainty 
for externalism.” (2005b, 208)  Having said this, however, more recently he suggests 
that one might, “plausibly argue that recognizing and incorporating the insights 
provided by Wittgenstein’s treatment of scepticism in On Certainty is essential to the 
proper development of any externalist anti-sceptical epistemology.” (2011, 547) 148 
 My interim conclusion is that Moyal-Sharrock’s and Pritchard’s two very 
different readings of Wittgenstein cannot be evaluated by the same criteria. 
Pritchard’s Neo-Mooreanism operates within the parameters (and under the authority) 
of an intellectualist naturalized philosophy, Moyal-Sharrock attempts to free her 
views from this, only to find them ensnared in the tendrils of those terms of art with 
which contemporary epistemology operates (and protects) itself.  In a final attempt to 
try and find some shared ground on which to consider the propositional and the non-
propositional know-how readings, I will return to Wittgenstein’s passages and offer a 
fresh argument against the propositional reading; one that aims to simultaneously 
deepen the exposition, the accuracy and the fecundity of non-propositional know-how 
reading.  To do this, I focus on two of the passages which Pritchard regular uses as 
anchors for his own propositional reading, beginning with: 
 
 The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.” (OC 166)  
 
If I understand Pritchard correctly, on his view the power of this passage turns on the 
idea that certain propositions, i.e., hinge propositions, are not just held without 
                                                
147 Cf., Pritchard’s observation, that, “[E]pistemological externalists have long made play with such a 
notion [i.e. a “respectable notion of entitlement”], arguing that agents can legitimately believe all 
manner of propositions in the absence of supporting reasons just so long as the agent’s belief is formed 
in the right kind of way, where this is defined externally in terms of, for example, the reliability of the 
belief-forming mechanism involved. (2005b, 207)  
148 On this I would agree with Pritchard, but for entirely different reasons.  For I take the development 
of externalist anti-sceptical epistemology to be best served by the realization (i) that what is ‘external’ 
(as it were) is best understood in non-naturalized, non-intellectualist terms, i.e., as a matter of the 
public nature of our normative practices; (ii) that in coming to master normative practices we are 
trained in public normative practices and in so doing become minded, intelligent, human beings; and 
(iii) that therefore there is no epistemological gap between mind and world for scepticism to find 
purchase.  But this is not the place for this argument, and the New Epistemology of Know-How is just 
one of the first steps to that particular philosophical destination. For illuminating discussions of this 
normative training see Meredith Williams (1991) and (2011).  
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grounds, but they are held without grounds because there is no grounding they could 
have.149  This contrasts with the non-propositional reading, in which hinges are not 
propositions, but are themselves grounds for empirical propositions. On the former 
account what is being presented is indeed, what Pritchard characterises as a new 
picture of the structure of (propositional) reasons.  On this picture there are (non-
hinge) propositions that are grounded or supported by other propositions, and there 
are (hinge) propositions that are not grounded or supported by other propositions.  
There is nothing, it would seem, which provides any non-propositional grounding. 
“The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing,” is taken to support 
this, because it takes ‘our believing’, or our beliefs, to be ungrounded, and 
ungroundable. Away from the context of the many of the other key passages of On 
Certainty, there is no question but that this looks like a viable construal.   
 On the latter (non-propositional) understanding, (empirical) propositions are 
grounded by other propositions but ultimately this justificatory support comes to an 
end in something non-propositional: our hinge or foundational or bedrock ways of 
acting.  Our non-propositional know-how. “The difficulty is to realize the 
groundlessness of our believing,” is taken to articulate this point in two ways.  Firstly 
empirical beliefs are ultimately ungrounded -- propositionally.  Secondly, that there is 
a way in which our empirical propositions are grounded, i.e., by our non-
propositional ways of acting, our know-how, but these ways of acting are not 
themselves grounded in anything further.  What we do is just what we do.  And what 
we do correctly is just what we do correctly.  Our normative linguistic know-how is a 
matter of engaging in rule- and standard-involving normative practices which are not 
played correctly because of some further justificatory grounding.150  Our linguistic 
know-how, our language-games just are what they are.  As Wittgenstein reminds us: 
 
                                                
149 On this propositional reading (i) “The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.” 
(OC 166) and (ii) “If the true is what is grounded then the ground is not yet true, nor yet false”  (OC 
205) are taken to be incommensurable.  The propositional view is then required to select which view 
best articulates Wittgenstein’s central ‘thesis’. It then selects (i), rejecting (ii). By contrast, the non-
propositional view does not regard them as being incommensurable, and so is not obliged to choose 
between them.  
150 When considering why a particular number is the right one in a series, Wittgenstein reminds us, “He 
must go on like this without a reason.  Not , however, because he cannot yet grasp the reason but 
because – in this system – there is no reason.  (“The chain of reasons comes to an end.”) And the like 
this (in “go on like this”) is signified by a number, a value.  For at this level the expression of the rule is 
explained by the value, not the value by the rule.” (RPP II, 404)  In other words that such-and-such a 
number is correct is just the way we act; what we do, when we do this – correctly. 
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 You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something 
 unpredictable.  I mean: it is not based on grounds.  It is not reasonable (or 
 unreasonable).   
  It is there like our life. (OC 559) 
 
So whilst Pritchard is right to claim (OC 166) in support of his views, this is only 
possible if one takes the passage out of context.  Once re-situated in the body of On 
Certainty, the alternative reading, which supports the non-propositional view is more 
consistent with the rest of Wittgenstein’s insights both here, and elsewhere. 
 
 What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions, is  
 not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole  
 hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which  
 we see any action.  (Z  567) 
 
One of Pritchard’s other favoured passages is, “It is always by favour of Nature that 
one knows something.” (OC 505)  There is no denying that this is a canny choice for 
any externalist or naturalized philosopher seeking to expand the support base for their 
views by raiding Wittgenstein’s coffers.  But a non-propositional reading could 
readily understand this as a reminder that our ways of acting (including our normative 
ways)  are a kind of second nature:   
 
 We’re used to a particular classification of things. With language,  
 or languages, it has become second nature to us.   (RPP II, 678) 
 
As Moyal-Sharrock puts it, “Our potential to develop these abilities [for language and 
other intelligent behaviour] is an endowment of nature; the actualization of that 
potential is ensured by nurture, and furthered by culture.” (2007, 6)  I would extend 
Moyal-Sharrock’s point that these abilities which we have and develop through 
training are not just non-propositional know-how, they are a know-how that is a kind 
of knowledge.  For, as Wittgenstein reminds us not only is, “The kind of certainty is 
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the kind of language-game,” (LW I, 892) but, “the concept of knowing is coupled 
with that of the language-game.” (OC 560) 151   
 
 The fact that I use the word “hand” and all the other words in  
 my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand  
 before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their  
 meanings – shews that absence of doubt belongs to the essence  
 of the language-game.  (OC 370) 
 
I conclude that Pritchard’s Neo-Mooreanism acknowledges but does not repudiate the 
non-propositional reading. Furthermore, the non-propositional view can more readily 
accommodate the breath and variation of the On Certainty passages, whereas the 
propositional view is inevitably limited to cherry-picking from a small selection of 
potentially serviceable quotes.  On Pritchard’s own admission, however, much of his 
attention is at the service of his own focus and interest in propositional scepticism, and 
so his reading is perhaps inevitably circumscribed.152  
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Moyal-Sharrock’s non-propositional understanding of hinge certainty articulates a 
foundational kind of know-how which is implicated in all our empirical knowledge. 
Although I take this know-how to be a kind of knowledge and Moyal-Sharrock resists 
this point, her understanding of Wittgenstein nonetheless illuminates the extent to 
which his philosophy can no longer be side-lined by any serious philosophical attempt 
to engage with know-how.  Even if my arguments above have failed to show that our 
foundational linguistic certainty or know-how is a kind of knowledge, there is still a 
kind of ‘objective know-how’ (of some sort) that, according to Moyal-Sharrock is 
constitutive of the enabling framework of empirical knowledge, and it is a non-
propositional know-how.  This, alone, is sufficient reason for the involvement of 
                                                
151 Pritchard has not yet offered any externalist reading of Wittgenstein’s “Not until there is a language-
game are their reasons.”  (RPP II, 689)  And it remains unclear what any such reading might be. 
152 That said, there are yet more resources in On Certainty and the later writings on psychology, for 
Pritchard’s (and other epistemologists’) further interests; particularly in relation to such currently 
popular topics as the value question and the relation between knowledge and understanding.  After all, 
“Understanding is like knowing how to go on, and so it is an ability.” (RPP I, 875)  
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Wittgenstein’s work in any future consideration of the philosophy of know-how 
which seeks to be comprehensive.   
 Furthermore, the critical engagement between the non-propositional know-
how readings and the propositional orientation raises an entirely new set of issues. For 
if the non-propositional know-how views of our grounding certainty are right, then 
not only is intellectualism about know-how wrong, but the intellectualist paradigm 
with which naturalized epistemology operates is itself threatened.  Engaging with 
Wittgenstein on the subject of know-how thus reveals the extent to which know-how 
can no longer be a peripheral topic; one whose consequences are ring-fenced from 
wider implications. In bringing Wittgenstein into the debate about know-how, know-
how stands ready to be repatriated from its epistemological exile.  
 In the next chapter, I expand on these conclusions to expose on a number of 
highly specific meta-philosophical considerations, which show that the expanding 
consequences of engaging with Wittgenstein on matters pertaining to know-how.  I 
explore ways of disempowering a number of critical attempts to undermine 
Wittgenstein’s own, and Wittgensteinian-inspired contributions to, epistemology.  
This is a final preliminary step en route to the creation of a viable and legitimate 
philosophical space for the New Epistemology of Know-How. And it takes us into 
questions about the nature of philosophy itself.  
 
 Some will say that my talk about the concept of knowledge is  
 irrelevant, since this concept as understood by philosophers,  
 while indeed it does not agree with the concept as it is used in  
 everyday speech, still is an important and interesting one, created  
 by a kind of sublimation from the ordinary, rather uninteresting one.   
 But the philosophical concept was derived from the ordinary one  
 through all sorts of misunderstandings, and it strengthens these 
 misunderstandings.  It is in no way interesting, except as a warning.   
          (RPP II, 289) 
  
  
 
* 
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6 
 
The New Epistemology of Know-How 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wittgenstein’s insights offer a number of as yet unexplored, reinvigorating and 
potentially revolutionary contributions to the ongoing philosophical investigations 
into know-how.  Although this realisation is facilitated by non-propositional know-
how understandings of On Certainty, the resources it identifies are by no means 
limited to Wittgenstein’s final writings.  They are to be found in the Investigations, 
and elsewhere; wherever his explorations of our form(s) of life and our normative 
practices are explored.  Given that Wittgenstein’s work cuts across the familiar lines 
of debate rehearsed by the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist confrontation, any 
engagement with his insights offers not merely the possibility of a fresh approach to 
know-how but, as I will argue in the this chapter, the opportunity for what might now 
be called ‘The New Epistemology of Know-How’.  
 The momentum for this New Epistemology of Know-How comes from three 
realisations.  Firstly, as a proper understanding of know-how may well involve 
radically reconsidering what helps ground our empirical propositional knowledge, the 
epistemological investigation of know-how can no longer be a discrete philosophical 
topic, on the sidelines of mainstream of epistemology.  Know-how is no longer 
irrelevant to epistemology’s preoccupation with, and sole focus on, propositional 
knowledge. The possibility that (some of our) know-how and (some of our) 
propositional knowledge are part of an interdependent set of relations, which may be 
part-constitutive of one-another,153 point to the central importance of the 
epistemology of know-how for epistemology in general.  Secondly, a Wittgensteinian 
appreciation of know-how inevitably challenges some of the assumptions and 
principles which are taken for granted by the intellectualist paradigm with which 
naturalized philosophy operates.  In pursuing any Wittgensteinian appreciation of 
                                                
153 I am currently exploring the possibility that the interdependency between (some) know-how and 
(some) know-that is best appreciated in terms of Wittgenstein’s notion of an internal relation.  As 
Hacker explains, “[I]f one severs the internal relations between concepts of As and concepts of Bs and 
abandons the use of concepts of Bs, one is not left with concepts of As, but with something else, which 
may be mere nonsense or may be given a fresh sense.”  (1986, 203) Though Moyal-Sharrock denies the 
internal relation between hinge certainty and empirical knowledge, I believe this is in tension with her 
observation that, “Language and form of life are internally related: to imagine a human language is 
necessarily to imagine a human form of life, a human way of being and acting, which essentially 
involves both our biological make-up and our social behaviour.”  (2007, 6 original emphasis)  
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know-how, one is therefore led to engage with a range of issues wider than the 
epistemology of know-how has so far recognised as pertinent.  One example of this, 
already identified, is the extent to which there are intellectualist commitments built 
into contemporary usage of the term ‘epistemic’.  In this chapter I will also identify 
comparable problems pertaining to the notion of the ‘cognitive’. Thirdly, engaging 
with the potential contributions of Wittgenstein’s insights for the philosophy of know-
how requires some degree of acceptance of the merits of his methods and an 
appreciation of the philosophical worth of descriptive rather than theoretical goals.  
This prompts the opening up of the philosophical debate to various meta-
philosophical questions.  Given that Wittgenstein’s approach is taken to be at odds 
with the methodology of naturalized philosophy, there is a risk that the legitimacy of 
one approach precludes the legitimacy of the other.  Unlike other potential 
contributors to the philosophy of know-how, the entrée of Wittgenstein into this 
particular debate therefore comes with a requirement to engage in meta-philosophical 
reflection.  That said, there is no obvious reason why pause for reflective thought on 
these matters should not be welcome and timely.  The arrival of Wittgenstein into the 
know-how debate thereby not only raises matters pertaining to epistemology in 
general, as well as to the philosophy of know-how, but its potential impact might not 
stop short of our understanding of what philosophy itself is. 
 In this chapter, I argue that not only are Wittgenstein’s potential contributions 
to the epistemology of know-how illuminatingly considered in tandem with the 
potential challenges he makes to the tenets of naturalized philosophy, but that the 
particular philosophical understanding he offers about know-how brings into question 
central features of what Pritchard claims is the, “actual methodology employed by 
analytic epistemologists” (forthcoming a), i.e., reflective equilibrium.  For, as I will 
show, the insights of On Certainty go to the very heart of this reflective equilibrium, 
revealing why it cannot deliver on its own methodological promises, because it 
mistakenly assumes that all our ‘intuitions’ are fact-stating propositions.  But, as 
Wittgenstein appreciates, not everything that looks like a empirical proposition is one; 
sometimes it is the expression of our non-propositional know-how.  If this is the case, 
then the modus operandi of reflective equilibrium may well be inadequate to its own 
task.   
 In what follows, I argue that from the marginalised topic of know-how comes 
a Wittgensteinian contribution that has the potential to be a non-naturalized David to 
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naturalized epistemology’s Goliath. Specifically, I start by articulating a meta-
philosophical comparison between (some of) the key methods and principles of 
Wittgensteinian & Naturalized Philosophy.  In Section 1, I use criticisms of 
Wittgenstein’s methods from John Searle to argue that the latter’s preoccupation with 
philosophical theory (supposedly exemplary of the ambitions of Naturalized 
Philosophy) ultimately struggles to articulate the very notion of theory it claims to 
champion. It is therefore unable to successfully challenge Wittgenstein’s contrasting 
descriptive priorities. Indeed, it is not clear that philosophical theorising isn’t just an 
alternative style of description.  In Section 2, I use criticisms of Wittgenstein’s 
methods offered by Peter Strawson, to show that the commitment to theory is not a 
commitment to a methodology at all, but to the fact that there is a metaphysical reality 
which underpins and thereby validates the practice of philosophical theorising.  Thus 
the apparent methodological criticism is but a disguised philosophical conflict.  In 
Section 3, I look at the practice of reflective equilibrium which Pritchard characterises 
as the methodology of contemporary epistemology. I show that some of the intuitions 
it supposedly uses as its ‘input data’ are already heavily biased intellectualist claims, 
some of which are susceptible to the same kind of re-appraisal that Wittgenstein 
applies to Moore’s truisms.  In Section 4, I suggest that the real merit of reflective 
equilibrium, as a methodology, may be better captured by using Gertrude Conway’s 
notion of reflective awareness, thereby offering a way to a modest rapprochement 
between naturalized and Wittgensteinian philosophical approaches.  In the final 
remarks, I bring together the conclusions of this chapter with those of the last chapter, 
concluding that the move forward to the New Epistemology of Know-How is now 
motivated and available.  
 
* 
 
1 Naturalized Philosophy I:  In Search of a Theory 
 
“I see philosophy not as an a priori propadeutic or groundwork for science, but as 
continuous with it.” (1969, 126)  This is Quine’s unqualified announcement of the 
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guiding principle which informs naturalized philosophy. In the last fifty years or so154 
the mainstream Anglo-American philosophical tradition has not just embraced this 
move but in the words of Hans-Johann Glock, naturalized philosophy has, “achieved 
the status of orthodoxy, especially in the USA.” (2008, 46)  Yet Wittgenstein has 
quite a different idea of what philosophers do and why. “We are not pursuing a 
natural science” he confirms, “our aim is not to predict anything.” (RPP I, 46)  
 Indeed, Wittgenstein’s goals lie elsewhere. “I am aiming at something 
different than are the scientists & my thoughts move differently than do theirs.” (CV, 
9)  In describing his own, “much more homespun way” of reflecting (BT 420), 
Wittgenstein warns that, “there is a “constant danger” of using words like 
‘explanation’, “in a sense that is derived from physics.” (BT 418) Instead, “All 
explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.” (PI §109) 
What Wittgenstein seeks are not theses but, “new comparisons” (CV 16), to help lay 
out, “an overview”, a “surveyable representation” [or “perspicuous presentation”155] 
with which to gain, “that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing 
connections’.” (PI §122, cf. BT 417) This kind of philosophical approach does not 
develop hypotheses aimed at new supposed philosophical truths, rather it seeks a 
clarifying overview of what we struggle to understand.  It strives to articulate the way 
things hang together, to map the, “landscape of conceptual relations,” (CV, 90) and 
thereby help us find our way around.  “Philosophy unties knots in our thinking; hence 
its results must be simple, but philosophising has to be as complicated as the knots it 
unties.” (Z 452, cf., LWP I, 750)    
 The goals, methods and strategies that shape Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
investigations are at odds with the theory-generating and hypotheses-involving 
practices which drive the naturalized philosophical agenda.  Is there any common 
ground on which a philosophical encounter between putative Wittgensteinian 
contributions might engage with contrasting philosophical ‘theses’? Are there any 
shared set of benchmarks on which both meta-philosophical approaches might agree?  
By the end of this chapter, I hope to have teased out a positive answer to this, but in 
order to get there the journey needs to expose the deep chasms which divide these 
                                                
154 I date the start of the Naturalized Philosophical movement to 1959, with Chomsky’s attack on B.F. 
Skinner’s (1957) Verbal Behaviourism, for reasons identified in Section 3.1 below.  
155 G. E. Anscombe’s translation of Philosophical Investigations 3rd Edition Oxford: Blackwell (2001) 
All other citations from the Investigations are from the  (2009) Revised 4th Edition, translated by 
Anscombe, Hacker & Schulte. 
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very different understandings of the nature and methods of philosophy. Even those 
naturalized philosophers who readily acknowledge a respect for Wittgenstein, such as 
John Searle, are at times at a loss to recognise the value in his methods.  Indeed, for 
Searle, “the single most disappointing feature of Wittgenstein’s later work,” (1987, 
342) is his, “aversion to theory.” (1987, 344)  In spurning theory-construction for 
description, Searle charges Wittgenstein with, “waffling in certain crucial areas.” 
(1987, 344)  Searle’s warning is unambiguous: eschew theorizing at your 
philosophical peril.  But is this charge warranted?  I now take a closer look at Searle’s 
own diagnosis as to where and why Wittgenstein has ‘gone wrong’. 
 Searle suggests that Wittgenstein’s spurning of theory-construction is the 
product of, “a series of massive mistakes,” (1987, 343); one group in the philosophy 
of language, the other in the philosophy of mind. In language, Wittgenstein’s 
supposed error is to reject a particular, theoretically amenable, picture of language. 
This is the view (to which Searle himself adheres156) that in every single one of our 
language-games and individual speech acts there is an ever-present, albeit sometimes 
‘transformed’ truth-functional propositional content.  In contrast, Wittgenstein’s 
understands language to be an ability, a normative technique which we language users 
come to master.  Wittgenstein’s own appreciation of language rejects the very thing 
which Searle takes to be impervious to challenge, i.e., the central intellectualist 
assumption that, “Representation is of the essence of language. ” (1987, 344) 
Furthermore, for Searle, Wittgenstein’s ability view blocks any viable theorising 
about the nature of our language. For, according to Searle, it is the representational 
propositionality itself which is what makes possible the provision of, “a general 
theoretical account of how the various modes of representations in different sorts of 
speech acts actually function.” (1987, 344)   
 According to Searle, Wittgenstein is therefore guilty of a double mistake: (i) 
denying the essential representationalism of language and, thereby (ii) ruling out the 
very possibility of theorizing about it.  That propositionality or representational 
semantic content (of some sort) is required for theorising is further evident in Searle’s 
notion of the ‘Background’(1983, 141-159)  This is postulated as the necessary 
condition for the possibility of having intentional states, and therefore cannot itself be 
                                                
156 Other adherents include truth-conditional theorists of meaning, Chomskyan-orientated linguists and 
those philosophers who believe that all philosophically relevant aspects of natural language can be 
captured by some form of predicate calculus or logic, eg. Timothy Williamson. 
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theorised about, for the very reason that it is non-propositional and constituted by 
abilities.157  With this criticism, Searle reveals the extent to which the method of 
investigation dictates the nature of what is being investigated. 
  This representation-hungry notion of ‘theory’ requires a representational 
conception of the explanandum.  In other words, a representation-hungry notion of 
theory requires an (already) intellectualised picture of what one is trying to 
understand. This is, for Searle, married to the task of providing a theory for it. 
Intellectualism and theory-provision are thus two sides of the same naturalized coin.  
And of course, if Searle is right about this, then he is also right that Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical views about language preclude him from theorising about it. 
 The reason Searle gives for Wittgenstein’s supposed antagonism to theoretical 
pursuits is not, of course, the reason Wittgenstein himself eschews theory-generation.  
For Wittgenstein regards scientific theories as typically (i) involving the power to 
make predictions and (ii) confirmable (or discomfirmable) by experimental methods.  
On the first point, it is not clear that the philosophical theories pursued by Searle are 
capable of offering successful predictions.  Indeed, it is not clear just what it is they 
might actually predict. Wittgenstein does not hide the fact that any potential 
prediction would be of little interest anyway, given that that he takes philosophy’s 
goals to be understanding, conceptual clarification and perspicuous presentations, not 
advance warnings.158 
 On the second point, Wittgenstein queries whether the practice of  
philosophical ‘theorising’ is in fact open to experimental confirmation or refutation.  
Announcing that an investigation is theoretical, or labeling it as such, is not yet 
engaging in the various appropriate experimental activities embedded in the quotidian 
methodology of the natural sciences. Both these issues are highlighted in 
Wittgenstein’s reflection on Goethe’s attempts to provide a supposed theory of 
colour: 
 
                                                
157 One might think of Searle’s Background as a kind of naturalized philosopher of mind’s noumenal 
realm.  
158 Although almost of Wittgenstein’s characterisations of philosophy in this chapter are taken from the 
post-Tractarian writings, (see particularly BT Sections 86-93), his insistence that the tasks of 
philosophy and the sciences are radically different is evident already in the Tractatus: “[P]hilosophy is 
not one of the natural sciences.  (The word ‘philosophy’ must mean something whose place is above or 
below the natural sciences, not beside them.) Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.  
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.  A philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations.” (TLP 4.111-4.112) 
172. 
 Goethe’s theory of the constitution of the colours of the spectrum  
 has not proved to be an unsatisfactory theory, rather it really isn’t a  
 theory at all.  Nothing can be predicted with it.  It is, rather, a vague  
 schematic outline of the sort we find in James’s psychology.  Nor is  
 there any experimentum crucis which could decide for or against the  
 theory.  (RC I-70, see also RC III-125) 
 
Although Searle berates Wittgenstein for eschewing theory, is it the case that Searle 
himself is engaged in theory-production? What experimentum crucis will confirm or 
refute Searle’s view (his ‘hypothesis’) that, “representation lies at the heart of nearly 
every single language game”? (1987, 343)  One might imagine Searle responding by 
saying that he is laying the groundwork for some future, as yet unarticulated, 
experimental possibility, but this does not solve the problem as to how an empirical 
experiment is supposed to confirm or refute a conceptual claim.159  These worries 
chime with those expressed by Herman Philipse, who throws down the following 
gauntlet to Searle: 
 
 Is he [Searle] engaging in proto-empirical theory building, as  
 present-day string theorists, are, hoping that his theories will become 
 empirically testable in the near future?  If so, what are the empirical  
 tests he is dimly envisaging for this theories, and what are the  
 predictions he derives from them?  Or is he just proposing a somewhat 
 simplified and systematized picture of how we are using segments of  
 ordinary language, such as words expressing intentional and mental 
 characteristics of human beings?            (2009, 171)   
 
And if Searle is doing just doing that, how different is it to (Wittgensteinian) 
description? Just when is a theory a theory? Searle needs to get more specific about 
what he charges Wittgenstein with failing to deliver, if Wittgenstein’s methods are to 
be found wanting.  One possible answer to what Searle may regard as crucial, can 
                                                
159 Cf., Williamson’s claim that philosophy, like mathematics, is a science with its own particular kind 
of ‘experiment’.  “Much of the philosophical community allows that a judicious act of the imagination 
can refute a previously well-support theory.” (2007, 117) But is this a flexible notion of science or 
experimentation, a redefinition of both, or a transgression of the bounds of sense?  As Hacker points 
out, “[A] thought-experiment is no more an experiment than monopoly money is money.” (2009a, 140, 
fn. 15)    
173. 
perhaps be found in the second ‘mistake’ which Searle accuses Wittgenstein of 
making.   
 In connection with the philosophy of mind, Searle charges Wittgenstein with, 
“the failure to see the importance of the brain for understanding mental phenomena”, 
due to his supposed, “neglect of the fact that causal processes in the brain are 
sufficient for any of our mental phenomena.” (1987, 344 emphasis added)  Here (for 
all his rejection of computationalism in the Chinese Room thought experiment160) 
Searle assumes a picture of the mind which nonetheless embraces several of the 
inviolable tent-poles of the intellectualist paradigm, i.e., the semantic thesis of 
intentionality (the there can be sub-personal representational states with discrete 
semantic content), the collapse of any distinction between co-variance and causality, 
and vehicle reductionism.161 These are not agreed starting points from which to reflect 
on the nature of human mindedness and intelligence, they are already highly 
developed positions about our mindedness and intelligence.  Wittgenstein rejects all 
of these reductionist claims and in so doing, according to Searle, commits his second 
mistake.  For Wittgenstein, however, the consideration of our ‘mental phenomena’ 
concerns those particular capacities, abilities, and skills which we have.  Being 
minded is not some thing we have, but it is a capacity we possess.  Understanding this 
requires attention to our psychological concepts and not the physical nature of our 
brain states.162  Searle is mixing up causal and conceptual connections, again on the 
similar grounds that (only) the former enable the possibility of theorizing.   The take-
home message of Searle’s two criticisms is the same: given that philosophy’s subject-
matter is conceived of in intellectualist terms, it therefore requires intellectualist 
philosophical engagement, and intellectualist philosophical engagement is theoretical.  
Put otherwise: no theory, no philosophical legitimacy.163  
                                                
160 See Searle 1980 (417-419) for Searle’s argument that the mind, albeit representational is not 
computational, on the grounds that “[S]ymbolic manipulations could never be constitutive of mental 
states, because the formal or the syntactical structure of the symbol manipulations could never be by 
itself sufficient to guaranteed the presence of intentional or semantic content.” (2001, 176).  Ironically, 
this very argument might also be exploited against the representationalist picture of the mind which he 
insists is a given. 
161 See Kenny (1989, Chapter 5), Bennett & Hacker (2003) 
162 The task of defeating this position is not the task at hand, though it is a quarry I pursue elsewhere (in 
‘The Intellectualist Paradigm’ MSS).  The task here is to identify the extent to which theory-provision 
is facilitated by, and only works within an intellectualist approach to the mind, language and 
knowledge.  It is therefore unsurprising that a theoretical ‘bringing to heel’ is sought by those eager to 
maintain the intellectualist paradigm.  
163 This point is reminiscent of Rorty’s observation, “From a Wittgensteinian perspective, the approach 
taken by Chomsky and his fellow cognitive scientists look like that taken by the man who searches for 
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 Wittgenstein is not unsympathetic, however, to the powerful ‘call’ of theory-
generation. Indeed he is alert to the extent to which, “One has to regard what appears 
so obviously incomplete, as something complete” when, “renouncing all theory.” 
(RPP 1, 723)  But this acknowledgement throws the ball back into Searle’s court. For 
if philosophical theory-generation is supposed to complete that which description 
supposedly leaves ‘unfinished’, and this is not a matter of providing predictions or 
experimental confirmation or refutation, then just what is it that remains outstanding?  
As Searle is not forthcoming with an answer to these questions, one might respond on 
his behalf that philosophical theorizing is not so much philosophical theory-
generation, itself, but is rather a matter of exploiting the findings of cognitive 
scientific theories.164 But as Moyal-Sharrock points out, “If attention is to be paid by 
philosophy to science, shouldn’t it be to scientific results rather than to scientific 
hypotheses that seem nourished by a preconception of how things must be.” 
(forthcoming a, original emphasis)   Those (limited) attempts by naturalized 
philosophers to justify the theoretical status or credentials of their own candidate 
‘theories’ risk reducing the notion of a philosophical theory to some ersatz version of 
its scientific namesake.  At which point, the gulf between philosophical theory and 
description fails to look particularly substantial. 
 Furthermore, Wittgenstein may set aside hypothesis generation and theory 
production, but he is nonetheless eager to pursue what he thinks such faux theories 
may, in part, be aiming at.  Indeed he suggests that what is often wanted from a theory 
would be better achieved by alternative methods.  What is wanted in the case of 
colour, is not a theory, but rather “the logic of our colour concepts” (RC I-22, RC III-
188)  What is actually sought is not an explanation that will enable prediction, but an 
answer to the kind of ‘why’ question which provides a suitable, “analogy” in virtue of 
which, “the phenomenon no longer stands alone, it is connected with others and we 
feel reassured.” (LW II, 86)  There is no principled reason why theory-eschewing 
description should not be illuminating, and substantial.  Moreover, in science itself, 
these ‘alternative’ results are often extraordinarily powerful. “The real achievement of 
a Copernicus or a Darwin was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new 
                                                                                                                                       
his missing keys under the lamp-post, not because he dropped them near there but because the light is 
better.” (2004, 221) 
164 I follow Thagard’s definition, “Cognitive science involves at least six integral disciplines: 
psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology and artificial intelligence.” (2009, 
242)  
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point of view.” (CV 26)  Indeed, the fecundity of the latter seems inexhaustible.  The 
meta-philosophical point here is that fresh perspectives and perspicuous presentations 
of the conceptual landscape are themselves substantial philosophical achievements.   
 It is not only in the philosophical arenas of mind and language that the cri de 
coeur of ‘theory’ can be heard. Epistemology is now standardly regarded not as a 
particular subject area of study, but a theory.  Pritchard & Blaaw’s mini-encyclopedia 
entry on epistemology immediately announces that epistemology is, “Also referred to 
as ‘theory of knowledge’,” (1997, 197) and Pritchard’s article The Methodology of 
Epistemology refers repeatedly to both the “specific epistemological task” and the 
“contemporary epistemology project” of “offering a theory of knowledge.” 
(forthcoming, a)165  These examples may, however, be using the notion of theory in a 
more deflationary sense.  As Ray Monk points out, there is a not unfamiliar non-
philosophical usage of the term ‘theory’ which is roughly interchangeable with, and 
“means nothing more than ‘view’ or ‘opinion’.” (2009, 136)  Indeed, in contemporary 
epistemology, the term ‘theory’ seems to oscillate between this modest usage, i.e., as 
a loose synonym for opinion, and the full-throttled Searleian scientifico-naturalistic 
exploitation; though it is not often clear which one is in play.166 But Searle’s charge 
looks to demand more than just a notion of theory which holds it to be synonymous 
with opinion, so this option is not helpful. 
 Although Searle’s charge seeks to contrast two radically opposing approaches, 
Searle’s preference for theory comes with a name-tag and a set of particular  
philosophical commitments but just what it is as a method remains surprisingly 
unclear.  At the same time, despite Wittgenstein’s rejection of the pursuit of what he 
understands as theorising, he does clarify what he takes a theory to consist in, and 
suggests its ambitions are perhaps better pursued by alternative routes.  So whilst a 
number of comparable goals may have been identified, the force of Searle’s ‘theory or 
                                                
165 Cf. Paul Moser’s overview of the 20th century epistemology which opens, “Epistemology is the 
theory of knowledge, the philosophical study of the nature, origin and scope of knowledge.” (1997, 
197)  This is just one a dozens of examples. 
166 Cf. Hacker (2006) for a reconstruction of the Quineian notion of ‘theory’, which is conceived as an 
alternative to human (general) knowledge, and involves construing all our knowledge (from ‘the cat is 
on the mat’ to the theses of the natural sciences) as the theoretical ‘output’ of our sensory ‘input.’  In 
this sense all claims to knowledge are theoretical.  This is not Monk’s suggestion, but it does point to 
the difficulties inherent in the naturalized philosophical method and its theoretical approach to all our 
familiar notions; a view that, inevitably, creates an epistemological gap between our knowledge and 
what it is of.   See Ayer (1973) for the recent empirical origins of this view, and an example of a 
reading On Certainty from such a perspective.  “Our judgements about what there is are always 
embedded in some theory.” (1973, 245 emphasis added) 
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waffle’ criticism would seem to come from rhetoric alone.167  Perhaps the gulf 
between them is not that big after all?  Or perhaps there is a fundamental commitment 
that cannot be bridged, but has yet to be identified?  Might it be that this clash, 
supposedly over methodology, is actually about metaphysics? 
 
2 Naturalized Philosophy II:  Safe-guarding the Metaphysics 
 
One possible explanation as to why Searle regards theory as philosophically 
preferable to description is that the former offers the kind of account which operates 
on two levels, whereas the latter does (or need) not.  Re-considering the supposed 
‘mistakes’ Searle discerns in Wittgenstein’s approaches to language and mind, one 
realises that the latter are not driven by the ambition to provide some kind of dual-
level account; unlike those of Searle.  Of course, pointing out that a theory is a dual-
level account looks to be nothing more than an innocuous way of saying an explanans 
is sought for an explanandum.  But a closer look at the specific characterisations 
which Searle offers, in both language and mind, reveals that there is more to it than 
that.  For what appears to guarantee that an explanans is suitably theoretical is that it 
accounts for the observable phenomenon, the explanandum, by the postulation of 
unobservables.  (In the philosophy of language this is the supposed ever-present 
propositional content, and in mind, the supposed sub-personal, brain-encoded 
representational postulates which are deemed sufficient for our intelligent practices.)  
On Searle’s understanding of the notion of theory, then, a theory is not just a dual-
level account, but one which explains the observable by the unobservable, the open-
to-view by the underlying and/or the public by the private or inaccessible.  Its 
theoretical legitimacy comes from the twin presence of (i) a dual-level structure, and 
(ii) an unobservable postulate at the ‘lower’ level.  It is not, therefore, any putative 
predictive power or the possibility of its being justified (or refuted) by some 
experimentum crucis, which makes a theory a theory but this involvement of a dual-
level account part-constituted by second-level unobservable explanatory postulates. 
 This invites the question: what is the nature and status of the unobservable, 
hidden, underlying, private, or inaccessible postulates?  If the answer is something 
                                                
167 Cf., Cottingham (2009) who argues that contemporary academia not only encourages the rhetoric of 
natural scientific methodology but demands it. He insists that is now no longer possible to be honest 
about one’s philosophical methods as a philosopher (i.e. reading books and thinking about ideas) if one 
hopes to get ‘research’ (sic) funding.  
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which cannot be established (or ruled out) by standard scientific experiment, and 
which does not serve to generate predictions, then the unobservable second level and 
its putative contents are metaphysical.  Thus, like science, philosophical theories offer 
a dual-level explanations, but unlike science, their explanans are metaphysical.  
Naturalized philosophy, understood in this way, gets to keep (some of) its scientific 
credentials whilst maintaining its own philosophical raison d’être.  Of course, Searle 
might object that my diagnosis is merely a Just-So Story, but in the absence of 
clarification of what Searle means by a philosophical theory, it is hard to see where it 
might be faulted as a description of what is actually going on in naturalized 
philosophy’s ‘theory-provision’.168 
 With Strawson’s help, I now argue that the primary task of so-called 
naturalized philosophical ‘theorizing’ is to protect a metaphysical ontology, without 
which naturalized philosophy would lose its rationale.  I exploit the work of Peter 
Strawson to help with this task for a number of interconnected reasons: (i) like Searle 
he has a great deal of respect for Wittgenstein, and so criticisms from him are more 
thoughtful and targeted than the more obvious dismissive barbs one might select 
from, say, Fodor; (ii) Strawson’s methods and principles are acknowledged 
(Pritchard, forthcoming a) to be operative in those of contemporary epistemology; (iii) 
my own reading of Pritchard’s work, in general, detects a Strawsonian ancestry, and I 
think that the issues raised below also pertain to any general understanding of 
epistemological externalism; and (iv) given (i)-(iii), Strawson’s work provides a 
uniquely pertinent historical thread with which to weave together the past and the 
present, the Wittgensteinian and the naturalized.  In so doing it offers the opportunity 
                                                
168 I take this characterisation of naturalized theory-provision to apply to the work of Stanley and 
Bengson & Moffett.  Its original entry into the specific realm of epistemology can be seen in a variety 
of papers in the wake of Quine (1969), such as Stephen Stich’s classic Belief and Sub-Doxastic States. 
(1978) In this paper, Stich claims there is a, “heterogeneous collection of psychological states that play 
a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs, though they are not beliefs themselves.” (1978, 499).  
Instead such states are supposedly, “sub-doxastic states representing the information that...” (1978, 
509)  In these earlier days of naturalized epistemology, there were momentary qualms about the very 
possibility of a presumed sub-personal theoretical postulate but these were soon overcome by the rising 
tide of and enthusiasm for A.I. and cognitive science in general. As Stich confirms, “Though talk of 
[sub-personal] states representing facts is difficult to explicate in a philosophically tolerable way, it is 
surprisingly easy to master intuitively.  Even the barest introduction to work in artificial intelligence 
and cognitive simulation quickly leaves one comfortable with attributions of content or 
representational status to the states of an information processing theory. (1978, 510 emphasis added)  
This is further evidence of the intellectualism that is constitutive of naturalized philosophy of language, 
mind and knowledge and intelligence.  And its inescapeable propositionality. 
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to reveal not merely what separates these two very different philosophical approaches, 
but what might connect them. 
 In Individuals, Strawson characterises his descriptive metaphysics as a method 
that uses language to understand human phenomenon; a strategy that does not look 
that far removed from Wittgenstein’s own methods.  There comes a point, however, 
where considering language can go no further.  The reason being, Strawson claims, is 
that there are, “general elements of structure [of the world] which the metaphysician 
wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of 
language, but lies submerged.” (1959, 10 emphasis added)   So not only does the 
metaphysician start with the tenet that there is something beneath the surface (some 
explanatory powerful unobservable hidden); what this is, is metaphysical rather than 
physical. Furthermore, it is the task of philosophical theory to unearth and expose it. 
To reject theory is, for Strawson, tantamount to rejecting the starting supposition that 
there are metaphysical facts and truths which it is the task of theory to uncover.   
 When characterising Wittgenstein’s more descriptive pursuits, Strawson 
suggests that Wittgenstein is (mistakenly) urging philosophers, “[D]on’t look for 
anything underlying… Don’t try for a general theory.”  (1992, 27 emphasis added).  
This reveals the extent to which for Strawson, as for Searle, a theory just is that which 
appeals to the ‘underlying’.  Unlike Searle, however, Strawson makes it very clear 
that for him the underlying (or submerged) is metaphysical, and that it is in refusing to 
engage with this supposed second theoretical and metaphysical level that leaves one 
failing to philosophise.  No metaphysics, no philosophy.  I suggest that this is not just 
Strawson’s view, but it also plausibly characterises the motivation behind Searle’s 
dictum: no theory, no philosophy.169 
 For Wittgenstein, however, the very assumption that there is a hidden 
metaphysical level which the right kind of philosophico-scientific theory will access, 
and thereby be able to solve our philosophical problems, is actual the source of those 
problems, not their solution. “Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain… For anything that might be hidden is of no interest go us.” (BT 418 
emphasis added)  This is not, of course, to suggest that the natural sciences are to be 
made redundant, but the observation that what they do is not what philosophy does do 
or should do. Conceptual clarification, philosophy’s proper task is not a matter of 
                                                
169 One might be tempted to add on behalf of Wittgenstein, no metaphysics: no need for philosophy. 
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postulating some unseen metaphysical something or other.  It is about understanding 
what is in front of us, but struggle to get a comprehensive and illuminating overview 
of.  For Wittgenstein, what one might be tempted to think of as the metaphysical 
features of the world are confusions born of the misguided mixing of empirical and 
conceptual matters.170   
 Thus, what appears to be a meta-philosophical discussion about the merits, or 
otherwise, of theory over description is actually a disguised philosophical argument 
about the status of metaphysics. The seeming meta-philosophical debate camouflages 
the conflicting positions of those who seek to discover metaphysical truths (like 
Strawson and Searle) and those (Wittgenstein and Hacker) who not only think this is 
chasing a mirage, but that the mirage is of their own making.171  Furthermore, as the 
operative notion of a theory is taken for granted, so too is the supposed fact of 
metaphysics.  What I am arguing here is not that there is no metaphysical level 
(though I agree with Wittgenstein that there isn’t), but rather than there is a symbiotic 
relation between the provision of a philosophical theory and the presumption of a 
metaphysical underpinning.  A dual-level structured account not only permits 
metaphysics, it engenders it.  It is therefore unsurprising that the pursuit of 
philosophical theories are deemed a necessary requirement for any philosophical 
agenda which shares Strawson’s confessed ambition to, “keep our metaphysics 
warm.” (1985, 62)    
 
2.1 Connective Analysis 
 
What is surprising and what may be a possible objection to this line of attack is to be 
found in Strawson’s own preferred method of analysis which, at first glance, looks 
thoroughly Wittgensteinian in spirit and detail.  Here is Strawson’s characterisation of 
what he terms ‘connective analysis’: 
 
 Let us imagine, instead, a model of an elaborate network, a system,  
 of connected items, concepts, such that the function of each item,  
                                                
170 Cf., Baker & Hacker (2009) particularly Chapter VII: Grammar and Necessity 241-370 and Baker 
& Hacker (2005) Chapter XIV: Philosophy 271-303.  Also Hacker (1996), (2009a) (2010), (2011a), 
(2011b) Kenny (2009) and Moyal-Sharrock (2007) and (forthcoming a). 
171 Cf., Hacker’s characterisation of metaphysics as, “a non-subject that rests on a confusion and 
conflation of empirical and conception questions.” (2010, 285 emphasis added)  “Philosophy… cannot 
discover metaphysical truths about the world – for there are none to discover.” (2009, 147) 
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 each concept, could from the philosophical point of view,  
 be properly understood only by grasping its connections with  
 the others, its place in the system – perhaps better still, the picture  
 of a set of interlocking systems of such a kind.” (1992, 19) 
 
This looks to capture much of Wittgenstein’s own approach to mapping the logical or 
grammatical terrain of our conceptual landscape.  Indeed, as Hacker acknowledges, 
“the felicitous term, ‘connective analysis’… is wholly appropriate for the later 
Wittgenstein’s style of analysis.” (Baker & Hacker, 2009, 49 fn. 7). Yet though 
Strawson declares that he is engaged in just such conceptual analysis, he worries (in 
the first instance about Ryle’s approach) that conceptual geography remains 
“uncomfortably metaphorical.” (1992, 3) What is the difference between Ryle and 
Wittgenstein’s notion of connective analysis and Strawson’s own method?  The 
answer is that whereas Ryle and Wittgenstein resist the siren call of metaphysics, for 
Strawson, it is not until connective analysis, or its associate methods elucidation and 
mapping, are engaged in the supposedly proper theoretical business of pursuing dual-
level metaphysical explanations, that they are properly philosophical methods. 
Connective analysis and elucidation are, for Strawson, techniques for gaining access 
to the underlying core of “natural metaphysics” (1985, 29) The kind of mapping he 
favours, is not Ryle’s or Wittgenstein’s single-level cartography, 172  but the, 
“mapping of a personal story on to the corresponding physical story.” (1985, 57) The 
entirely un-Wittgensteinian spirit of this can be seen in Strawson’s claim that it is, 
“reasonable to draw a conclusion that is commonly drawn… namely, that each 
particular mental event or state belonging to a personal history has a particular 
physical basis or is physically realized (as the phrase goes) in a particular physical 
event or state belonging to the corresponding physical history.” (1985, 57) Here 
Strawson’s view connects back with the Searle’s view of what understanding mind 
‘should’ be engaged with.  But again, this is not a physical (natural scientific) method 
which is open to refutation, it is a picture of our mindedness (and our intelligence) 
which keeps the metaphysics bubbling away. 
                                                
172 Ryle christens “a favourite procedure” of Wittgenstein’s, “the tea-tasting method.”  For, “Tea-tasters 
do not lump their samples into two or three comprehensive types.  Rather they savour each sample and 
try to place it next door to its closest neighbours, and this not in respect of just one discriminable 
quality, but along the lengths of various lines of qualities.” (1951, 7) 
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 Furthermore, it is not obvious how Strawson’s insistence that his philosophy 
exemplifies connective as opposed to reductive analysis might be supported.173  At 
best, it risks being disingenuous, at worst, it is a matter of substantial misdirection.  
But given that Strawson characterises this kind of (at least partially, reductive) 
elucidation as both the method and the goal of the “connective metaphysical task” 
(1985, 27) there seems no other conclusion to draw.  Inevitably, this approach is in 
obvious tension with Goethe’s maxim which Wittgenstein approvingly cites, “Don’t 
look for anything behind the phenomena; they themselves are the theory.” (RPP I, 
889)174  Once again, the apparently meta-philosophical debate over methodology is 
camouflaging a philosophical antagonism over the possibility of metaphysical truths.   
 In his original review of the Philosophical Investigations, however, Strawson 
unhesitatingly concludes that Wittgenstein’s views are, “of the greatest interest and 
importance. But the value of the book as a model of philosophical method is greater 
still.” (1954, 99 emphasis added)  Yet when it comes to translating these methods into 
the reality of his own philosophical practices, Strawson still wonders, if it might be 
possible to, “make room for a purged kind of metaphysics with modest and less 
disputable claims than the old.” (1954, 78)  Yet again, it would seem that it is not the 
methods that meta-philosophy is disputing; it is the results that they produce, and the 
commitments they protect.  There appears to be no Archimedean point from which to 
provide a meta-philosophical argument for the merits of doing naturalized philosophy 
as opposed to pursuing a more Wittgensteinian activity (or vice versa).  What there is, 
however, is the possibility that it is the philosophy itself which provides the sought-for 
meta-philosophical justification or authority.  As such, legitimising the value of any 
method  is not a prequel to selecting or valuing a philosophical method, rather it is a 
consequence of it.  
 I complete this section by considering one philosophical example from 
Strawson to highlight the contrast between naturalized and Wittgensteinian 
approaches.  It provides a concrete example of the foregoing discussion, as well as 
bringing to bear some of the Wittgensteinian insights from the last chapter on a key 
                                                
173 Indeed, Pritchard similarly equivocates around the notion of reductionism. On the one hand 
“elucidation” is sometimes “more informative than a reductive analysis” , yet it is one of the chief tools 
of contemporary epistemology, which is “focused on offering a completely reductive analysis of 
knowledge.” (forthcoming a) 
174 Elizabeth Stopp’s (1998) Penguin edition translation of Goethe’s Maxims & Reflections offers the 
even more apposite: “Don’t go looking for anything beyond phenomena: they are themselves what they 
teach, the doctrine.” (Maxim 575) 
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Strawsonian presumption; thereby also playing a important role in setting the scene 
for upcoming discussion on reflective equilibrium. 
 In Analysis and Metaphysics, Strawson regards it as self-evident that, “It is 
true that p if and only if p,” is a, “fact that calls for explanation.” (1992, 90)  Strawson 
offers us no reasons, however, (i) why this sentence is a fact, when it appears quite 
different from an empirical fact which might be established by observation; (ii) what 
an ‘explanation’ of it might be aiming to explain or clarify; and (iii) what makes this a 
quintessentially a philosophical issue, problem, or task.  
 Whereas thanks to Wittgenstein’s investigations into ‘Here [waving] is a hand’ 
in On Certainty, ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ need not be assumed to be a 
empirical fact-stating proposition.  For not everything that looks like a proposition is 
one.175  Although Strawson’s example is not one of the sentences Wittgenstein 
discusses, I would suggest that like ‘Here [waving] is a hand’, it is nonetheless, part-
constitutive of the framework, the methods of inquiry which make possible the 
ascertaining of our empirical knowledge. ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ is the 
expression of a grammatical rule, or standard.  It licenses the move from, say, ‘It is 
true that the London hosted the 2012 Summer Olympics’ to ‘London hosted the 2012 
Summer Olympics’, or from ‘Rio di Janeiro is already preparing for the 2016 Summer 
Olympics’ to ‘It is true that Rio di Janeiro is already preparing for the 2016 Summer 
Olympics.’  Our knowledge of ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ is not the 
propositional knowledge-that of some fact, it is the know-how that is correctly 
exemplified in our linguistic move from ‘It is true that this body-part is a hand’, to 
‘This body-part is a hand.’   
 Strawson’s view that ‘It is true that p if and only if p’ is a fact, is a proposition 
and can be known, is, of course, the very epistemicist176 position Pritchard holds about 
so called ‘hinge propositions’.  So the philosophical positions of both Strawson and 
Pritchard are reflections of their meta-philosophical commitments (for the former) 
                                                
175 To be clear, on Pritchard’s reading of the relevant passages in On Certainty he does not argue for, 
nor is he committed to the view that, “everything that looks like a proposition is one”.  (Cf., 2011a, §2)  
Indeed, in the specific case of “There are physical objects” he is willing to grant this apparent 
proposition is nonsense.  That said, the argument of this thesis does not turn on the features of such so-
called ‘universal hinges’, (Moyal-Sharrock, 2007, Chapter 5), but is limited to such ‘linguistic hinges’ 
as ‘This is a hand’. (See my section 5.2 above.) And Pritchard does not doubt that such sentences as 
‘This is a hand’ have sense; indeed his own Neo-Moorean Epistemicist Reading of On Certainty 
requires that they not be nonsense. (This point also serves also as a reminder that Pritchard is not 
seeking to offer a full interpretation or exposition of On Certainty, as already noted in footnote 143.) 
176 Bearing in mind the qualification regarding epistemicism, introduced in footnote 140. 
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about philosophy in general, and (for the latter) about epistemology in particular.  To 
what extent, then, might reflective equilibrium help or hinder any engagement with a 
Wittgensteinian method (in general) and a Wittgensteinian appreciation of know-how 
(in particular.)  A closer look at reflective equilibrium is now required. 
 
 
3 Reflective Equilibrium by the Light of Naturalized Philosophy 
 
Reflective equilibrium is, very briefly, both a methodology and a methodological 
ambition. It is the task (and result aimed at) of bringing our judgements, intuitions, 
individual beliefs and guiding principles, into a coherent and thereby warranted 
whole.  It is a discriminatory activity of dynamic evaluation; which John Rawls 
describes as a, “going back and forth.” (1971, 20)  “Equilibrium” is reached, Rawls 
declares, “because at last our principles and judgements coincide,” and the process is, 
“reflective… since we know to what principles our judgements conform and the 
premises of their derivation.” (1971, 20)   
 According to Duncan Pritchard,177 this reflective equilibrium is not only a 
generally applicable philosophical method, it is the method of contemporary analytic 
epistemology.178  In pursuing reflective equilibrium, today’s epistemologist goes back 
and forth reflecting, refining, and sometimes rejecting, his or her intuitions in the 
pursuit of a “stable theory” of knowledge. But where Rawls makes it plain that part of 
the ‘raw material’ under consideration are principles, and thus some kind of rules, 
standards or norms, Pritchard’s characterisation of reflective equilibrium has no place 
for principles qua rules, standards or norms.179  In the context of his own self-
                                                
177 All unspecified citations from Pritchard in this section are from his (forthcoming, a); The 
Methodology of Epistemology. 
178 Pritchard’s paper mentions no exceptions to this generalization other than the target group of 
contrasting ‘experimental’ philosophers that motivates his paper.  Epistemologist Timothy Williamson 
does not, however, share Pritchard’s views on the merits of reflective equilibrium, regarding it as 
lacking in the desired rigour. He argues that whilst superficially analogous to the, “mutual adjustment 
of theory and observation in natural science” (2007, 244), given that he regards philosophy as an 
“evidence-based discipline,” (2007, 246) too little has been clarified about the nature of ‘evidence’ 
supposedly offered by intuitions. Pritchard’s paper might usefully be regarded as a response to the 
gauntlet Williamson throws down.  
179 This is not to be confused with an alternative notion of ‘norm’ which is operative in contemporary 
epistemology and is not a grammatical rule or norm of description (such as ‘This [waving] is hand’ or 
‘This ☞is red’) but is hypothetical prescriptive generalization, usually taking the form, ‘You ought to 
do A if B.’  One example is the so-called ‘knowledge norm of assertion’, i.e.,  “You ought only to 
assert that p if you know that p”. But this isn’t a rule or norm that is constitutive of any of our 
normative practices (which is the way in which I, following Wittgenstein, understand and am using the 
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professed epistemicism, and the view that (following Strawson) everything that looks 
like a fact-stating, knowable proposition is one, there is no distinction to be had 
between descriptions and norms of description.  In reflective equilibrium the raw 
material, i.e., the “input data” or “intuitions” on which an epistemologist goes to 
work, are thus entirely constituted by a collection of fact-stating, propositional 
knowledge-candidates, which are all either true or false (in virtue of the way the 
world actually is.)  There are no rules used in order to refine and reject beliefs as 
either true or false.  The epistemologist is supposed to use his or her, “critical and 
logical acumen” together with, “a healthy dose of ingenuity” in order to “square” the 
“data”.  But yet, a closer look at the intuitions which Pritchard identifies, and 
helpfully taxonomises, reveals a number of intuitions which many which ‘non-
epistemicist’ readings would argue are neither fact-stating, nor (ultimately) 
propositional.  The insights of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty are now potentially 
applicable at a meta-philosophical level.   
 In characterising the ‘input’ on which epistemology’s process of reflective 
equilibrium works, Pritchard discriminates four different kinds of intuitions: the 
extensional, intensional, general and linguistic.  Specifically, they are (i) “extensional 
intuitions”, i.e., judgements as to whether or not particular examples are actually 
knowledge, e.g., Gettier-style cases; (ii) “intensional intuitions”, e.g. “Knowledge that 
p entails p,” or “S’s knowledge that p entails S believes that p”; (iii) “general 
intuitions” e.g. “that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief”; and (iv) 
“linguistic intuitions” i.e., “intuitions about the correct linguistic usage of the target 
term.”   
 Alert to the non-propositional readings of On Certainty (and other 
Wittgensteinian insights) one is now in a position to offer the following alternative 
observations.  Regarding (i) extensional intuitions, that is intuitions about whether or 
not a, say, Gettier-style case is a case of knowledge, there need be no fact of the 
matter.  With extreme, unexpected, or unanticipated cases, there need be, as yet, no 
rule that yet determines whether any particular example is to be correctly 
characterised as knowledge. If knowledge is a family resemblance concept then 
determining whether a particular case if a member of the conceptual family may 
                                                                                                                                       
term).  There is also an entirely different notion of normative in the work of John Greco, which I fail to 
understand.  See Greco (2005) for the suggestion that ‘normative’ is a synonym for ‘pertaining to 
value’, or which may mean “intellectually better” (2005, 257) 
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change depending on the situation and purpose to hand, and the general evolution of 
our normative linguistic practices.  Our conceptual scheme is flexible. Although 
Pritchard does not announce in this particular paper whether he construes extensional 
intuitions as epistemicist (or not), there is no reason to think that this is not the case. 
In which case, extensional intuitions are to be regarded as capturing the facts of the 
world (unmediated by any norms of representation or conceptual schemes).  Thus in 
the very act of identifying extensional intuitions it looks like there is already a 
metaphysical underpinning built into epistemological reflective equilibrium. Not only 
is this a move away from Rawls’ original conception, it suggests that reflective 
equilibrium is not a neutral but an intellectualist, methodology. 
 Regarding (ii) intensional intuitions, such as ‘Knowledge that p entails p’. I 
would refer to the point made above, in connection with Strawson’s consideration of 
‘It is true that p if and only if p’.  For in characterising the examples of intensional 
intuitions Pritchard follows Strawson’s view that they are fact-stating propositions. 
This ignores any reflection on the possibility or potential relevance of grammatical 
propositions or rules, etc.  Again it appears epistemicist, and as such suggests the 
further embedding of a metaphysical underpinning.180  So too with (iv) linguistic 
intuitions.  Yet, as explored in the previous chapter, linguistic hinges, such as ‘Here 
[waving] is a hand’, (which might reasonably be regarded as an example of one of 
Pritchard’s linguistic intuitions) might be understood as expressions of non-
propositional rules of grammar, or norms of description.  From a Wittgensteinian 
perspective, these are not metaphysical facts in the world (for there are none), nor are 
they descriptions of the way the world is.  They are the norms of descriptions that 
provide the conceptual scheme which make it possible, through our language mastery, 
to describe the way the world is.  What though of (iii) the general intuitions?   
 Rather than focus on the example Pritchard gives (that knowledge is more 
valuable than true belief) I will instead consider his so-called ‘ability intuition’ which 
he has elsewhere (2009) and (2010) identified as one of the master intuitions about 
(propositional) knowledge. As a supposed master intuition, I presume it might be 
                                                
180 Pritchard also refers to “deep-seated” intensional attitudes or intuitions as “intensional platitudes”, 
but again one may think that (some of these) overlap with Moorean truisms, which on a non-
propositional understanding of Wittgenstein, are a kind of non-propositional know-how.  I anticipate 
Pritchard will be pursuing the connection between intensional platitudes and his own account of hinge 
‘propositions’ in future, though it should be noticed that he follows Quine in accepting the possibility 
that, “any particular intensional platitude is not immune to revision” (forthcoming a), whereas for 
Moyal-Sharrock ‘universal hinges’ are not giveupable.  
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uncontentiously taken to be an example of the kind of general intuition which 
reflective equilibrium seeks to ‘square’ as part of its method of epistemological theory 
generation.   
   According to Prichard, the ability intuition is the intuition that knowledge (and 
by that Pritchard always refers to propositional knowledge), “is true belief that is due 
to cognitive ability in some way. ” (2009, 414)  This is sometimes articulated as the 
view that (propositional) “knowledge is the product of cognitive ability” (2010, 134) 
or that (propositional) “knowledge involves cognitive ability” (2010, 133).  It is, 
Pritchard announces, “an adequacy condition on any theory of [propositional] 
knowledge” that “the ability intuition” be accommodated. (2010, 135)   But what are 
we to understand by a ‘cognitive ability’?181  And, crucially, for the philosophy of 
know-how, might it be comparable to, or even in some sense, the same as, a kind of 
know-how?   Given that one of Wittgenstein’s potential contributions to epistemology 
is his insight that all empirical propositional knowledge is enabled by a kind of non-
propositional know-how, might it be that Pritchard is arriving at exactly the same 
appreciation with his intuition concerning the importance of ‘cognitive ability’.  
Might, with this particular example, we have found a point of contact between the 
naturalized approach and the Wittgensteinian approach that will usher new 
possibilities for mutual understanding?  All roads now point to the question:  Is know-
how cognitive?  Is know-how a cognitive ability?   
 To answer this question, and thereby to expose the similarities and differences 
between the ability intuition and know-how requires an understanding of the term 
‘cognitive’.  But as I will now argue, the term ‘cognitive’ (like the ‘epistemic’) is not 
as innocuous as it might appear.  Until the prohibitions that it entrenches are exposed, 
the constraints on answering the above questions cannot be fully appreciated. To 
reveal just these difficulties (as a precursor to a full appreciation of the limitations of 
reflective equilibrium) I turn to the instigator of this intellectualist shift: Noam 
Chomsky.  
 
(See over page) 
 
                                                
181 For Pritchard a cognitive ability is, “a belief-forming process which is reliable” and which is 
“integrated within, and therefore part of, the cognitive character of the agent, where the agent’s 
cognitive character is her integrated web of stable belief-forming processes.” (2010, 136)   
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3.1  Chomsky’s Shuffle182 
 
In reviewing B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour, Chomsky simultaneously attacks 
Skinner’s behaviorist methodology, introduces his own radically different approach to 
language, and re-characterises our language use and understanding, and our intelligent 
behaviour in general, in terms of information processing over sub-personal 
representations. “One would naturally expect that the prediction of the behavior of a 
complex organism (or machine) would require in addition to information about 
external stimulation, knowledge of the internal structures of the organism, the way in 
which it processes input information and organizes its own behaviour. (1959, 27 
emphasis added).  Knowing how to speak and understand our native tongue is thus 
introduced as an explanandum, but one already characterised in a fully intellectualist 
way. And like Searle and Strawson above, it demands an unobservable set of hidden 
explanatory postulates which whilst providing no predictions and being invulnerable 
to confirmation or refutation by experiment, do offer a dual-level metaphysically 
amenable ‘theory’. 
  Our human language use and understanding is, for Chomsky, to be 
understood as the information-processing of a machine. “[K]nowing a language” is a 
matter of, “the “computational” aspects of language – that is, the rules that form 
syntactic construction of phonological or semantic patterns” which are “represented 
in the mind and brain.” (1980, 54 emphasis added). Crucial to this picture is a 
stipulative redefinition of the term ‘cognitive’, in which the word is turned into a 
technical term.  One consequence of this is that (as with ‘epistemic’) it has become 
unclear how to engage with the question: Is know-how cognitive?   A fortiori attempts 
                                                
182 I take this characterisation from Ryle who uses the term ‘shuffle’ to describe a general manoeuvre 
of his intellectualist opponents. When writing The Concept of Mind Ryle’s opponents obviously did not 
include Chomsky, but his criticisms are entirely applicable to Chomksy’s own strategy (and indeed to 
much in epistemological externalism and naturalized philosophy in general.)  “There is a not 
unfashionable shuffle which tries to circumvent these considerations by saying that the intelligent 
reasoner who has not been taught logic knows the logicians' formulae "implicitly" but not "explicitly"; 
or that the ordinary virtuous person has "implicit" but not "explicit" knowledge of the rules of right 
conduct, the skillful but untheoretical chess-player " implicitly" acknowledges a lot of strategic and 
tactical maxims, though he never formulates them and might not recognise them if they were imparted 
to him by some Clausewitz of the game.  This shuffle assumes that knowledge-how must be reducible 
to knowledge-that, while conceding that no operations of acknowledging-that need be actually found 
occurring. It fails to explain how, even if such acknowledgements did occur, their maker might still be 
a fool in his performance”.  (1946, 7-8 emphasis added)   Ryle’s characterisation of an intellectualist 
shuffle which embraces the implicit and sub-personal, is a prescient characterisation of the move 
Chomsky was to make within a few years. (And that Quine, Goldman, Stich et al continued.)  
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to grapple with the question: Is Pritchard’s cognitive ability one and the same as 
know-how? are even more problematic.  
 I now explain how this move was made, and introduce some of the constraints 
and commitments that are consequent on it. Very briefly, Chomsky’s original theory 
of language acquisition and ability turns on the idea that humans are born with a 
‘Universal Grammar’.  This ‘initial state’, which incorporates the fundamental 
structure of all languages, is to be regarded as a brain-located language ‘faculty’ 
which grows into its mature ‘steady state’.  The mature steady state is constituted by 
our specific language’s ‘generative grammar’, which is represented in the 
‘mind/brain’ and which provides the information-bearing representations that we 
process, or compute, and the rules183 for so doing. All this happens at the sub-personal 
level, “far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness.” (1965, 8).  It 
not only explains what it is to know a language, it is what we know when we know a 
language.  We human beings sub-personally ‘know’ the rules and representations that 
are the ‘mental states’ that comprise the ‘steady state’ of our ‘generative grammar’.   
 This sketch of Chomsky’s view uses a variety of familiar terms, typically used 
as non-technical characterisations of features or activities of people, at a personal 
level.  Chomsky however uses them to characterise features or activities at a sub-
personal level. Alert to the awkwardness of using the term ‘know’ about something 
going on at a subpersonal level, inaccessible to reflective awareness, he deliberately 
introduces the term ‘cognize’ as a way round the potential terminological problems: 
 
 I have been speaking of “knowing English” as a mental state  
 (or a stable component of mental states), or a property of a person  
 in a certain mental state, but … What is it that is known?  Ordinary  
 usage would say: a language – and I have so far been keeping to this  
 usage, speaking of knowledge and learning a language, eg. English.   
 But… this way of talk can be misleading… To avoid terminological  
 confusion, let me introduce a technical term devised for the purpose,  
 namely “cognize” with the following properties… The particular things  
 we know, we also “cognize”… Furthermore, we cognize the  
                                                
183 Chomsky’s ‘rules’ are not to be confused with Wittgensteinian rules, standards or norms; all of 
which can be cited as standards by which the correctness of our normative actions and activities can be 
judged, and as such they cannot be sub-personally inaccessible. 
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 system of mentally-represented rules from which the facts follow.   
 That is we cognize the grammar that constitutes the current  
 state of our language faculty and the rules of this system as  
 well as the principles that govern their operation.  And finally,  
 we cognize the innate schematism, along with its rules, principles  
 and conditions. 
  In fact, I don’t think that “cognize” is very far from “know”….  
 If the person who cognized the grammar and its rules could  
 miraculously become conscious of them, we would not hesitate to say  
 that he knows the grammar and its rules, and this conscious knowledge  
 is what constitutes his knowledge of language.  Thus cognizing  
 is tacit or implicit knowledge, a concept that seem to me unobjectionable… 
 cognizing has the structure and character of knowledge… but may be and  
 is in the interesting cases inaccessible to consciousness.  I will return to  
 the terms “know” and “knowledge”, but now using them in the sense  
 of “cognize”… The fundamental cognitive relation is knowing a grammar.”   
       (1980, 69-70 emphases added) 
 
According to Chomsky’s reinvention of the notion of cognition, we know how to 
speak our native tongue because we sub-personally cognize the tacit propositional 
knowledge that is the steady state of our generative grammar. But, note here, sub-
personal cognition is of and is only of subpersonal propositional knowledge.  
 What this move does is, therefore, to remove know-how from the picture by 
reducing it to know-that. Cognition is now of the propositional, and only of the 
propositional.  Therefore, non-propositional cognition is now a contradiction in 
terms.  How then might one discuss the extent to which know-how is cognitive?  The 
answer is: with great difficulty.  The propositionality that is constitutive of the 
intellectualist paradigm is now built in to the meaning of the verb ‘to cognise’ and the 
noun ‘cognition.’184  Furthermore, as the final lines of the quote reveal, having 
switched from ‘know’ to ‘cognize’ for the stipulative redefinition, Chomsky 
immediately announces he intends to ‘return’ to using ‘know’, as if nothing of 
importance has actually transpired.  Whereas in fact, ‘know’ has had any all of its 
                                                
184 Ryle earlier characterises, “the Three Estates of Cognition, Volition, and Emotion” as “a feudal 
allegory;” suggesting, “‘Cognition’ belongs to the vocabulary of examination papers.” (1949, 244) 
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non-propositionality excised.  Chomsky’s shuffle ensures the removal of everything 
except propositional knowledge, resulting in the reduction of all other knowledge to 
propositional knowledge. 185 
 This forecloses on the philosophical possibility and value of our ordinary talk 
of knowing how to speak and understand a language, in the sense of a non-
propositional ability to speak and understand a language. Not only does this 
encourage a turn away from our language use and understanding as being examples of 
a kind of know-how or ability, it requires a tandem re-conception of the notion of 
competence. Unsurprisingly (and entirely necessary according to the demands of his 
own account) Chomsky simultaneously redefines our ordinary notions of 
‘competence’ and ‘performance’ turning them into technical terms.  To be competent 
in a language is now, as a matter of stipulation, to (sub-personally) cognize one’s 
(sub-personal) generative grammar. Chomsky deliberately contrasts this with the 
notion of performance, which now identifies a speaker/hearer’s actual language use.  
Crucially for Chomsky competence is not an ability. “We thus make a fundamental 
distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language and 
performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations).” (1965, 4)  This is 
because, for Chomsky, one can have the competence without actually being able to 
speak or understand language.  
 This point is made throughout Chomsky’s work, and together with the priority 
of competence over performance it is repeatedly acknowledged. “[O]ne might have 
the cognitive structure that we call “knowledge of English” fully developed, with no 
capacity to use this structure.” (1975, 23 emphasis added) Again, “I assume that it is 
possible in principle for a person to have a full grammatical competence and no 
pragmatic competence, hence no ability to use a language appropriately, though its 
syntax and semantics are intact.” (1980, 59 emphasis added) What this picture 
                                                
185 It is unsurprising that Stanley’s linguistic-prompted view of know-how, which comes from a 
Chomskyian tradition (furthered by Fodor), finds it unproblematic to reduce any and all know-how to 
propositional knowledge.  For Stanley is just doing for the rest of our intelligent activities what 
Chomsky does for language, and indeed Chomsky himself regards the metaphysics of mind he 
proposes for language to offer a viable interdisciplinary template for the scientific or philosophically 
naturalized study of other ‘mental faculties’ or knowledge.  “It may turn out that in the domains where 
we speak of, “knowledge of X” (knowledge of language, of music, of mathematics, of the behavior of 
objects, of social structures, of human characteristics, etc)… there is a mentally represented system of 
this nature which can be take to be an object of knowledge.” (1980, 180)  Given that our relation to this 
proposed sub-personal mentally represented system is a matter of ‘cognizing’ the system; then by 
natural extension our ‘cognitive abilities’ are the sub-personal abilities we have in ‘cognizing’ any and 
all such knowledge. And upon this rock was cognitive science (and subsequently naturalized 
philosophy of mind and epistemology) built.  
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confirms is that for Chomsky you can be linguistically competent (because you 
supposedly sub-personally cognize your tacit propositional linguistic knowledge) but 
this need not entail you can actually speak or understand a language. Unperturbed by 
the implausibility (not to mention the dubious coherence of this) Chomsky readily 
insists that, “[I]nvestigation of performance will proceed only as far as understanding 
of competence permits.”186 (1965, 6)  
 Chomsky’s final move, in locking down this entirely intellectualist theory of 
our language understanding, is to marry the new theoretical meanings of ‘cognitive’ 
and ‘competence’ together.   
  
 By “grammatical competence” I mean the cognitive state that  
 encompasses all those aspects of form and meaning and their  
 relation, including underlying structures that enter into that relation,  
 which are properly assigned to the specific subsystem of the human  
 mind that relates representations of form and meaning.  
                       (1980, 59 emphasis added) 
 
Thus the theoretical framework of Chomsky’s work turns on the radical bifurcation of 
our ability to speak our first language into (i) a sub-personal (non-ability-like) 
competence that consists in the state which is the sub-personal cognizing of the 
propositional knowledge which are the propositional representations of the steady 
state of our generative grammar, and (ii) a person-level performance that is an ability, 
but an ability one might not actually have, even though one were competent. It is 
incontrovertible that Chomsky was aware of the extent to which his re-definitions 
inaugurated radical, and radically intellectualist, conceptual shifts: 
 
 [M]y concept ‘knowledge of a language’ is directly related to  
 the concept ‘internalization’ of the rules of grammar”…[ and I have]  
 tried to avoid, or perhaps evade the problem of explication of the  
 notion ‘knowledge of  language’ by using an invented technical term, 
 namely the term ‘competence’ in place of ‘knowledge’.  However, the  
 term ‘competence’ suggests ‘ability’, ‘skill’ and so on, through a chain  
                                                
186 This competence/performance distinction finds its contemporary resonance in the 
‘epistemic’/pragmatic contrast.  
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 of associations that leads directly to much new confusion.  I do  
 not think the concepts of ordinary language sufficient for the purpose  
 at hand; they must either be sharpened, perhaps somewhat  
 arbitrarily, or replaced by a new technical terminology.   
            (1975, 315 emphasis added) 
 
And indeed this is exactly what Chomsky has done with both ‘cognition’ and 
‘competence’. To regard either of these notions as invoking abilities or non-
propositional knowledge of any kind is, on Chomsky’s account, not just inappropriate, 
but mistaken. It is a misuse of the terms ‘cognition’ and ‘competence’; terms now 
specifically re-designed to ensure the avoidance of any implications of ability or 
know-how.187  When contemporary philosophers of mind talk of cognition, they help 
themselves to this Chomskyan picture and its associated intellectualist terminology.188  
Furthermore, this is exactly the kind of picture with which Stanley operates, as he 
now makes clear in his monograph when referring to the sub-personal propositional 
that are “cognized” (2011, 26) and which (with their facilitating mechanisms) are 
“realized in the brain.” (2011, 45)   Indeed, Stanley now announces, “that just as the 
brain has specific mechanisms governing place and person names, the brain has 
                                                
187 Cf., Harman (1967) for one of the first critics of this approach, responding to Chomsky (1965), 
“Competence is knowledge in the sense of knowing how to do something: it is an ability. It is not the 
sort of knowledge that can properly be described as ‘tacit.’” (1967, 81) This view was quickly swept 
aside, however, by the all-conquering progress of Chomsky’s theory, facilitated through its uptake by 
the  cognitive science it helped to create.  Its marginalization has since been perpetuated by the now-
familiar naturalized philosophical strategy of dividing our vocabulary into two conceptual schemes; 
one philosophico-theoretic one, the other had by the so-called ‘folk’.  This is another example of a 
methodological divide between naturalized philosophy and a more Wittgensteinian approach.  
Ironically, contributions from philosophers not au fait with Chomksy’s shuffle, (as well as those 
working in a more Wittgensteinian tradition) continue to use ‘competence’ in the non-technical way, 
even though their points are thereby unwittingly falling on ears (like Stanley’s) who now understand 
‘competence’ in Chomsky’s technical sense.  See for example, the interesting (and I think often 
overlooked views) on know-how offered by such philosophers as Kjell S. Johannessen. “To document 
that one does in fact master a given concept one has to be accepted as a competent performer of the 
series of established activities or practices which incorporates the concept.” (Johannessen, 1990, 112)  
The coherence of Chomsky’s separation of competence and performance makes no sense on these non-
technical usages. 
188 This can be seen in the recent debates about the nature of the so-called ‘extended mind’.  For even 
those extended mind theorists like Clark & Chalmers who argue that, “Cognitive processes ain’t (all) in 
the head,” (1998, 8) are still using the Chomksyan intellectualist assumption that cognitive processes 
are matter of sub-personal information-processing over propositional representations.  The 
propositionality and computational processing over representations is part of the orthodoxy of the 
‘cognitive’ science picture that sprung from this Chomskyian soil.  Even self-described ‘cognitive 
integrationist’ Richard Menary admits, “Cognition is simply defined as the processing of 
representations.” (2007, 10)  
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specific mechanisms governing indexical propositional and non-indexical 
propositional contents.” (2011, 156)189  
 Earlier, I explored the difficulties faced by any putative anti- or non-
intellectualist accounts if faced with the question: Is know-how ‘epistemic’?  The anti- 
or non-intellectualist, or Wittgensteinian, has exactly the same difficulties with the 
question: Is know-how cognitive?   How might he or she exploit the term ‘cognitive’ 
without (i) falsely suggesting an intellectualist commitment to the reducibility of 
know-how to sub-personal tacit propositional knowledge that is sub-personally 
cognized and/or (ii) consolidating the dominant intellectualist/theoretical meaning of 
the term ‘cognitive’, thereby contributing to the intellectualism which nourishes it and 
whence it comes, and/or (iii) having to engage in the kind of historical reconstruction 
and disambiguations seen above, for an audience who are (often) unaware that one of 
their most important terms of art has a highly strict and restrictive meaning. 190  
 With this historical shift now established, I return to the ‘intuitions’ that are 
the ‘input data’ of reflective equilibrium, particularly the ‘cognitive’ ability intuition 
which Pritchard champions. 
 
3.2 Reflective Equilibrium Revisited 
 
According to Pritchard, “the methodology of analytical epistemology” is “essentially 
the application of a process of reflective equilibrium to the inputs just described” [i.e., 
the four types of intuitions] in pursuit of a reflectively stable theory of knowledge 
which can accommodate all these inputs.  One of these master intuitions, he takes to 
be crucial to any epistemological theory is that our knowledge is true belief that is due 
to cognitive ability.  One might now ask what it is that is actually providing the ability 
intuition with its plausibility?  The suggestion that our ‘cognitive ability’ is a matter 
                                                
189 The intimacy between the Chomskyian picture of the mind and Stanley’s views can be seen in the 
following sentence, which could be taken from either linguist:  “It is in virtue of our competence with 
individual words and understanding of modes of syntactic combination that we have whatever abilities 
we do with sentences.”  This is, in fact, Stanley (2005, 138) and presumes just the point at issue, which 
is that a person can become ‘competent’ whilst still not having the relevant person-level ability.  But as 
Normal Malcolm warns, “Our understanding of human cognitive powers is not advanced by replacing 
the stimulus-response mythology with a mythology of inner guidance systems.” (1971, 392) 
190 Chomsky’s stipulative theoretical reinvention of ‘cognition’ and ‘competence’  finds itself in 
increasingly historically-insensitive environments, further contributing to its invisibility.  Recently, 
Ronald Giere suggested that he and his fellow cognitive scientists should regard themselves as, “free to 
develop it [the word ‘cognition] as a technical term in cognitive science.” (2007, 318)  As if it weren’t  
one, already. 
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of sub-personally cognizing tacit propositional knowledge in such a way that one 
might be competent though not be able to understand or speak a language, looks to be 
neither intuitive nor plausible, nor anything that one might pre-theoretically regard as 
an obvious suggestion which demands accommodating. Instead, I would suggest that 
the plausibility that our propositional knowledge requires some kind of ‘cognitive’ 
ability comes from our entirely un-technical (but no less philosophically important) 
appreciation that there is an intimacy (in many cases) between knowing how to do 
something and knowing that something is the case. Knowing how to multiply 25 x 25 
is a matter of knowing that 25 x 25 = 625.  Knowing how to read a thermometer and 
knowing that it is 18 degrees Centigrade in the room.  By contrast, on a Chomskyan 
construal of the notions of the ‘cognitive’ a cognitive ability is the sub-personal 
information processing (by and of tacitly cognized propositional knowledge).  It is 
propositional ‘all the way down’.  Any abilities or know-how which might be thought 
to be involved turn out to be reducible to sub-personal propositional knowledge.191   
 Might the ability intuition be seen as an expression of a genuine need for new 
strategies, tools and options with which to expand, or even circumvent, the ubiquitous 
propositionality demanded by intellectualist naturalized philosophy? What is now 
emerging is the extent to which any appeal to know-how has a number of both visible 
and invisible obstacles to surmount. Not to mention more ramifications than 
previously anticipated.  Furthermore there is now an unsuspected potential 
rapprochement between naturalized philosophy’s ‘cognitive ability’ and 
Wittgensteinian ‘foundational know-how’, if a method can be found through which to 
bring these two appreciations into philosophical contact. 
 Whilst it is the case that the ‘raw material’ of epistemological reflective 
equilibrium is almost entirely intellectualist, there are nonetheless viable 
Wittgensteinian alternatives to each of the four kinds of intuitions.  As such, it is not 
clear how epistemologists engaging in reflective equilibrium who fail to consider 
these Wittgensteinian options might be able to claim they are attempting to square all 
the data.  There is therefore no other choice than to engage with Wittgenstein’s 
contributions and these alternative conceptions of our supposed intuitions.  At the 
very minimum, then, the non-propositional know-how readings of On Certainty (and 
other Wittgensteinian insights) add to the ‘input data’ reflective equilibrium seeks to 
                                                
191 So too with ‘cognitive character’ which is also a sub-personal (not personal) level matter.  
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embrace.   For as seen, the assumption that extensional intuitions always state facts 
can be challenged by, or viewed instead from, an appreciation of the flexibility of 
family resemblance notions.  The presumption that intensional intuitions, such as ‘It is 
true that p if and only if p’, have to be fact-stating might be challenged by the view 
that they might be non-fact stating expressions of a grammatical norm or rule.  The 
view that a linguistic intuition such as ‘Here [waving] is a hand’ is fact-stating may 
again, be considered as the expression of a norm of description.  And regarding the 
matter of a general intuitions such as the ability intuition, it is quite possible that the 
intuitive power this intuition has actually comes from the appeal of the involvement 
of non-propositional know-how.  
 Not only has substantial doubt has been cast on the neutrality of the ‘input 
data’ used by reflective equilibrium, but until it incorporates Wittgensteinian 
contributions its comprehensivity must remain in doubt and the value of its ‘stable 
theories’ compromised.  As such, I conclude that the epistemological playing field on 
which reflective equilibrium192 takes place, will not be level until Wittgenstein’s own, 
and other Wittgensteinian orientated insights, participate in the process.  And that 
until such time, epistemological reflective equilibrium is better characterised as 
Chomskyan rather than Rawlsian. 
 The problematic nature of reflective equilibrium may be further compounded 
by the fact that the skills one supposedly needs to engage in it are to be provided by 
the right kind of “philosophical training” in Strawsonian “elucidation” which as 
already noted is a “connective metaphysical task.” (Strawson 185, 27 emphasis 
added)  Thus in order to do epistemology ‘properly’ one has to be trained into the 
acceptance of the intellectualist paradigm.  Yet reflective equilibrium fails to 
acknowledge that the kind of much-needed know-how and skills it requires are 
developed through engagement in normative practices. Normative practices are 
constituted by standards of correctness and skillful practitioners are those who 
recognise standards of correctness as standards of correctness and are capable of 
modifying their behaviour in light of them.  To be skilled in a normative practice 
requires, as Pritchard acknowledges, being training into that practice.  But what 
justifies the practice?  What justifies our ways of acting?  
                                                
192 Cf. Cottingham (2009) for further worries about what he calls the “flawed methodology” (2009, 
244) of reflective equilibrium, which in seeking to, “subsume…under a simple and elegant generative 
principle or set of principles,” (2009, 243) pursue reductive analytic “theorising”, when what is needed 
for philosophical understanding is process of synthesis, or “linking” things together. 
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 Once again Wittgenstein’s potential contributions to the philosophy of know-
how are not only targeted on a topic within epistemology, but are potentially 
illuminating of the very methodology with which epistemology operates.  But just as 
there are unanticipated connections between what Searle (overtly) demands from a 
‘theory’ and what Wittgenstein seeks from description, there is a philosophical 
method close to reflective equilibrium which offers a number of echoes of the best of 
Pritchard’s conception of epistemology’s methodology.  
 
4 Reflective Awareness: A Non-Naturalized Methodology 
 
One might seek to address some of the above concerns about reflective equilibrium by 
appreciating that epistemological reflective equilibrium is more Chomskyan than 
Rawlsian, and that a reconsideration of the role played by principles in Rawls 
methodology would be useful.  Perhaps this, in tandem with an alertness to the 
constraints imposed by certain intellectualist-only terms of art, would be a route to a 
greater pluralism in contemporary epistemology. 
 Another option may be to consider what Gertrude Conway refers to as  
‘reflective awareness’.   Conway characterises our reflective awareness as the practice 
of the critical distancing and reflecting upon our judgements amid the, “matrix of 
activities which fundamentally structure our account of the world” (2007, 75)  Here 
there is a matrix of activities which is acknowledged to shape, frame and enable our 
propositional knowledge, and which is not itself some further type of propositional 
knowledge (or reducible to propositional knowledge.)  This matrix is constituted by 
our ways of acting; many of which are normative.  Whilst, of course, total 
disengagement from our normative practices is impossible, one can come to 
distinguish between the rules, standards and conceptual schemes that shape them and 
the judgements they enable.  One can come to appreciate the categorial distinction 
between ‘Here [body-part] is a hand’ and ‘Here [waving] is a hand.’   
 On Conway’s understanding, a philosopher is someone, who is not only 
critically engaged with the substance of many of Pritchard’s ‘intuitions’ but who also 
has the crucial and, “uncanny inability to take the inherited background, the 
entrenched propositions for granted.”  (2007, 75 emphasis added.)  Like Pritchard’s 
reflective equilibrium, this stresses the importance of reflecting on our ‘intuitions’, 
but in such a way as to be prepared to acknowledge the grip of those operative 
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paradigms within which our practices proceed. Such reflective awareness is, however, 
unambiguously non-reductive.  It generates no theories; it aims a no new 
‘informative’ truths.  Rather, “The philosopher strains to see more clearly the world in 
which we live everyday and provides a perspicuous reading of the language games 
which tacitly193  define our daily living.” (2009, 76) It is in this spirit that Conway 
reads Wittgenstein’s remark that, “the philosopher is not a citizen of any community 
of ideas.  That is what makes him into a philosopher.” (Z 455)    
 The value of such ‘cosmopolitanism’, as Conway conceives of it, is touched 
on, tangentially, in a worry expressed by Pritchard.  Having acknowledged that one’s 
epistemological intuitions and intellectual virtues are inculcated and honed by the 
supposed expert views of one’s epistemological community; what happens if one’s 
‘experts’ are in thrall to a misguided picture?  Unfortunately, having admitted this 
possibility of Pritchard says nothing about what one might do, or need to do, about 
such a situation. This is because reflective equilibrium does not provide him with the 
necessary resources, given that it fails to identify that possibility that some of the 
supposed ‘intuitions’; are actually (ungrounded but grounding) rules and standards by 
which the correctness of other ‘intuitions’ can be judged.  By contrast, Conway argues 
not just for this Wittgensteinian categorial difference, but for the importance of 
deliberately seeking encounters with outsiders, those engaged in different practices 
which reveal apparently incommensurable views, view-points and frame-works. This 
provides the kind of challenges that prompt both self- and other- critical scrutiny. In 
our thoughtful engagements with ‘the Other’, “such contrasting brings us to live more 
reflectively within our own culture by forcing us back on ourselves in critical scrutiny 
in response to rival claims.”  (2007, 99)  Reflective awareness, unlike reflective 
equilibrium needs, indeed, thrives on the de-stabilising and distancing encounters with 
alternative ways of making sense. (And is exemplified in such fecund encounters as 
Wittgenstein has with Moore’s truisms.) The move to homogeneity or subsumption 
under generalization194, which haunts the corridors of reflective equilibrium, runs 
counter to such reflective awareness. 
                                                
193 For the avoidance of doubt, Conway’s notion of ‘tacit definition’ has nothing to do with the kind of 
Chomskyan sub-personal ‘tacit knowledge’ realized in the brain.  Conway’s usage has the standard 
non-technical connotations.   
194 Cf., Ryle on Wittgenstein and the nature of philosophy itself in his (1951) “In philosophy, 
generalisation are unclarifications.” (1951, 7) 
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 Reflective awareness is, therefore, more naturally at home with any method 
which appreciates that philosophy seeks understanding rather than some kind of new 
philosophical truths or empirical knowledge (of the kind sought after by naturalized 
philosophers for whom philosophy is just another science). This distinction has been 
made by a number of Wittgensteinian philosophers. Anthony Kenny contrasts 
science’s appropriate concern for “information and explanation” with philosophy’s 
contrasting method and ambition of “description and understanding.” (2009, 252) 
This distinction also helps to provide the rationale for Hacker’s own characterisation 
of philosophy’s quest, “to attain an overview of a conceptual field, to arrange the 
grammatical data so that the manifold relationships become perspicuous”; an activity 
which enables one, “to disentangle conceptual confusions, to destroy metaphysical 
illusion, to undermine mythologies of symbolism and psychology.” (2005, 285)195  Or 
as Wittgenstein himself writes, “Philosophy simply sets everything out, and neither 
explains nor deduces anything.” (BT 418)  On this view, although philosophy is not 
continuous with science as Quine suggests, it is neither in competition with science 
nor dismissive of it. Rather it acknowledges the distinct, and distinctly valuable, 
purpose of sciences, as well as being a potential resource for it.196 
 That there is a substantial contrast between the methods and goals of the more 
naturalized philosophy and Wittgensteinian methods seems introvertible. The relation 
with science and the pursuit of metaphysically-underpinned theories are gulfs that do 
appear unbridgeable.   The announcements of overlapping practices such as mapping, 
connective analysis and elucidation, mask similarly radical differences.197  Yet in the 
contrast between reflective equilibrium and reflective awareness there is a shared 
commitment to the practice of critical reflection, which is held to be central to both 
methodologies.  Is it perhaps here that a meeting point might be found between two 
                                                
195  See Hacker (2009a) for more on why, “Philosophy is not a contribution to human knowledge but to 
human understanding.” (2009a, 135)  
196 Cf., Nachev & Hacker (2010) as an example of philosophical conceptual clarification working with 
science (on the neuroscience of persistent vegetative states), as opposed to Bach & Dolan (2012), an 
example of science, in need of philosophy’s conceptual contribution. The latter’s paper misguidedly 
presumes that it is coherent to talk about the possibility of the, “distinct neural encoding of uncertainty” 
(2012, 572), on the assumption that the brain can be the subject of properties that are only applicable to 
the person.  The paper also repeatedly ‘exploits’ the intellectualist paradigm’s misconception that there 
can be semantic content at a sub-personal level, in reference to semantically-sensitive “neural 
computations.” (2012, 584)   Yet, as Bennett & Hacker clarify, “A neural representation in the non-
semantic, non-iconic sense – that is a causal correlate – is not a form of storing information and does 
not involve encoding.” (2003, 164) 
197 For Pritchard the “mere elucidation of a term can in fact give us just what we seek in terms of being 
a theory of that term.” (forthcoming a) 
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apparently very different ways of philosophising.  Might there yet be a positive 
answer to Strawson’s hopeful speculation, “[C]ould not the activities we call ‘doing 
philosophy’ also form a family?” (1954, 78)  And if so might a Wittgensteinian entry 
in the philosophy of know-how be just the springboard needed to confirm this? 
 
5 Wittgenstein’s Epistemology & The Possibility of Wittgensteinian 
 Epistemology  
 
Quine’s re-conception of epistemology as a subject, “contained in natural science, as a 
chapter of psychology” (1969, 83) whose purpose is to provide “the technology of 
truth-seeking,” (1986, 665) brought naturalized philosophy to epistemology, where it 
has since become the orthodoxy.198  Furthermore, if John Turri’s definition of 
epistemology is now indicative of the subject, then the intellectualism which is the 
hallmark of naturalized epistemology would appear to be the only game in town: 
 
 Epistemology is the philosophical subdiscipline that studies the 
 evaluative dimensions of cognition, their metaphysical bases, and 
 increasingly nowadays, the language we use to ascribe cognitive 
 achievements. The nature and scope of knowledge is the central  
 focus of epistemology. (forthcoming) 
 
In this chapter I have presented just a few of the possible reasons why Epistemology 
thus Naturalized is nothing but Epistemology inevitably Intellectualised. As such, the 
opportunity for contributions from Wittgenstein, and Wittgensteinian approaches in 
general, have little, indeed possibly no room for manoeuvre.199  They are shut out by a 
discipline whose propositional presumption is anchored to the cornerstones of 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind200 and which has turned ‘epistemic’, 
                                                
198 Alvin Goldman’s similar trajectory further contributed to this. He not only embraced cognitive 
sciences self-professed aim to “delineate the architecture of the human mind-brain” but regarded it as 
“essential for primarily epistemology.” (1986, 1)   
199 This goes some way to explain Michael Williams’ claim that, “Wittgenstein’s position is not 
epistemological scepticism but scepticism about epistemology,” (2004, 269) and Rorty’s suggestion 
that Wittgenstein “set aside epistemology” altogether. (1979, 6) 
200 Coliva reminds us “Philosophy constantly runs the risk of producing myths – viz. false pictures – of 
our conceptual and epistemic systems.” (2010, 206-7).  Nowhere, though, is this more evident in than 
in the very suggestion that we have epistemic systems and that, as per Turri, epistemology has a 
metaphysical base. 
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‘cognitive’, and ‘competence’ not only into intellectualist technical terms but 
synonyms.201  
 Given the lengthening list of possible contributions which Wittgenstein’s 
insights into  the philosophy of know-how offer, his exclusion from the philosophical 
debate can no longer warranted.  That this must inevitably, as indicated, come with a 
requirement for reflection on the very methodology of epistemology itself, cannot be 
helped.  But as all parties involved are eager to reflect on our most deeply held 
‘intuitions’ and those pictures which can and do hold us captive, then this is not a 
challenge that any would or should wish to avoid.  
 According to Glock, On Certainty’s “most important achievement was to 
provide the cue for an epistemology socialized.” (1996, 81) This is a powerful point, 
but unfortunately Glock undercuts this reminder of the main challenge to the 
intellectualist picture, by going on to talk about our ‘epistemic activities’.  I would 
like to take Glock’s cue and suggest instead that we move beyond Epistemology 
Naturalized to Epistemology Socialized, (or perhaps even to Epistemology 
Elucidated) but I think perhaps that the most fruitful way forward would be to return 
to the pursuit of Epistemology Unqualified.  This ‘new’ kind of epistemology might 
perhaps be helpfully understood as the study of knowledge, a study open to a variety 
of possible approaches, some, but not necessarily all of which, are theoretical.  Some 
Wittgensteinian, some Naturalized.  It would acknowledge the commitment to critical 
reflection and a belief that it is the quality of the philosophy which confirms the worth 
of the meta-philosophy, and not vice versa. 
             In the final chapter, I attempt to untangle some of the knots about know-how, 
using Wittgensteinian methods.  There will, therefore, be no theorising.  Nor will I use 
any theoretical terms, introduce any new terminology, or suggest any acronyms. I 
pursue no necessary and sufficient conditions, and offer no hypotheses. Rather, I 
present some features of the landscape pertaining to know-how.  If, of what comes 
next, the reader thinks, “But yes, of course, that is how it is,” then I will have started, 
albeit modestly, what I take to be one possible example of Wittgensteinian 
                                                
201 John Greco & John Turri’s Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Virtue Epistemology opens with the 
announcement of a “helpful” note about their terminology, stating, “[W]e use ‘cognitive’ epistemic’ 
and ‘intellectual’ synonymously.” (2011) Given the above arguments, this is, of course, exactly right. 
What is less clear, however, is the extent to which the authors are wittingly exploiting and deliberately 
committed to the intellectualist paradigm or they are unwittingly in the grip of it and unaware to what 
they are committed, and are thus implicitly ruling out. But such is the nature of the power of any 
operative paradigm.  
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epistemology, in this case the New Epistemology of Know-How.  This is not to be 
regarded as either quietism or therapy; but something that seeks to be a substantive 
contribution to our human understanding.  
 For those who read the final chapter and think that philosophising ought to be 
something more, or something else, they may perhaps add what follows to their cache 
of ‘data’, and honour it, perhaps, in their own accounts.  Although what follows is by 
no means complete, it is not the prequel for something different, rather it is the start of 
an attempt to make visible what is in front of us, but which we struggle to see. The 
signpost which points the way, is Wittgenstein’s: 
 
 I can characterise my standpoint no better than saying that it is the  
 antithetical standpoint to the one occupied by Socrates in the  
 Platonic dialogues.  For if were asked what knowledge is, I would  
 enumerate instances of knowledge and add the words ‘and similar things’.  
 There is no shared constituent to be discovered in them since none exists. 
                         (Wittgenstein & Waismann 2003, 33) 
 
 
 
* 
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Know-how: The Beginnings of a Perspicuous Presentation 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
I now step away from the current debate, and the terms under which it is conducted, in 
order to present a variety of observations about our know-how, together with some of 
its conceptual connections to our abilities, actions, activities and practices.   
 In the sections below the comments and reminders which are in tabular form 
are meant to be uncontentious. After each table I reflect further on some of the points 
that emerge and articulate some of the reflections that are prompted. This commentary 
does not purport to be offering theories, but rather teases out further points and 
questions of interest. 
 In the first section, I consider a variety of different abilities, actions and 
activities and practices from the point of view of their normative or non-normative 
status. This is very much by way of a preliminary overview. The last line of Table 6 
ends with the introduction of know-how.  Three further tables then go on to articulate 
different aspects of, and perspectives on the reticulations at play.  
 
1  Abilities, Actions, Activities and Practices: Introducing know-how 
 
As human beings we do a variety of different things, some of which we are not only 
able to do, but we know how to do.  One possible articulation of the territory which 
this covers is laid out in Table 6. This identifies a number of features and 
characteristics of our abilities, actions, activities and practices around which  
discriminations may be orientated.   
 
(See over page) 
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Table 6. 
Human Abilities, Actions, Activities and Practices 
 
Non-Normative 
Abilities, Actions and Activities 
 
Normative 
Abilities, Actions, Activities and Practices 
 
One-Way Powers 
 
Two-Way Powers Two-Way Powers 
Examples 
- digesting food 
- breathing 
- seeing, hearing, tasting, 
touching, feeling 
Examples 
- crying, smiling, laughing 
- making noises 
- moving around under 
one’s own steam 
- urinating, vomiting 
 
 
Examples 
- speaking one’s native tongue and other languages 
- counting, multiplying, use numbers, engaging in 
mathematical activities 
- participating in religious ceremonies and practices 
- engage in political activity, law-making, civil 
defence, wars,  
- building, inventing, exploring, discovering  
- create artefacts, engaging in artistic practices and 
production 
- playing games and sport, doing exercise 
- seeing-as, hearing-as, tasting-as, touching-as, 
feeling-as 
- helping, teaching, empowering other people (in 
schools, hospitals, in the community, in the street) 
 
Voluntary Control 
These abilities and their 
exercises cannot be 
brought under voluntary 
control.  
 
Voluntary Control 
These abilities and their 
exercises can be brought 
under varying degrees of 
voluntary control, though 
they begin as outside 
voluntary control.   
 
Voluntary Control 
The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities and 
practices are all subject to voluntary control.  
 
 
 
Intentional Action 
These abilities are not 
exercised as intentional 
actions.  
 
One cannot not decide to 
do them, though one can 
predict that one will be 
Intentional Action 
The exercise (and 
deliberate non-exercise) of 
these abilities are possible 
intentional actions.   
 
An actor can cry on cue in 
play.  One may resist 
Intentional Action 
The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities and 
practices are all possible candidates for intentional 
actions. 
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doing them in the future. 
 
laughing at a funny joke, 
successfully keeping a 
straight face. 
 
Preventabilty 
These possibility of 
exercising these abilities 
can be prevented by 
deliberate or accidental 
interference with our 
normal bodily workings 
through the imposition of 
physical barriers (eg. 
blindfolds), environmental 
changes (eg. darkness), 
drug or medical 
intervention.  
 
Preventability 
The possibility of 
exercising these abilities 
can be prevented by 
deliberate or accidental 
interference with our 
normal bodily workings, 
though drug or medical 
intervention (eg. the 
removal of tear ducts).    
 
The ability to refrain from 
exercising these abilities 
can be overridden by drug 
or medical intervention, 
(eg. laughing gas can force 
one to laugh). 
Preventability 
The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities and 
practices are preventable through deliberate or 
accidental interference through drug or medical 
intervention, or through the lack of necessary or 
appropriate equipment, colleagues, financial 
resources, opportunity or time. 
Evaluation 
These abilities and their 
exercises may be 
evaluated in terms of 
whole (or partial) success 
(or failure) and efficiency. 
 
These abilities and their 
exercises are not subject to 
evaluation in terms of 
their correctness (or 
incorrectness). 
Evaluation 
These abilities and their 
exercises, the exercise of 
voluntary restraint (of the 
abilities) may be evaluated 
in terms of whole (or 
partial) success (or 
failure). 
 
These abilities, their 
exercises (and restraints) 
are not evaluated in terms 
of correctness (or 
incorrectness) but may be 
evaluated in terms of 
appropriateness (or 
inappropriateness) and/or 
some but not all types of 
merit (eg. financial)  
Evaluation 
The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities and 
practices may be evaluated in terms of whole or 
partial success (or failure), and/or correctness (or 
incorrectness), and/or accuracy (or inaccuracy) and/or 
appropriateness (or inappropriateness) and/or 
skillfulness  (or lack of skill) and/or merit (or lack of 
merit*).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Such as musical, financial, strategic etc., merit. 
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Learnability/Teachability 
These abilities are neither 
learnt or learnable. 
 
 
Learnability/Teachability 
These abilities are not 
learnt or learnable but one 
may be trained by others to 
bring them under voluntary 
control (eg. potty-training) 
or learn how, oneself, to 
bring them under voluntary 
control, and so refrain 
from their exercise, (eg. 
not laughing, not crying). 
 
 
Learnability/Teachability 
The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities and 
practices are all learnable, though not all are 
teachable. 
 
One may learn wittingly (or unwittingly) by being 
taught or trained wittingly (or unwittingly) by others.   
One may learn wittingly and unwittingly by self-
direction, observation and practice. 
 
One may learn by a mixture of all of these methods. 
 
One may learn something but may or may not be able 
to teach it.   
 
One may have the ability to teach something but may 
not be able to do it oneself. 
 
(I will return to this in Table 7.) 
 
Improvability 
These abilities and their 
exercises may be 
potentially directly 
improvable through drug 
or medical intervention or 
technological 
supplementation (eg. 
spectacles, hearing aids).   
 
These abilities and their 
exercises may be 
indirectly potentially 
improvable through diet 
and/or exercise regime 
(e.g. the improvement of 
one’s ability to breath and 
smell through stopping 
smoking.)  
Improvability 
These abilities and their 
exercises are potentially 
directly improvable 
through drug or medical 
intervention or 
technological 
supplementation. 
 
These abilities and their 
exercises are not 
(obviously) improvable 
through diet and/or 
exercise. 
Improvability 
The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities and 
practices can be improved. 
 
Improvement may be identified in terms of increased 
frequency of, or likeliness of success and/or 
correctness and/or accuracy and/or appropriateness,  
and/or skill, and/or merit.   
 
Improvements may be further identified and 
characterised in adverbial terms relating to the 
manner, styles and modes in which the activity is 
done, or the ability exercised, eg, tidiness, speed, 
delicacy, etc. 
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Deterioriation 
These abilities may but 
may not deteriorate and 
will inevitably cease 
altogether (in death). 
  
Deterioriation 
These abilities may but 
may not deteriorate and 
will inevitably cease 
altogether (in death). 
 
Deterioriation 
These abilities may but may not deteriorate in terms 
of decreased frequency of, or likeliness of success 
and/or correctness and/or accuracy and/or 
appropriateness, and/or skill, and/or merit, 
and will inevitably cease altogether (in death). 
 
 
Creditable 
These abilities and their 
exercises, are not typically 
creditable to the person.  
 
The improvement of these 
abilities and their 
exercises through 
deliberate direct or 
indirect intervention is not 
normally deemed 
creditable to the person, 
but the decision to attempt 
to improve the abilities is. 
 
Creditable 
These abilities and their 
exercises are not typically 
credible to the person, but 
the ability to bring them 
under voluntary control 
and thereby restrain from 
exercising them (wholly or 
partially) is normally 
creditable to the person.   
Creditable 
The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities or 
practices is creditable to the person, the participant or 
the practitioner. 
Forgettable 
These abilities are not 
characterisable as either 
forgettable or 
unforgettable.   
 
 
Forgettable 
These abilities are not 
characterisable as either 
forgettable or 
unforgettable.  But the 
deliberate ability to 
restrain from doing 
something (eg. not 
smiling, not crying) can be 
forgotten or perhaps lost, 
either temporally or 
entirely.  Similarly the 
ability to cry at will (in the 
case of an actor) can be 
forgotten or lost. 
 
 
Forgettable 
The exercise of these abilities, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities or 
practices can be forgotten. 
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The above abilities, actions, activities and practices may also be things we know how to do. 
 
Knowable  
These abilities and their 
exercises are, and are 
regarded as things we do, 
as opposed to things we 
know, or know how to do. 
 
A does digest food but A 
doesn’t know how to 
digest food.   
 
Knowable  
These abilities and their 
exercises are regarded as 
things we do, not things 
we know.   
 
But the learnt ability to 
exercise some of these 
abilities at will (crying on 
demand) and to restrain 
from their exercise  (eg. 
not laughing when 
amused) is something one 
does, one is able to do, and 
also knows how to do.  
 
A does cry (but A doesn’t 
know how to cry), but A 
does know how not to cry. 
Knowable 
These abilities and their exercises, the doing of these 
actions and the participation in these activities or 
practices are thing we both do, are able to do know, 
and know how to do.  
 
A does speak English and Spanish; A knows how to 
speak English and Spanish; A doesn’t know how to 
speak Turkish, he/she is unable to speak Turkish. 
 
A is able to land an airplane, A knows how to land an 
air-plane.   
 
A knows how to render a good likeness in clay. A 
know how to multiply imaginary numbers, A knows 
how to officiate at weddings, how to run a 
Presidential campaign, how to train for the high-
jump, lobby for environmental issues, make a patient 
feel comfortable after a long spell in bed, not take 
‘no’ for an answer, etc.. 
 
 
From this preliminary introduction of the topic of abilities and know-how a number of 
points emerge, which look to bear on any fuller appreciation of know-how.  
 
(i) The borders between our normative and non-normative abilities are porous. In 
certain situations crying is a non-normative activity, typically provoked by physical or 
emotional distress.  Were one to learn that a friend had unexpectedly died, one might 
be unable to prevent oneself from crying but it would make little sense to say that one 
cried correctly or incorrectly.  Were one to be acting in a play, however, the failure to 
cry on cue, or the intentional crying at the wrong moment might be reasonably taken 
to be an example of failing to do something correctly.  Matters can be further 
complicated, as in Camus’ novel L’Etranger (1942). Here the main character 
Merseult is deemed to be morally reprehensible for failing to cry at his mother’s 
funeral.  Whilst it appears that our normative abilities, actions, activities, and practices 
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are things we also know how to do, the same action may sometimes be a normative 
activity, sometimes not. 
 
(ii) It is not obvious whether certain activities are standardly to be characterised as 
normative or non-normative. Consider the activity of comforting a grieving person.  
Would we say that this is a normative activity?  What would it be to comfort someone 
correctly as opposed to incorrectly?202 
 Evaluating an action or activity in terms of correctness looks to be distinct 
from evaluating it in terms of success. Playing chess correctly, is a matter of playing 
by the rules, but playing chess successfully is normally a matter of winning a 
particular game, or regularly (though not necessarily always) winning a number of 
games.  Yet in the case of some actions and activities, evaluation in terms of success 
and correctness conditions would seem to be the same thing. Think of multiplying 25 
x 25. If one gets the answer 625 one has done the multiplication both successfully and 
correctly.  Yet have the same criteria been applied, in judging the activity as both 
successful and correct? Or is that we regard the procedure to be correct (in contrast to 
successful) because multiplication is a practice obviously constituted by specific rules 
and clear repeatable techniques?  Yet comforting a grieving person does not look like 
something that is constituted by rules. Is this why it seems awkward to suggest that 
comforting a grieving person can be done correctly? If there are no correct or 
incorrect ways of comforting someone, only successful ways, then it looks like this 
action may be better identified as a two-way non-normative activity. But do we really 
want to say that what may be a highly sophisticated, complex and subtle activity is 
non-normative?   
 It would seem that we have less trouble distinguishing between people who 
know-how to comfort others and people who don’t, than we do distinguishing 
between those actions and activities that are normative and those that are not.  This 
suggests that there are cases where regarding the exercise of an ability or an activity 
as matter of know-how is not a consequence of, or does not entail that that ability or 
activity is normative.  
 
                                                
202 This is not to be confused to with comforting someone inappropriately. 
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(iii) Language, itself a normative practice, is extensively implicated in our normative 
activities. This raises questions as to whether the normativity of practices is a product 
of this very language-involvement.  This is an enormous philosophical topic in its 
own right, but it is perhaps worth considering, in light of the articulation in the above 
table, that the “same” ability might be regarded as normative when exercised by a 
human being, and non-normative when exercised by another kind of animal who does 
not have our normative linguistic practices with which to understand what they are 
doing.  One might think, say of, the ability to delay the eating of food when hungry.  
We humans might delay eating when hungry because, say, an honoured guest has yet 
to arrive and join the table. This would be part of the correct behaviour at, say, an 
official banquet.   So, too, an ant might delay eating a leaf until it has returned it to its 
nest, even though it may not have eaten for a very long time. It is not clear, however, 
whether it makes any sense to regard the ant as appreciating that it was applying some 
kind of standard to its own behaviour.  There might be standards, but without a 
language with which to articulate and recognise standards qua standards, it is unclear 
that the ant’s action is to be regarded as normative. Yet both the person and the ant 
have delayed eating when hungry.   We might want to say that the person knows how 
to behave appropriately at a state dinner, but do we want to say that the ant knows 
how to do something, in the same way? 
  
(iv) Intentional actions can be things one refrains from doing, when one has the ability 
to do them.  As such, when exercising an ability nothing observable, as it were, needs 
to occur.  But this is not because something unobservable is occurring.  By not doing 
something, such as not laughing at a comedy routine which one finds very funny, one 
is exercising an ability. One can also exercise the sophisticated parenting skills by 
deliberately not intervening in a particular situation.  As such, whilst it appears that 
our normative abilities, actions, activities, and practices are things we do and know 
how to do, in the act of doing them and in so exemplifying our know-how, no actual 
action need occur.  
 
2 Know-how: Characterisations and Contrasts 
 
There are numerous ways one might go about attempting to lay-out some of the 
features, characteristics and aspects of our know-how. In Table 7 below, I offer just 
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one of the many possible approaches, limiting myself to those particularly normative 
abilities, actions, activities and practices, the like of which have been introduced in 
Table 6’s right hand column.  I leave to one side, for the purposes of the current 
presentation, those two-way but non-normative abilities, on the grounds that they are 
perhaps more borderline candidates, and space is limited.  Of course, any full 
epistemology of know-how is likely to want revisit our non-normative two way 
powers, perhaps by the light of the topics which unfold below.  In Table 7, I have 
chosen one particular ordering of the issues, reminders and observations concerning 
our know-how, but a range of alternative orderings would undoubtedly reveal yet 
further interdependencies and contrasts. 
 
Table 7: 
 
Human Normative Abilities, Actions, Activities and Practices 
 
Know-how 
 
In being able to do, engage in, and participate in normative abilities, actions, 
activities and practices, people are knowledgeable.  
 
In knowing how to do, engage in, and participate in those normative abilities, 
actions, activities, and practices, people are knowing agents, practitioners and 
participants. 
 
A does speak English, A is able to speak English, and so A knows how to speak 
English.  A does not speak Polish, is not able to speak Polish, and so A does not 
know how to speak Polish. 
 
B is able to land an airplane; B knows how to land an air-plane.  
 
C is able to officiate at a wedding; B knows how to officiate at a wedding.  
 
D knows how to drill for oil, E knows how to multiply imaginary numbers, F 
knows how to run a Presidential campaign, G how to train for the high-jump, H 
how to lobby for environmental issues, J to make a patient feel comfortable after 
an operation, K knows how to build up a successful business from scratch,  etc.. 
 
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K are all knowledgeable, in different ways and about 
different things. 
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Know-how: 
Situation-and 
Occasion-
Dependency 
 
Not all the things that one knows how to do, one knows how to do, or is able to 
do in any and/or all situations or occasions.  
 
Situation- and/or occasion-dependency may be a matter of a variation in contexts 
of purpose, of geography, or of importance, etc. A may know how to run a 
political campaign at local but not national level, in England but not in Italy, or 
when the candidate’s priorities are his or her own, but not when they diverge.  
 
Situation- and/or occasion dependency may be a matter of the availability or 
quality of the required equipment or tangible resources. B may know how to 
mend car engines but not without certain tools.  C may know how to stamp out 
water poverty world-wide but not without enough money and the will to see it 
fully spent where it will solve the problem. 
 
Situation- and/or occasion dependency may be a matter of one’s own physical 
condition.  Arthritis may hamper or curtail the exemplification of the ballerina’s 
know-how.  
 
Know-how: 
Other-Dependency 
(1) 
 
Not all the things one knows how to do, one can come to know how to do alone. 
Some things require the involvement of other people to gain know-how. 
 
Knowing how (and learning how) to play football involves playing in a team. It 
involves match-play skills, learning to give and receive passes, and collectively 
develop attacking and defensive positions.  
 
Knowing how (and learning how) to play music with other musicians is a 
separate skill to playing one’s instrument alone. It involves listening to others 
and responding to musical choices and developments that are outside one’s direct 
control.  
 
Know-how: 
Other-Dependency 
(2) 
 
Not all the things that one knows how to do, one still knows how to do if the 
people with whom one does them change. 
 
A may know how to play with one group of musicians, but not another. 
 
B may know how to teach one student how to multiply (using a particular 
method), but not another (using the same method).   
 
 
 
212. 
Know-how: 
Of groups 
 
Some things that people know-how to do are part contributions to things that 
only groups of people know-how to do. 
 
The team members of NASA (together) know-how to put a man on the moon, 
but each person in the team does not know how to do what all the other team 
members know how to do.  
 
The whole crew of a whaling ship knows how to catch a whale, though not each 
crew member knows how to do the jobs of all the others.  
 
Know-how: 
Exercises & 
exemplifications 
The exercise or exemplification of one’s know-how may be different on each 
occasion.  This may be because of situation-, occasion- or other-dependency or 
because of one’s own mood, health or degree of concentration. 
 
The exercise or exemplification of A’s surgical know-how is different on each 
operation.  A may know how to perform a triple-heart bypass, but no two triple 
heart-bypasses are alike.   
 
Singer B knows how to perform the role of Tosca, although she never gives the 
same performance twice. 
Know-how: 
Identity 
One person can have the same know-how as another if both people know how to 
do the same thing. 
 
A and B both know how to fly a helicopter.  They have the same know-how, 
though the exercises of their know-how may be quite different. 
 
Know-how: 
Fallibilism 
 
Any particular or individual exercise of one’s know-how need not be successful, 
correct, accurate, appropriate, skillful or of any merit.  Failures occur, mistakes 
are made, but one’s know-how need not be undermined.  
 
There is no one single percentage by which an exercise of know-how is 
evaluated as successful, or correct etc.,  
 
A need never win a game of chess, but may still know-how to play it, if his 
opponents are always of a higher standard.  
 
All of Dr. B’s patients might die, but if he or she works in a hospice then Dr. B 
may have an extraordinary amount of know-how about the nature of the human 
body and the welfare of patients. 
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Whereas if the majority of C’s plants died, gardener C would not have much, if 
any, gardening know-how.  
 
Know-how: 
Under a 
description  
 
The exercise of know-how and know-how itself may be identified under a 
variety of different descriptions.   
 
Sculptor A is an expert in rendering good likenesses and knowing how to capture 
the personality of his sitters.  If A’s model is King Gustaf of Sweden, and A 
renders him well, then A knows how to render a good likeness of King Gustaf of 
Sweden.  But if A doesn’t know the identify of his model, then A still knows 
how to render a good likeness of King Gustaf of Sweden.   He also knows that he 
knows how to render a good likeness of his current sitter.  A does not know, 
however, that he knows how to render a good likeness of King Gustaf of 
Sweden.  But he does know that he would know how to render a good likeness of 
King Gustaf of Sweden were he to attempt to do so. 
 
Know-how: 
Decompositionality 
& 
Countability 
Knowing-how to do one thing is often a matter of knowing how to do a lot of 
things.  
 
When one knows how to make a Shepherd’s Pie, one knows how to shop for the 
ingredients, handle money, make arithmetical calculations, cut and fry onions, 
peel and boil potatoes, select and prepare meat, use a weighing machine, 
assemble the ingredients, season appropriately, use a variety of kitchen 
implements, use a cooker and a stove, make creative choices about how to 
decorate the top, tell the time, manage one’s time, read numerals, possibly read a 
recipe, etc.   
 
How many things does one know how to do when one knows how to bullfight, to 
rear a child, to defend one’s country, to speak a language?  The answer to this 
would seem to relate to the purpose of question. 
 
The noun ‘know-how’ is a cognate of the verb ‘to know’ and the verbal phrase 
‘to know how to do something’; but it is not a count noun.   
 
Know-how: 
Degree of Grain 
 
Knowing how to do something can be characterised to different degrees of grain. 
 
A knows how to write.  A knows how to write his name.  A knows how to write 
his name with his right hand (but not the left).  A knows how to write his name 
with the right hand (but not the left) whilst blind-fold, etc.. 
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Know-how: 
Differentiation 
Knowing-how to do one thing can be differentiated from knowing how to do  
(the apparently) same thing by contrasting both with a third thing one knows 
how to do.  
 
Knowing how to repair something that you have made is different to knowing 
how to repair something that you haven’t made.  
 
Know-how: 
Demonstrability & 
Definability 
What it is to know how to do some particular thing can be demonstrated through 
the exercise or exemplification of that know-how.   
 
Exercise or exemplification can be used to ostensively define a particular kind of 
know-how.  
 
This [exemplification] is how you serve in tennis. 
 
That [exemplification] is knowing how to quit while you’re ahead. 
 
Know-how: 
1st/3rd Personal 
Know-how 
The ostensive definition of know-how provides third-personal know-how, but 
not necessarily first-personal know-how. 
 
Ostensive definition of know-how results in knowing how one who knows how 
to do some particular thing does it, i.e., what the ability, action, activity or 
practice of knowing how to do that thing is, in general.    One knows that 
knowing how to do that thing is a matter of being able to do that 
[exemplification].  
 
Ostensive definition of know-how does not automatically result in oneself 
knowing how to do that thing. 
 
Watching somebody do a Fosbury Flop high jump exemplifies what knowing 
how to do a Fosbury Flop is (third-personally) and provides an ostensive 
definition of a Fosbury Flop. 
 
Knowing how to do a Fosbury Flop oneself (first-personal knowledge) is a 
matter of successfully learning how to do a Fosbury Flop. 
 
Know-how: 
Imitation (1) 
 
Some kinds of (first personal) know-how may be gained through imitating 
exemplifications. 
 
A comes to know how to pick grapes by watching B exemplify his knowledge of 
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picking grapes and successfully imitating A.   
 
Successful imitation may involve no or some practice, using abilities one already 
has.  Both C, D and E already know how to speak. But C knows how to imitate 
any accent on hearing it once, D takes more time, needs more examples to 
imitate and has to practice more, whilst E is ‘tone deaf’ and does not know how 
to distinguish between accents and does not know how to imitate them, although 
he has the physical ability to speak and to hear no less than C and D. 
 
A first-time banquet guest F imitates neighbouring etiquette-expert guest G in 
selecting the right items of cutlery with which to eat the banquet.  F comes to 
know how to eat correctly according to the rules etiquette when using a 16-piece 
cutlery set.  Anyone who follows G comes to know how to eat correctly with a 
16-piece cutlery.  No new physical abilities are required.  
 
A visitor to Paris, H overhears a local L saying he’s en route to the Eiffel Tower 
via public transport.  H follows L and in so doing learns the bus and metro route 
from his hotel to the Eiffel Tower.  H knows how to get from his hotel to the 
Eiffel Tower.  No new physical abilities are required.  
Know-how: 
Imitation (2) 
Some kinds of (first personal) know-how may be gained through following 
descriptions (or visual, diagrammatic presentations) of exemplifications of 
know-how. 
 
First-time banquet guest F* learns how to handle a 16-piece cutlery set prior to 
the banquet by reading the relevant section of etiquette expert G’s ‘how-to’ 
book. F* displays his know-how at the banquet by successfully handling the 
cutlery throughout the meal.   No new physical abilities or techniques are 
required or need to be mastered. But F*, unlike F, needs also to know how to 
read. 
 
Visitor to Paris, H* reads directions in his guide-book of how to get to the Eiffel 
Tower from his hotel.  H* follows the directions, learns how, and comes to know 
how to get to the Eiffel Tower.  No new physical abilities or practical techniques 
need to be mastered, though H* needs to know-how to read, and may need to 
know-how to read another language (if he finds he has only picked up a French-
language guide.) 
 
Self-assembling a wardrobe, J follows the international (wordless) instructions 
which explain how to put the wardrobe together using only pictures of nails, 
pieces of wood, dotted lines and arrows.  Three hours later J knows how to 
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construct the wardrobe.  No new physical abilities are required, but one needs to 
know how to follow schematic visual instructions, which may include knowing 
how to match objects to their images, count and read numerals. 
 
Know-how: 
Imitation (3) 
Some kinds of (first-personal) know-how may be gained through following 
descriptions, instructions, diagrammatic presentations etc., of exemplifications of 
know-how, but the successful implementation of these instructions also involves 
the mastery of new physical abilities or practical techniques. This involves 
further imitation of exemplifications of those additional abilities and techniques, 
which will involve further exemplification which may or may not be conveyed 
through description. 
 
In coming to know-how to perform various key-hole operations, surgeon A come 
to know how to develop abilities using remotely extended surgical procedures 
aided by cameras, which are of no use outside of the operating theatre.  
 
In coming to know-how to perform dressage non-rider B first has to know-how 
ride a horse. 
 
Know-how: 
Imitation (4) 
Some kinds of (first-personal) know-how involve the same physical actions but 
are exemplifications of very different know-how.   
 
In typing, novelist A engages in the same physical activity as poet B, secretary C 
or accountant D.  To know-how to write a novel, to compose a poem, to organise 
a diary and to prepare documents, or to do double-entry book-keeping are not the 
same things as knowing how to type, yet their physical manifestation need only 
be typing.  
 
(A further variation on knowledge-under-a-description.) 
 
Know-how: 
Informed Imitation  
Some kinds of (first-personal) know-how require both the imitation of physical 
action or technique (which may or may not be describable) together with the 
making of decisions as to which physical action, move or technique is required.  
 
Decision-making may require understanding the different options of and reasons 
for each, which itself may involve an amount of empirical, mathematical or 
theoretical knowledge.  Selecting the appropriate propositional knowledge is 
itself a matter of developing the appropriate know-how. 
 
A knows how to sail when he or she knows not just how to rig the sails and 
217. 
navigate but when he or she knows how to do these appropriately, i.e., knows 
when and why to do these things.   
 
B knows how to treat certain kinds of illness when B knows how to decide when 
surgery and further interventions are no longer appropriate. 
 
Know-how: 
Non-imitation 
Inauguration 
Some kinds of know-how are not the result of any imitation, but when 
exemplified the possibility of new know-how by imitation is inaugurated.  
 
The inventor of a new machine knows how to use it.  In demonstrating it to 
others so that they might come to know how to use it, he is not engaged in 
imitation, but those who learn how and come to know how will use imitation.  
 
Loom operators came to know how to use John Kay’s flying shuttle through 
following his (first) and others’ (subsequent) exemplifications. 
 
 
Know-how: 
Hermeneutic 
Learning (1) 
Reflecting on particular exercises or exemplifications of one’s (and others’) 
know-how may provide additional information, insight or understanding, which 
then becomes part of the reservoir of resources which is part-constitutive of 
one’s know-how.   
 
A’s skill at diagnosing motorbike engine problems and repairing them improves 
with each engine encountered; enhancing the know-how brought to the next job.  
 
Picasso and Matisse’s artistic know-how evolved and expanded as they watched 
and learnt from each other’s work. 
 
Know-how: 
Hermeneutic 
Learning (2) 
Unsuccessful or failed attempts to exemplify know-how may provide additional 
information, insight or understanding, which becomes part of the resources 
constitutive of one’s know-who.   
 
Writer A’s serial failed attempts to articulate her thoughts in a letter finally 
resulted in her knowing how to communicate her point. 
 
Squash-player B’s serial failed attempts to hit the ball in the middle of the 
racquet are useful contrasts through which the successful hitting the ball in the 
middle of the racquet comes to be recognised and appreciated. 
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Know-how: 
Kinships 
The reservoir of resources that is constitutive of one’s knowledge how to do one 
thing may become a reservoir of resources that is constitutive of one’s learning-
how (and subsequently knowing how) to do something else. 
 
A’s knowledge of how to play the clarinet is transferable to the playing of the 
saxophone.   Much of B’s knowledge of how to grow vegetables is transferable 
to growing fruit.  
 
Know-how: 
Teaching 
Know-how can be taught by exemplification and demonstration where imitation, 
or imitation and self-reflection alone, suffices to come to know-how to do 
something. 
 
A can teach B how to play noughts and crosses by demonstration.   
 
Know-how can be taught by description or verbal instruction where imitation 
guided by description (or description plus self-reflection) suffices for someone to 
come to know-how to do something. 
 
C can teach D how to open E’s safe by description. “You turn the dial to the left 
until no. 78.  OK. Now turn it to the right to 23, etc…” 
Know-how: 
Training 
One can come to know-how to do things by being trained and/or acculturated 
into practices.  The trainee need not appreciate that he or she is being trained, 
and it is by no means clear whether the training is successful because of the 
trainer’s witting or unwitting methods, or a combination of both. 
 
In knowing how to speak a language we are trained into/acculturated into a 
normative practice that requires immersion in a community of speakers with full 
mastery of their language.  
 
Know-how: 
Rules (1) 
Knowing how to engage in normative abilities, actions, activities and practices is 
a matter of engaging correctly in rule- and standard-involving practices.  
 
Some rule- and standard-involving practices are learnt by first learning some (or 
all) of the rules and standards by which those practices are constituted. 
 
A learns how and comes to knows how to play checkers by learning the way the 
counters move, how they interact and what constitutes victory in the game. 
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Know-how: 
Rules (2) 
Some rule- and standard-involving practices are not learnt by first learning what 
the rules and standards are, or even that there are constitutive rules and 
standards.   
 
B learns his or her first language, perhaps in this way.   
 
Full mastery requires appreciating that there are constitutive rules and standards 
and being able to change what one does in order to bring one’s activity and 
practice into conformity with them. 
 
Know-how: 
Rules (3)  
Different kinds of know-how, whilst being part-constituted by rules and 
standards, do not all share the same degree of latitude as to what it is to correctly 
follow the rules.  
 
A and B both know how to multiply and as such they will get the same answer 
when they multiply 25 x 25.  If they do not get 625, then they will have made a 
mistake.  It is part of knowing how to multiply that one appreciates there is only 
one possible answer.  
 
C and D both know how to compose for the piano in the key of B Flat.  
Exemplifications of their know-how will be quite different.   
 
E and F both know how to speak Mandarin but if given the task of describing the 
same object they may do in quite different ways.   
 
Know-how: 
1st/3rd Person 
Claims to Know-
how 
 
Knowing that someone knows how (or doesn’t know how) to do something is 
made on empirical evidence.   
 
A knows that B knows how to speak German (having heard B talking with the 
locals on holiday in Berlin); that C knows how to make jewelry (having been on 
a guided tour of C’s workshop); that D knows how to make a limited budget 
stretch (having lived with D for a week).  A knows that E doesn’t know how to 
cook having eaten numerous unpalatable meals provided by E. 
 
Knowing of oneself that one knows how to do something (or does not know how 
to do something) is not a matter of having empirical evidence.  
 
I know how to crochet, and I know that I know how to crochet, but not because I 
have gathered evidence for this in the same way as I know that A knows how to 
crochet, but not B. 
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I do not know how to speak Russian, but not because I have evidentially 
disconfirmed my putative know-how.  I do know that I don’t know how to speak 
Russian, Mandarin, juggle with 4 balls, build a suspension bridge, or play bridge. 
I know that I have not learnt these abilities, but not from empirical observation of 
myself.  
 
 
From these uncontentious reminders of some of the similarities and differences at play 
in our know-how, a number of innocuous conclusions would seem to follow.   
   
(i)  The above table suggests that any comprehensive understanding of our know-how 
is likely to require a complimentary and concomitant understanding of what it is to act 
in accordance with a rule, to be guided by a rule, to follow a rule; generally to engage 
in rule-following practices.  This points to the importance of engaging with, and 
discriminating between two quite distinct and mutually exclusive ways of 
understanding our rule-governed practices; particularly what it is to know how to 
speak a language.   
 On the one hand, there is the Chomskyan approach which pervades and 
informs not only linguistics but cognitive science and a not insubstantial amount of 
(naturalized) philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology. On this view, the rules 
which supposedly constitute our normative linguistic practices are a kind of sub-
personal tacit propositional knowledge.  We have such knowledge, but we are 
unaware of it, and it is inaccessible to reflection.  On the other hand, there is 
Wittgenstein’s understanding, which takes rules to be not explanatory hypotheses 
(possibly encoded in the mind/brain), but as guides to, and standards for, our actions; 
against which what we do may be evaluated as correct or incorrect.  In order to fulfill 
this latter role, rules are not in the head (as it were) but are constituted by and 
incarnate in our public normative linguistic practices, into which we are trained or 
inculcated. On this view, we need not first learn that such-and-such is a rule, nor need 
we have an overview of our rules, nor is there the need for rules to be considered prior 
to their successful employment, once we are masters of our first language.  It would 
be reasonable to suggest that silence about what it is to engage in rule- and standard-
constituted activities and practices is not an option for any epistemology of know-how 
which seeks to be comprehensive or valuable. 
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(ii) The extent to which knowing and learning are interconnected also emerges from 
the above table. In some instances, there is no clear demarcation between learning 
how to do something and coming to know how to do it. At what point can one be said 
to know how to read, or to play the piano?  Furthermore as one’s know-how can 
continue to evolve, there is an important sense in which learning is not just a 
preliminary to, but remains part of knowing how to do something.  This suggests that 
any comprehensive epistemology of know-how might look at the conceptual 
interdependencies between learning and knowing.  Also implicated in this nexus of 
connections are the notions of doing, practicing and experience; in light of the extent 
to which we may to know how to do something by learning through doing and 
reflecting on our experiences.  
 
(iii) The sheer diversity of examples of know-how looks to be a prima facie challenge 
to any assumption that a single example of know-how might provide a paradigm case 
on which a philosophically viable epistemology of know-how may be built.  The 
“contemptuous attitude towards the particular case” as Wittgenstein puts it (BB, 18) 
looks more than ever out of place in the area of know-how.  The importance of 
considering a substantial range of cases and looking at the particulars of each would 
appear to be unquestionable.  Similarly, the idea that that there may be one way which 
is ‘the way’ of knowing or knowing-how to do something, looks similarly incautious. 
I return to some of the previously considered points now from a slightly different 
angle, to approach to know-how via this idea of ‘ways’ of knowing. 
 
3 Know-how:  Ways of Knowing 
 
The ways in which we know how to do things appear to pick out a variety of different 
things: methods, procedures, manners, modes and styles.  Some of these cut across the 
previously articulated first and third personal conceptions of know-how.  
 
 
(See over page) 
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Table 8. 
 
Knowledge:  Ways of Knowing 
 
Ways of Knowing: 
Methods & Procedures 
 
Describability 
& Commandability 
Knowing how to do something can be a matter of knowing a way of doing 
something, where the way is a describable method or procedure.  
 
Method and procedures may be described in declarative sentences or turned 
into a set of commands or recipe-style instructions for following.  Such 
descriptions or instructions, when followed correctly help the agent, 
participant or practitioner to produce an exemplification of know-how.   
 
A may follow a set of instructions for getting to the Olympic Stadium:  Get 
on such-and-such a bus, get off at such-and-such a stop, cross over the 
bridge, turn left and carrying on walking for 100 yards.  If these 
instructions are carried out correctly, A will know how to get to the 
Stadium from where A begins.  
 
One may come to know how to get from one place to another by doing it 
successfully only once.  However, some types of know how cannot be 
achieved by a single successful exemplification.  One may read a set of 
instructions as to the method of shooting a bow and arrow at a target and in 
the first attempt to do it, hit the target.  But one successful shot is not a case 
of knowing how to be an archer.  One knows the way, one has read the 
way, one has been successful in executing the way to fire an arrow, but one 
does not yet know how to be an archer.  
 
Different descriptions or set of instructions can state a way of knowing 
how to do the same thing.   
 
Ways of Knowing: 
Methods & Procedures 
 
 
Teaching-how  
using  
Commentary-as- 
Instruction 
 
 
A person who knows how to teach someone to do something may do so 
using a set of instructions or ‘tips’ that resist translation into assertoric 
sentences, but work in tandem with exemplification or attempts at 
exemplification.  
 
A is teaching B how to do a particular exercise in the proper way. 
“Up a bit”, “Over, yes”, “Left hand in,” “Now lean.” “Feel that?” “OK”  
“And breathe…” 
 
The same words could be in a variety of instances to help someone comes 
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 to know how to do something. A might be teaching B how to grip and 
swing a golf club, or how to walk on a cat-walk, or how to diagnose 
peritonitis. 
 
Ways of Knowing: 
Methods & Procedures 
 
Indescribability 
 
 
Knowing how to do something can be a matter of a matter of knowing a 
way of doing something that is indescribable, even though there is a 
specific procedure that is being followed or pursued.  
 
A is a virtuoso violinist and knows how to identify any other of the world’s 
leading violinists within a few notes of their playing.  A does not know 
how to describe the way in which this is done.   
 
Knowing how to do something can be a matter of doing something that one 
recognises as a paradigm example of what it would be to know how to do 
something, even though neither the person doing it nor those witnessing it 
know how it is being done.   
 
An example of this is the single occasion on which Laurence Olivier gave 
his finest performance of Othello.  To all present, including Olivier, his 
performance was in a different league to anything ever achieved prior to 
that.  When he came off-stage Olivier was deeply distressed because, so the 
story goes, he knew that he’d just given one of the finest performances of 
his life, but he also knew that he didn’t know how he’d done it, or how to 
do it again.  
 
Ways of Knowing: 
Manners, Styles, Modes 
 
The ways in which one knows how to do something need not refer to either 
methods or procedures by which it is done, but to the manner, style or 
mode in which those methods or procedures are pursued or practiced. 
 
- intelligently/stupidly, 
- creatively/derivatively 
- slowly/quickly 
- stylishly/awkwardly 
- tidily/messily 
- with/without fuss  
- with/without substantial expense  
- with/without panache 
- with/without respect 
- with/without hope 
- with others/alone 
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- under duress/eagerly 
- “like that” 
 
 
 
In attempting to distinguish describable from indescribable ways of knowing, several 
difficulties are encountered: (i) identifying what might count as a full description is 
unclear, and varies on a case by case basis, (ii) the describable and indescribable 
aspects are often interwoven and (iii) ostensive definition sometimes picks out a 
method and sometimes a manner of engaging in a method.  The assumption that there 
is “a” way of knowing looks somewhat premature. 
 
4 Know-how:  Conceptual connections 
 
The final table of this chapter offers further reminders of the common ways in which 
we talk about know-how and the kinds of conceptual connections, implicatures and 
sub-text at play in our grammar and our conversations. 
 
 
Table 9. 
 
Know-how: 
Something one has  
To know how to do something is to have a kind of knowledge. 
 
Know-how is a possession.  Like a book it is something that one has, 
though, unlike a book, it is not something one owns.  Like a book it is 
something one can sell to someone else, though in so doing, one retains 
it.   One can buy someone’s know-how but in so doing one does not 
gain the know-how oneself, only the products of that know-how.  
 
Unlike with a book one can’t give one’s know-how away though one 
might pass it on or share it.  Like a book it is something one might lose, 
but not because it had been physically misplaced. 
 
Unlike possessing a book, possessing know-how is having a power or a 
potentiality. 
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Know-how: 
Being knowledgeable 
To know how to do something is to be knowledgeable. 
 
To be knowledgeable is to have the power to do something. 
 
A knows how to build a chess-playing a computer; A is very 
knowledgeable about chess-playing computers.   
 
The construction team for the Olympic venues know how to create  
world-class facilities. They are very knowledgeable.  
 
Know-how:  
Conversational Implicatures 
(1)  
In discussing, asking and enquiring about know-how a variety of 
different things can be implied by the use of the verbal phrase ‘to know 
how to…” or its cognates. 
 
A1: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium? 
B1: Yes.  You catch the number B Bus.  Get off at the S Stop opposite 
the park.  Then cross over the Br Bridge and take a left.  
 
Here AI is simultaneously(i) asking if B1 has certain information, (ii) 
telling B1 that he/she doesn’t have the information, (iii) asking if B1 is 
prepared to share the information and (iv) requesting that B1 do share 
the information.   B’s ‘Yes’ is simultaneously an answer to the 
questions (i) and (iii). B’s supply of directions is simultaneously an 
acknowledgement of (ii) and a response to (iv).   
 
After this exchange A1 now has the relevant information about the way 
to get to the Olympic Stadium from where he/she is now.  A1 knows 
how to get to the Stadium. 
 
Know-how:  
Conversational Implicatures 
(2) 
A2: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium? 
B2: Yes.  (B2 walks off.) 
 
Here A2 might be a tour guide checking amongst his party that 
everybody knows how to get where they are going, in the wake of 
instructions issued by A2 earlier.   
 
Here A2 is simultaneously, (i) asking if B2 remembers the already 
issued information, (ii) reminding B2 that the information can be 
repeated if it has been forgotten, (iii) letting B2 know that he is 
prepared to repeat the information if required, (iv) providing an 
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opportunity for B2 to request the information.  
 
Both before and after this exchange A2 and B2 know how to get to the 
Stadium. 
Know-how:  
Conversational Implicatures 
(3) 
A3: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium? 
B3: Yes.  (B walks off.) 
 
Here A3 is simultaneously (i) asking if B3 has certain information, (ii) 
telling B3 that he/she doesn’t have the information, (iii) asking if B3 is 
prepared to share the information and (iv) requesting that B3 do share 
the information.   
 
B3 misunderstands, however, thinking A3 does have the information 
and is offering to help.  As B3 does know how to get there, B3’s yes, is 
simultaneously a way of declining A3’s (mistakenly assumed) offer of 
help.   
 
The situation ends with A3 still not knowing how to get to the Stadium, 
B3 still knowing how to get there.  
 
Know-how:  
Conversational Implicatures 
(4) 
A4: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium? 
B4: Yes.  (B walks off.) 
 
Here A4 might be asking (i) asking if B4 has certain information, (ii) 
telling B4 that he/she doesn’t have the information, (iii) asking if B4 is 
prepared to share the information and (iv) requesting that B4 do share 
the information.   
 
B4 finds it amusing, however, to pretend that he has misunderstood (as 
in the A3/B3 situation).   Or perhaps B4 is simply rude.  
 
Know-how:  
Conversational Implicatures 
(5) 
A5: Do you know how to get to the Olympic Stadium? 
B5: Practice. 
 
 
This, and similar things, are know-how. 
 
* 
 
227. 
 
 
    
 
   We shall not cease from exploration  
   And the end of all our exploring  
   Will be to arrive where we started  
   And know the place for the first time. 
 
 
    (from T. S. Eliot  Four Quartets, Little Gidding) 
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